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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This monograph develops and tests a theory of student effort and school priority
setting. The key assumptions of the theory are that:
* Learning requires the time and active engagement of the learner.
* Students have many other uses for their time, so learning is costly for them.
* The intensity of their investment in learning depen s on a comparison of benefits--
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards for learning—to costs. When the benefits of learning
increase, student effort increases and learning increases.
* Parents, school administrators and teachers are also influenced by comparisons of the
benefits of learning to the costs of focusing school resources and policies on academic
achievement. When rewards for academic achievement grow for students and parents,
pressures are generated that induce teachers, administrators and school boards to
refocus their energies on raising academic achievement.
The first major prediction of the theory is that an increase in the extrinsic rewards for
learning will cause student effort and achievement to increase. The primary extrinsic reward for
achievement in high school is a higher probability of completing college. Thus the extrinsic
rewards for learning in high school depend on the size of the payoff to college and on how
contingent college admissions decisions are on achievement in high school. Time series data
suggests that changes in college selectivity and payoff may have contributed to the ups and
downs of student achievement during the postwar period. The college payoff and test scores
rose during the 1950s and peaked during the 1960s. Both series then declined during the
1970s, bottomed out around 1980, and then rose during the 1980s. The doubling of the payoff
to college during the 1980s appears to have contributed to more homework being assigned
and done and a big increase in the proportion of students taking rigorous mathematics and
science courses. Analysis of cross section data also supports a causal link. High school
students living in communities where the payoff to college is large tend to take a heavier
academic course load and are more likely to go to college.
The theory's second major prediction is that systems of regional or national
curriculum-based external examinations that signal levels of achievement in specific subjects
to colleges and employers will increase extrinsic rewards for learning and this, in turn,
stimulates changes in priorities and behavior that result in higher achievement. The rest of the
monograph is devoted to testing this prediction.
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The effects of external examination systems must be assessed by comparing
education systems, not by comparing individuals, classrooms or schools. Changes in
examination systems take decades to have their full effect. This limits the number of
independent observations and reduces the power of formal statistical tests. The low power of
individual tests can be overcome by developing multiple tests of hypotheses.
The analysis indicates that externally set curriculum-based examinations at the end of
secondary school have pervasive backwash effects on students, parents, teachers and school
administrators. Nations with curriculum-based external examinations set higher minimum
standards for entry into secondary teaching, pay their secondary school teachers more and
focus school resources primarily on teaching. Mathematics and geography achievement is also
higher in these nations. After Sweden eliminated upper secondary school exit exams during
the 1970s, the proportion of students taking rigorous college prep mathematics and science
courses declined substantially.
New York, the only the state in the U.S. with a system of curriculum based external
exams, ranks number 3 in teacher pay and the proportion of teachers with at least a masters
degree and ranks number 2 in the share of the education dollar that is spent on instruction.
The ratio of K-12 spending per pupil to public higher education spending per student is higher
than, in any other state. When adjustments are made for the ethnicity and parent's education
of SAT test takers, New York State ranks higher on the SAT than any of the other 37 states
where the SAT is taken by large numbers of students. New York State students scored 23
percent of a standard deviation higher than students of the same race and social background
in other states.
Holding the social class background of students constant, students from Canadian
provinces with examination systems were substantially (23 percent of a standard deviation)
better prepared in mathematics and 18 percent of a standard deviation better prepared in
science than students from provinces lacking such exams. The effect of an exam system on
mathematics achievement of 13 year olds is larger in a standard deviation metric than the
decline in math SAT scores between 1969 and 1980 that has been such a focus of public
concern.
The analysis also found that examination systems had pervasive effects on school
administrators, teachers and parents. In the provinces with external exams, schools were more
likely to:
-- employ specialist teachers of mathematics and science
-- employ teachers who had studied the subject in college,
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-- have high quality science laboratories
-- schedule extra hours of math and science instruction
-- assign more homework in math, in science and in other subjects
-- have students do or watch experiments in science class and
-- schedule frequent tests in math and science class.
At home students watched less TV and were more likely to report their parents wanted them to
do well in math and science. In addition, parents were more likely to talk to their child about
what they were learning at school.
There is no evidence that external exams caused any of the undesirable effects that
opponents of external exams have predicted. Canadian students in provinces with exit exams
did not watch fewer science programs on TV and reading for fun went up, not down as
predicted. Contrary to the predictions of exit exam opponents, mathematics teachers
decreased their emphasis on low level skills like computation and science teachers arranged
for students to do more, not fewer, experiments.
Only two of the testable hypotheses set forth in chapter 3 were rejected. Jurisdictions
with exit exams did not have smaller class sizes. Secondly, Canadian employers in Quebec
were not using grades on high school exit exams in their hiring process.
The final chapter of the monograph applies the theory to the task of interpreting
differences between systems of secondary education in Britain, France, the Netherlands and
the United States. In the Netherlands and France, learning in secondary school is assessed by
difficult subject-specific external examinations and doing well on these exams generates very
large rewards for the student. The reputations of teachers and schools are also affected by
student achievement on these exams. Parents base their selection of the upper secondary
school their child will attend and which academic or vocational program he/she will pursue, in
part, on these reputations. Parents tend to set difficult goals for their children, so most
students are placed in programs of study that for them are very demanding. Students are
formed into classes which take all their subjects together, remain intact for two years or more
and become the student's circle of friends. Students who are not progressing at the rate
necessary to succeed on the external exam are asked either to switch to an easier curriculum
or to repeat the year. Students do not want to be forced to sever the friendships they have
developed in the class, so they are strongly motivated to keep up with their studies.
In the United States, students are ranked relative to their classmates, not assessed
against an external criterion, so they pressure each other not to study. Teachers are expected
to pass almost all students, and if the class fails to study hard, the teacher is forced to lower
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the passing standard of the course. Subjects are taught at vastly different levels, but the rigor
of the courses and the learning achievements that result are not well signaled to parents,
neighbors, colleges and employers, so rewards for setting difficult goals are small.
The French and Dutch models of secondary education combine in one system many of
the most drastic reforms that have been proposed for the United States:
1.   Externally set subject-specific achievement exams taken by almost all secondary
school graduates which supplement not displace teacher assessment of students.
2.   Parental/student choice of upper secondary school with money following students.
3.   Mastery learning with teeth (those who fail two subjects in secondary school are
required to either repeat the grade or transfer to a less demanding school or
program).
4.   Secondary teaching is available only to those who demonstrate very high levels of
competence in their subject. High entry standards are sustained by offering high
wages and good working conditions.
5.   High standards for admission to the next stage of education.
This system of incentives and school organization appears to work for France and the
Netherlands. A similar system, lacking only the externally set exit exams, also works well in
undergraduate education in the United States. At the secondary level, however, such reforms
are controversial. Successful implementation of any one of these reforms would be a major
political undertaking? Implementation of the whole package of reforms is politically infeasible at
present. Yet the analysis suggested that when, in Britain, just two elements of the package—
mastery learning with teeth and attractive teacher salaries—are missing and a third element,
school choice, is only recently introduced, achievement levels were substantially lower than in
the Netherlands and France. Consequently, from a practical policy point of view the message
is not very positive. School climates and educational standards do not change rapidly and
easily. France and the Netherlands have not discovered a cheap and painless route to high
achievement.
The important lesson is that incentives—both their strength and structure—matter.
There are less controversial ways of increasing the rewards for academic achievement.
Reforms tailored to the American context have a greater chance of success than an effort to
replicate the French or Dutch systems of secondary education.
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INTRODUCTION
Many countries have recently implemented changes in their curriculum-based
examination systems. The English have merged the old Certificate of Secondary Education
(CSE) and the O level exams into the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE).
France has broadened the list of Baccalaureate Examinations to include numerous vocational
specialties and has set a goal of 80 percent of the age cohort participating by the year 2000.
The Brevet exam at the end of lower secondary school, which had been abolished in 1977,
was re-introduced in 1986. "The reasons were that the results had been eclining in the
experience of many people...(Kreeft 1990 p. 6)." The Canadian provinces of Manitoba and
Saskatchewan have recently reestablished curriculum-based examinations that had been
discontinued in the early 1970s.
Proposals to create or expand curriculum-based exams are central to the policy debate
in the United States. The Education Subcouncil of the Competitiveness Policy Council (a
nonpartisan group appointed by the President and congressional leaders) recently concluded
that:
Working hard and achieving in school must count for them [students], too. And
presently, high school students who plan to go on to college do not need to work hard
and get good grades in order to achieve their goal. Except for the tiny percentage of
kids who want to go to selective colleges, students know that, no matter how poor their
grades, they will be able to find a college that will accept them. If most colleges
continue to admit students who have done little work in high school, there is no reason
to expect any change in student behavior.
The vast majority of employers give exactly the same message to students going
directly from high school to work: What you did in high school does not count... Hard
working kids do not...have an edge since few employers ever inquire about what
courses a young applicant took or ask to see a transcript (March 1993, p. 30).
Their recommended solution was that "ex ernal assessments be given to individual students at
the secondary level and that the results should be a major but not exclusive factor qualifying
-for college and better jobs at better wages (1993, p. 30)."
The Commission on Workforce Quality and Labor Market Efficiency advocated similar
reforms:
The business community should ...show through their hiring and promotion decisions
that academic achievements will be rewarded (1989, p. 9).
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National educational and employer associations should work together to develop easily
understood transcripts, based on voluntary achievement testing programs, that assess
student proficiency in a wide variety of academic and vocational areas (1989, p. 12).
The American Federation of Teachers advocates developing a system in which:
Students are periodically tested on whether they're reaching the standards, and if they
are not, the system responds with appropriate assistance and intervention. Until they
meet the standards, they won't be able to graduate from high school or enter college
...The curriculum that teachers use are based on the standards and so are the
assessments...professional development programs are focused on preparing teachers
to help students meet the standards- nd textbooks and other instructional materials
are tailored to the content of the curriculum frameworks (AFT 1995 p. 1-2).
The theory that lies behind these policy recommendations can be stated very simply.
Learning is not a passive act; it requires the time and active engagement of the learner.
Students have many other uses for their time, so learning is costly for them. The intensity of
their investment in learning depends on a comparison of benefits—intrinsic and extrinsic
rewards for learning—to costs. When the benefits of learning increase, student effort
increases and learning increases. Parents, school administrators and teachers are also
influenced by comparisons of the benefits of learning to the costs of focusing school resources
and policies on academic achievement. When rewards for academic achievement grow for
students and parents, pressures are generated that induce teachers, administrators and
school boards to refocus their energies on raising academic achievement.
Systems of regional or national curriculum-based examinations in secondary school
that signal levels of achievement in specific subjects to colleges and employers transform the
incentive environment of students, parents, teachers and school administrators and this
stimulates changes in priorities and behavior that in turn result in higher achievement in
examined subjects.
The policy debate is filled with claims about the effects of exam systems, but there is
little solid empirical research on how they effect school policies, teaching and student learning.
This monograph begins the process of filling this gap in our knowledge. It proceeds as follows.
Chapter 1 provides a formal mathematical presentation of the simple economic theory of
learning and school priority setting summarized in the two previous paragraphs. Readers who
are uncomfortable with mathematical models may want to skim or skip over the mathematics.
Such readers are encouraged, however, to read as much of the text in the chapter as possible
and to look ahead at chapter 3 where the theory is presented in an informal manner with lots of
examples and illustrations from American schools.
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The theory assumes that student effort and school priority setting respond positively to
increases in the economic payoff to learning and to obtaining a college degree. Chapter 2
presents a number of tests of this assumption of the theory.
According to our theory, curriculum based external examinations increase the
pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards for study and this, in turn, induces students to study
harder and school to refocus priorities on academic achievement. Chapter 3 offers a non-
mathematical explanation of the theory together with examples of its operation taken from
American experience. Sixteen hypotheses about the impacts of curriculum-based external
exams are specified, many of which are tested later in the monograph.
The effects of external examination systems must be assessed by comparing
education systems, not by comparing individuals, classrooms or schools. This limits the
number of independent observations and reduces the power of formal statistical tests. The low
power of individual tests will be overcome by developing multiple tests of hypotheses.
International comparative data on spending and learning outcomes is used in chapter 4 to test
for impacts of curriculum based external exams. As predicted countries with end of school
examination systems invest more in their secondary schools and achievement in examination
subjects tends to be higher.
Chapter 5 compares New York, the only state in the U.S. with curriculum based
external exams, to the rest of the nation and again finds support for the hypothesis. Chapter 6
compares Canadian provinces with curriculum based external examinations to provinces
lacking such systems. Here again the students in provinces with exams outperform the
students who live in provinces without them. Schools in provinces with exit exams hire better
trained specialist teachers, have better science facilities and schedule more class time for
mathematics and science.
Chapter 7 applies the theory to the task of explaining and interpreting differences in
student achievement among France, England, Scotland, the Netherlands and the United
States. The lag of England and Scotland behind France and the Netherlands cannot be
explained by differences in examination systems, so other causes are explored.
The monograph concludes with a summary and suggestions for future research.
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I. AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE EFFECTS OF
PEER PRESSURE AND REWARDS FOR LEARNING ON
SCHOOL PRIORITIES, STUDENT EFFORT AND ACHIEVEMENT
Much of the economic research on elementary and secondary education has employed
a production function paradigm. Conventionally, test scores measuring academic achievement
are the outputs, teachers are the labor input and students are goods in process.
This monograph points in a different direction. Schools are viewed as worker managed
organizations producing multiple outputs. In the classroom/school team production unit,
students are as much workers as the teachers. Students are also consumers who choose
which goals (outputs) to focus on and how much effort to put into each goal. The behavior of
each of the system's actors (teachers, administrators, school board, students and parents)
depends on the incentives facing them. The incentives, in turn, depend upon the cost and
reliability of the information (signals) that are generated about the various outputs of the
system.
In order to focus attention on the essence of the problem a very simple theoretical
model containing just 6 equations is developed below. The six equations are: an achievement
function, a rewards for achievement function, equations for the benefits and costs of student
effort and for the benefits and costs of school inputs focused on academic achievement.
The Achievement Function
Learning is a change that takes place in a person. It occurs when an individual who is
ready and able to learn, is offered an opportunity to learn and makes the effort to learn. All
three elements are essential.
Learning readiness and ability—indexed by A—depends on prior learning, intelligence
and family background.  A is exogenous (i.e. determined outside the model).
While, in principle, every literate individual with access to a library has the opportunity
to learn, schools and teachers have, in practice, a great deal of influence on what youngsters
learn and at what pace. Educators determine what courses are required, which electives are
offered, the topics covered, teaching methods, homework and paper assignments and
classroom expectations. In our model opportunity to learn is operationalized as school quality
or QX. School quality is the product of two variables, one exogenous, the other endogenous
(i.e. determined within the model).  X is a composite index of the teacher behaviors, school
inputs and policies fostering academic achievement that are controlled by educators and their
political supervisors. X is the teacher and/or school administrator's choice variable. Q is an
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exogenous efficiency index measuring how effective X, th chosen school inputs and policies,
are at improving student achievement. Q can also be viewed as an index of the teaching
technology available to the educators.
While facilitating learning is the primary purpose of American schools, other goals
compete for school resources and administrative attention. Among the other goals are child
care, improved health and nutrition, discouraging drug use, student self esteem, community
service, opportunities for physical exercise, equalizing opportunities and/or outcomes,
achieving racial balance in school populations and community entertainment (e.g. band and
interscholastic sports). Consequently, X should not be confused with per pupil expenditure.
The model is designed to explain the priority that schools give to academic learning as a goal,
not school spending.
The part of the learning equation controlled by the student is effort (E). Students
choose which courses to take and how much effort to devote to each course. Classroom
observational studies have found that the time engaged in learning is considerably less than
the time available for learning and that time on task varies a great deal across students and
across classrooms (Frederick 1977, Frederick, Walberg and Rasher 1979). Time devoted to
homework also varies a great deal. In 1990, 33 percent of 17 year olds reported doing two or
more hours of homework each night, while another 15 percent reported not being assigned
homework or not doing the homework assigned (NCES 1993 p. 352).
Just as important as the time devoted to learning is the intensity of the student's
engagement in the process. Sizer (1984) concluded, "No more important finding has emerged
from the inquiries of our study than that the American high school student, as student, i all too
often docile, compliant, and without initiative" (p. 54).
Student-teacher ratios of 17 to 1 imply that, in the aggregate, students spend nearly 17
times as many hours learning as teachers spend teaching. Student time and engagement is,
therefore, probably the most important input in the educational process.
All of these factors are summarized in the simple equation:
(1) Human Capital at the end of secondary school = L = AEa(QX)b a + b < 1
where E = Student Effort—an index of the time and psychic energy that students devote to
                   learning
X = A composite index of inputs and policies that foster academic achievement.
Q = Efficiency Factor for X, the School Inputs Index.
a = elasticity of human capital (L) with respect to Effort
Curriculum-Based External Examinations WP 95-30
Page 12
b = elasticity of human capital (L) with respect to School Academic Quality (QX)
I have assumed the human capital production function is Cobb-Douglas with a + b < 1. This
gives the model a number of realistic features.
(a) School quality and student effort interact positively. An improvement in teacher quality
enhances the effect of greater student effort and vice versa.
(b) A 20 percent increase in both effort (E) and school quality (QX) increases human
capital (L) by less than 20 percent.
The Extrinsic Rewards for Achievement Function
(2) Present Discounted Value of Pecuniary and other External Rewards for Achievement = Y =
wL + q(L-Lm) + lA
where w = the impact of absolute levels of achievement (human capital) at the end of
       secondary school on the present discounted value of lifetime earnings and other
       extrinsic rewards for learning. It includes the effects of secondary school learning
       that operate through admission to preferred colleges, completing college,
       successful pursuit of lucrative but difficult majors such as engineering, entry into
       and completion of graduate programs. It also includes the benefits that parents
       derive from the economic success of their children and the honor and prestige
       given to those who are seen as high achievers. Curriculum based external
       examinations increase w, the payoff to absolute achievement, and tend to reduce
q,
       the payoff to one's relative position (rank) in the secondary school's graduating
       class and l, the payoff to IQ and family background.
L-Lm = Student achievement relative to the school mean (Lm). Rank in class and
grades awarded on a curve are examples of signals of achievement that
describe the student's achievement relative to others in the school.
q = the impact of achievement relative to the school mean on the present discounted
      value of lifetime earnings and other extrinsic rewards for learning (includes impacts
      on admission to preferred colleges and the benefits that parents derive from the
      success of their children).
a = the impact of A (i.e. early IQ, early achievement and family background) on the
       present discounted value of lifetime earnings. l would be large and w and q small
if
       access to college depended solely on family background and IQ test scores
       obtained prior to entering secondary school. The SAT is not a pure IQ test, but
       relative to curriculum based exams it is at the aptitude end of the spectrum.
       Consequently, substituting curriculum based exams for the SAT in university
       admissions decisions would lower X and raise w. Since A is exogenous, changes
in
                    a do not effect student incentives to study or community incentives to invest in
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                  secondary schools.
It is important to note that the specification implies that studying by one student
imposes costs on other students. Greater achievement for person 'i' increases school mean
achievement, Lm, and lowers everyone else's position relative to the mean (e.g. rank in class).
In fact the loss that others experience when person 'i' tries harder is exactly equal to q(L-Lm),
the gain person 'i' experiences from raising her achievement relative to the school mean. If, for
example, there are 200 students in the graduating class, a one-unit increase in Li for person 'i'
raises Lm by .005. This lowers the benefits that each of the 199 other students get from the
second term of equation 2 by .005*q.
Choosing Learning Effort
The student is not just another input into an educational process that is controlled and
directed by others. Rather, students are more appropriately viewed as entrepreneurs trying to
grow and develop in an environment shaped by a great variety of forces: history, parents,
teachers, peers, employers, government, society, and their own abilities. Students generally,
and secondary school students especially, should be viewed as choosing what to study and
how hard to work at learning it.
When making these choices the student compares expected benefits to expected
costs. The benefits are both extrinsic (Y) and intrinsic (j)—the joy of learning for its own sake
and the honor and respect that parents and teachers give for achievement.
Student and Parent Benefits of Effort Equation
(3) Student and Parent Benefits of Effort = B = (w + q + j) [AEa (QX)b]
where j = the present discounted value of the intrinsic non-pecu iary benefits, joy, of learning
     received by the student and her parents. Note that these benefits are assumed to
                occur regardless of whether the learning is signaled to others or honored publicly.
Student and Parent Costs of Effort Equation
The costs are time, psychic energy, money for tuition and books, loss of control over
one's in-class time and, frequently, peer pressure against learning.
(4) Costs of Student Effort = C = C0 E
h + ciqL
where C0 E
h = the costs that arise from giving up other more pleasurable activities when time
and energy are devoted to learning.
h = the elasticity of this cost with respect to effort. h > 1 because the marginal cost of
       effort rises as effort increases.
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ciqL = the costs of effort that result from the fear that one's classmates will think you
are
           a "nerd...teachers pet...or acting white." When ci = 1, the anti nerd pressure
           against academic effort exactly offsets the losses that trying harder imposes on
           others q(L-Lm) because greater achievement for person 'i' increases school
           mean achievement, Lm and lowers everyone else's position relative to the mean
           (e.g. rank in class). If ci > 1, anti-nerd peer pressure imposes larger costs on the
           studious than they impose on their classmates.
Community Benefits of Giving Academics High Priority Equation
Communities similarly base their choices about spending and priorities on a
comparison of benefits and costs. Community decisions about school spending and the priority
attached to learning are motivated by benefits that students get from general improvements in
the their academic achievement, w and j.
(5) Community Benefits of Giving Academic Achievement Top Priority = BP =
p(wm + jm)[A
m Em
a (QX)b]
where p = a parameter characterizing the political power of parents in school board elections
                  and the benefits that non-parents get from greater achievement.
wm = the average impact of absolute levels of achievement (human capital) on the
         extrinsic benefits of learning (includes impacts on admission to preferred colleges
         and the benefits that parents derive from the economic success of their children).
jm = the average present discounted value of the non-pecu iary benefits, joy, of
learning
       received by students and parents.
Note how q, the benefit of improving one's ranking relative to school mean achievement, does
not appear in the equation describing community benefits of greater learning.
Cost of School Inputs Equation
(6) Cost of school inputs & policies devoted to academic achievement = D = D0X
g
where g = The elasticity of the costs of school inputs with respect to increases in Xg > 1.
Determining Student Effort
To study the determinants of student effort, we define a net benefits of study effort
equation, B-C, by subtracting eq. 4 from eq. 3, and then obtain the maximum of the function by
differentiating it with respect to E, effort.
(7) max B-C = (w + q + j) [AEa (QX)b] - [C0Eh + c1qL]
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The derivative of (6) with respect to E for the average student is:
8) d(B-C) = a(w + q + j) [AEa-1 (QX)b] - hC0Eh
-1 - ac1q[AEa
-1(QX)b] = 0
   dE
The third term is combined with the first.
9)        = a[w + j + (1-c1)q)]*[AEa
-1 (QX)b] - hC0Eh
-1 = 0
10) Eh-1 / Ea-1 = Eh-a =  a   [w + j +(1-c1)q)]*[A(QX) b]
     hC0
11) E = { [a/hC0]*[w + j + (1-c1) q]*[A(QX) b] }
1/(h-a)
Determining Community Investment in School Quality
We determine the community's investment in school quality by subtracting the costs of
that investment, eq. 6, from its benefits, eq. 5, and then determining the maximum for the
function by differentiating with respect to X.
12) BP-D = p(wm + jm) [AEm
a (QX)b] - D0Xg
13) d(BP-D) = bp(wm + jm)[AEma Qb Xb-1] - gD0Xg-1 = 0
    dX
14) X = { [b/gD0](pwm + pjm)[ AEma Qb] }1/(g-b )
The Effects of Pecuniary Rewards on Effort
What does this model tell us will happen to effort, the school input index and
achievement when curriculum based external exams are introduced. Curriculum based exams
cause an increase in w, the extrinsic reward for absolute achievement. The effect of an
increase in w can be determined by differentiating eq. 11 and eq. 14 with respect to w.
15) dE =                1                E > 0
dw (h-a)[w + j + (1-c1)q]
16) dX =             1         X > 0
dw (g-b)[wm + jm]
Employing the chain rule, we differentiate L with respect to w.
17) dL = dL dE + dL dX  =            aL                +              bL                  > 0
dw   dE dw   dX dw     (h-a)[w + j + (1-c1)q]        (g-b)[wm + jm]
Curriculum-Based External Examinations WP 95-30
Page 16
The model clearly predicts that a rise in the economic payoff to the absolute level of
human capital (L) at the end of high school from whatever cause—technical change, shifts in
college admissions policies or establishing a system of curriculum based examinations—will
have substantial positive effects on student effort, student learning and inputs devoted to
raising academic achievement. The impact of economic rewards is largest when nonpecu iary
motives are less important than pecuniary motives (i.e. j is considerably smaller than w), when
anti-nerd peer pressure is strong (e.g. c1 > 1), when the elasticities of learning with respect to
effort (a) and school inputs (b) are substantial, and when the marginal cost curves for E and X
are flat (e.g. h and g are close to 1).
Curriculum based external exams (CBEEs) increase w, the pecuniary rewards for
absolute levels of academic achievement, in two ways. First, they improve the signals of high
school achievement available to colleges and employers and thus cause the these institutions
to give greater weight to high school achievement when they make admissions and hiring
decisions. In the process their decisions become less sensitive to other factors such as
aptitude tests like the SAT, family connections, racial and religious stereotypes, and
recommendations of a previous employers and the chemistry of 20 minute interviews. Total
extrinsic rewards for achievement will doubtless rise, d(w+q)/d(CBEE) < 0.
Second, curriculum based external examinations can be expected to shift attention and
rewards from measures of relative achievement such as rank in class and teacher grades to
measures of absolute achievement (e.g. grades on the external exam). In mathematical terms,
dw/d(CBEE) > 0 probably implies a dq /d(CBEE) <0. The decline in q does not influence
school priority decisions because q does not appear in the equations describing the benefits
and costs of X, school inputs. The likely decline in rewards for relative achievement has an
ambiguous effect on student effort. The equation for this impact is:
18) dE  =                1-c1               E< / >
dq        (h-a)[w + j + (1-c1) q]
Since c1 is positive, equation 18 is always less positive than equation 15. Thus, in the unlikely
event that a curriculum based exam decreased q by the same amount it increased w, student
effort would increase because peer pressure against studying would decrease. The positive c1
reflects the fact that anti- erd peer pressure against studying is caused in part by institutions
that reward relative rather than absolute achievement. When one student's success comes at
the expense of other students, students as a group pressure their classmates to be
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uncompetitive. If peer pressure is so strong that it outweighs the pecuniary benefits that
students expect from being ranked at the top of the class, c1 > 1 and a reduction in these
rewards (q) will increase student effort.
During the last 15 years the payoff to college attendance has doubled. The wage
reward for mathematics achievement also doubled for males and increased 25 percent for
females between 1978 and 1986. These facts imply that w increased significantly during this
period. The model predicts that this should have caused teachers and administrators to place
higher priority on fostering academic achievement and induced students to study harder and
learn more. These hypotheses are tested in chapter II.
Chapter III provides a thorough discussion of why curriculum based external
examinations increase extrinsic payoffs for academic achievement and thus induce changes in
the behavior of students, parents and educators. These hypotheses are then tested in
chapters IV through VI.
II. THE IMPACT OF THE PAYOFF TO COLLEGE AND
THE SELECTIVITY OF COLLEGE ADMISSIONS ON
EFFORT AND ACHIEVEMENT IN HIGH SCHOOL
It is well established that the pecuniary payoff to college has substantial effects on the
proportion of high school graduates who enter and complete college (Freeman 1975, 1976b,
Bishop 1977, 1990). Studies have also found that the choice of undergraduate and graduate
fields of study respond rapidly to changes in the labor market payoff to different fields of study
(Freeman 1971, 1976a). What impacts do the payoff to college have on study effort and
achievement in high school?
Academic achievement in high school has important effects on the probability of
attending college, the quality of college attended and the probability of completing college.
Consequently, the selectivity of college admissions decisions and the payoff to the college
degree are primary determinants of w, the extrinsic rewards to studying in high school. For
those not planning to go to college, better jobs are the relevant pecuniary inducement for study
in high school. The theory presented in the previous chapter, therefore, predicts that the
dramatic rise during the 1980s in the payoff to college and to mathematics achievement of
high school graduates who did not go to college should have stimulated schools to set higher
standards and induced students to study harder. This in turn should have increased
achievement. These hypotheses are tested in time series and cross section data in this
chapter.
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2.1--Evidence from Aggregate Time Series Data
In this section we will review how the rewards for learning in high school have evolved
during the last 60 years. Three indicators of these rewards are examined:
*  The wage payoff to academic achievement for those who do not go to college.
*  The impact of academic achievement on the probability of college attendance.
*  The payoff to completing a bachelors degree.
Trends in the Payoff to Academic Achievement
Holding Years of Schooling Constant
In the United States, reading and mathematics skills have historically not had large
effects on the wage rates of young workers who have not gone to college (Bishop 1985). Even
so, the payoffs to these skills appeared to decline during late 1960s and early 1970s. The
threat of litigation brought under the 1971 Griggs interpretation of Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1965 induced many employers to stop using tests assessing reading and mathematics to
help in the selection of new employees (Friedman and Williams 1982). As a result, during the
1970s young high school graduates who had learned English, science and mathematics
thoroughly typically did not earn appreciably more than the high school graduates who had
done poorly in these subjects (Bishop 1985, 1989, 1993). Since individuals who have strong
mathematics skills and good grades in high school are better employees, their greater
productivity is eventually recognized and rewarded by employers. It often takes more than a
decade, however (Grubb 1994, Bishop 1989). Thus non-college bound students who work
hard in high school must wait many years to reap any rewards. When they do appear, the
rewards—a 2 to 3 % increase in earnings per grade level equivalent on achievement tests—
are not a very strong incentive for hard study. Even for adults the wage rate rewards of
learning are smaller than the actual gain in productivity that result (Bishop 1987, 1993).
The environment changed somewhat during the 1980s and 90s. The economy was
being transformed by the spread of the personal computer and the introduction of high
performance work systems empowering front line workers to take over functions previously
performed by engineers and managers. Court actions such as the Wards Cove decision made
it easier to defend using reading and mathematics tests as part of a selection process. A
number of employers reintroduced basic skills tests into their selection procedures for clerical
and factory jobs. A 1985 American Society for Personnel Administration survey (BNA 1986)
found that 24 percent of the firms responding had increased testing in the past year and
another 44 percent were considering an increase in the amount of testing they do. Employers
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now appear to be paying more attention to the academic qualifications and, as a result, the
labor market rewards for mathematical ability of young workers have risen. Murnane, Willett
and Levy (1994) found that the effect of a one standard deviation increase in mathematics
skills on the wage rates of 24 year old men rose from $0.46 per hour in 1978 to $1.15 per hour
in 1986. The wage payoff for young women rose from $1.15 per hour to 1.42 per hour in 1986.
Trends in College Admissions Selectivity
During the 1920s need based scholarships were rare and social class was the primary
determinant of who went to college. Achievement in high school had little effect on who went
to college. Those who entered college in 1925 were on average at the 53rd percentile of ability
among high school graduates. Those who did not enter college were at the 47th percentile on
average; a gap of only 6 points (Taubman and Wales 1972).
In the decades that followed academic achievement in high school became a
substantially more important determinant of college entry. The percentile gap between college
entrants and high school graduates not going to college rose to 11 points in 1929, 15 points in
1934, 20 points in 1946, 19 points in 1950, 22 points in 1957, 27 points in 196061 (Taubman
and Wales 1972). By 1960 achievement had larger effects on college entry probabilities than
social class (Bishop 1977).
In order to examine what has happened since 1960, the calculations made by
Taubman and Wales were replicated in two more recent nationally representative longitudinal
studies of high school seniors—National Longitudinal Survey: Class of 72, and High School
and Beyond (1980 graduates). Rates of college entrance for the year following graduation
were calculated for each quartile of the ability distribution. The relationship between college
entrance rates and a student's ability ranking was approximated by a series of linear segments
and mean ability rankings were calculated for college entrants and for non-college going high
school graduates.
The trend toward growing academic selectivity of college enrollment reversed during
the 1960s and early 1970s. A large number of 2-year colleges with open admissions policies
were founded during this period and males flooded into colleges to postpone being drafted.
The class rank gap between those who do and do not attend college fell from 27 percentile
points in 1960-61 to 22 points in 1972 (calculated from data in Gardner 1987; Bishop 1991).
The correlation between test scores and college attendance 18 months after graduating from
high school fell from .458 for 1961 graduates to .399 for 1972 graduates (Bishop 1991).
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After 1972 the trend reversed once again. The class rank gap rose to 25 points by
1980 and the correlation between test scores and college attendance rose to .442 (Jackson
1988). A 1985 survey of 2203 college admissions directors allows us to track admissions
selectivity between 1980 and 1985. Only 2 percent of the institutions reported they had
become less selective during that period. The proportion reporting they had become more
selective, on the other hand, was 42 percent at four-year private colleges, 49 percent at four-
year public colleges and 8 percent at two-year public colleges (Breland, wilder and Robertson
1986). Later surveys of college admissions officers indicate that the rigor of the courses taken
in high school has become an increasingly important admissions criterion and reliance on the
SAT has decreased.
In summary, the dependence of college entry on achievement in high school appears
to have grown over the course of the last 70 years. It rose dramatically from 1925 to 1960, fell
back for about 15 years and then resumed its rise in the late 1970s.
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Trends in the Payoff to College
The wage premium received by those with a college education has varied a great deal
over the course of the last 65 years. The ratio of the weekly earnings of five high level
professional occupations to the weekly earnings of manufacturing production workers fell
substantially during the depression and World War II from 3.3 in 1929, to 2.88 in 1939 and
2.46 in 1950 (Bureau of the Census 1975, D804, D913- 6, D920; Bishop 1991).
Professional wages then rebounded and the ratio rose to 2.9 in 1964.
Decennial census data on the payoff to college exhibit a similar pattern. The ratio of the
incomes of 25 to 35 year old white males with four or more years of college to the incomes of
20 to 29 year old high school graduates was 1.99 in 1939, 1.45 in 1949, 1.68 in 1959 and 1.76
in 1969 (Marenbach 1973, 89-90, see figure 1).
Figure 1 also presents Katz and Murphy's estimates of college/high school weekly
earnings ratio for workers with less than 5 years of post-sch ol work experience. Their
carefully constructed series indicates that the wage premium for college degree holders with
under 5 years of work experience fell from 51 percent in 1963-64 to 44 percent in 1979-80 and
then rose to 84 percent in 1988. The payoff to obtaining an associates degree has also
increased substantially during the 1980s and 90s.
Test Score Trends—1918  to 1980
Despite significant increases in the share of the age cohort in school, test scores of
school children rose during the period between 1920 and 1940. A study of the school children
of eastern Tennessee found that 7th and 8th graders improved by two-thirds of a standard
deviation on paper and pencil IQ tests between 1930 and 1940)(Wheeler, 1942). A study of
two high schools in the midwest found no change in the mean IQ test score of the students at
a small rural high school and a 5 point increase between 1923 and 1942 at a large high school
serving a small city and the surrounding county (Finch, 1946). Johnson (1935) found a 3 point
gain in IQ test scores between 1925 and 1935 at Grover Cleveland High School in St. Louis.
Roessel's (1937) comparison of the students in three Minnesota high schools in 1920 and
1934 and Rundquist's (1936) comparison of Minneapolis high school students in 1929 and
1934 both found increases in test scores. World War II draftees had IQ test scores more than
two thirds of a standard deviation higher than World War I draftees (Tuddenham 1948; Flynn
1984).
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For the post-WWII era, the best data on trends in the academic achievement of
students nearing completion of secondary schooling comes from the Iowa Test of Educational
Development (ITED). This data set is particularly valuable because it provides equated data
extending back to 1942 and annual data from 1960 to the present. Because about 95 percent
of the public and private schools in the state of Iowa regularly participated in the testing
program, the analyses of trends in ITED data for Iowa is not plagued by changing selectivity of
the population taking the test. This feature of the data makes ITED trends for Iowa a better
representation of national trends prior to 1970 than the ACT, the SAT, and the American
Council on Education Psychological Exam. These other tests were taken at first by a highly
selected group of students and only more recently by more representative samples of college
bound students, so trends in scores on these tests are biased by the decreasing selectivity of
those who took the test.
Figure 1 plots the trends of ITED composite scores for Iowa 11th and 12th graders.
Through 1965 the trend was up: at first moderately so, and then dramatically after Sputnik
(Forsyth, 1987; A. N. Hieronymus, E. F. Lindquist and H. D. Hoover, 1979). The gains for 12th
graders between 1942 and 1966 are all the more remarkable for they coincide with an increase
in the high school graduation rate in Iowa from 65 percent in 1941 to 88 percent in 1968. Other
tests that have been administered for long spans of time to stable test-taking populations also
exhibit a positive trend during this period (Farr and Fey 1982). Between 1958 and 1966
Minnesota high school juniors gained .39 SDs on the Minnesota Scholastic Aptitude Test
(Swanson, 1973). The periodic national standardizations of the ITED also exhibit an increase
during the 1960s (Koretz 1986).
In 1966 the educational achievement of high school students stopped rising and began
a decline that lasted about 13 years. On the ITED the composite scores of Iowa 9th graders
dropped .283 SDs and the scores of seniors dropped .35 SDs or about 1.25 grade level
equivalents. Comparable declines occurred throughout the country and for upper elementary
and junior high school students as well. The bottom was reached around 1980.
The Response of Effort to the Rising Payoff to Learning since 1980
The increase in rewards for achievement during the last 15 years appears to have
helped cause a rise in standards and in student study effort. Many states established minimum
competency tests for graduation and increased the number of mathematics and science
courses required for graduation. Homework assigned and completed has increased. The
percentage of 13 year olds reporting they either had no homework or did not do it fell from 33
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percent in 1982 to 9 percent in 1990. The percentage of 17 year olds reporting they did at
least one hour of homework each day rose from 32.5 percent in 1978 to 66 percent in 1990
(NCES 1993 p. 122, 351). High school graduation rates are creeping up. Students are taking
more rigorous courses. Between 1982 and 1990 enrollment shares rose 20 percentage points
for Geometry, 14 points for Algebra II, 19 points for Chemistry and 8 points for Physics (NCES
1993 p. 68). The number of students taking AP exams has tripled.
Test Score Trends since 1980
Around 1980 the test scores of Iowa high school students began to rise again. By 1988
Iowa 12th graders had recouped about three-quarters of their previous decline and ninth
graders had surpassed their 1965 record by almost two-fifths of a grade level equivalent. SAT
and ACT scores have risen as well though at a slower rate because of increases during the
1980s in the proportion of high school graduates taking these tests.
Between 1982 and 1992 NAEP mathematics and science scores at age 17 rose more
than a grade level equivalent. Grade level equivalents on the NAEP IRT scale sores can be
calculated by dividing the difference between the scores of 17 year old students and 13 year
old students by four. Using this simple approach we can see that a GLE is 8.5 points on the
NAEP mathematics scale, 9 points on the NAEP science scale and 7.5 points on the NAEP
reading scale (Mullis, et al. 1994). Mathematics scores of 17 year olds rose 1.06 GLEs (9
points) and science scores rose 1.22 GLEs (11 points). Reading scores have risen .53 GLEs
since 1980. These gains have been accomplished despite significant growth in the share of
students who are from minority and disadvantaged backgrounds. Between 1977 and 1990, the
black and Hispanic share of NAEP test takers rose from 16 to 23 percent. The achievement of
minority students improved by roughly 2 grade level equivalents between 1980-82 and 1992.
Comparing Trends
The time-series data for the postwar period apper to suggest that changes in the
economic payoff to college may influence the academic achievement of students in high
school. Both the college payoff and test scores rose during the 1950s and peaked during the
1960s. The two series then decline together and starting in 1979-80 they start up together.
When the average 11th and 12th grade ITED test score is regressed on the logarithm of the
current college graduate/high school graduate weekly earnings ratio and a trend, one obtains
the following results:
ITEDAV =  22.07 + 1.41*log(CollegeWage/HSWage)  -.0114*Year R2 = .78
      (5.56)   (7.92)      (3.70)           1966-1987
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The results suggest that the decline in the payoff to college between 1969 and 1979 lowered
test scores by 15 percent of a standard deviation (about half the total decline in academic
achievement at the end of high school) and the rise between 1979 and 1987 raised test scores
by 29 percent of a standard deviation. Further support for the hypothesis comes from the fact
that categories of students who have higher than average probabilities of attending college—
white students, suburban students and college going students—experienced larger than
average test score declines between 1966 and 1979 (Koretz 1989).
If the model is expanded to incorporate changes in college selectivity, it can also
explain rising test scores during the 1920s and 1930s. On the surface, the declining payoff to
college during that period appears to be inconsistent with our theory. However, the growing
impact of high school achievement on college attendance means that the expected payoff to
such achievement (payoff times the impact of a one standard deviation test score differential
on college entrance) rose substantially. Using the wage premium of professionals over
manufacturing workers as our indicator of the payoff to a college degree, the expected payoff
to a one SD differential in achievement was 12.4 percent in 1924, 22.7 percent in 1929, 29.1
percent in 1939 and 24.9 percent in 1949. Only the 1940s creates problems for the theory.
During the 1940s test scores rose despite declines in the payoff to college and expected
payoff to learning in high school.
There may, however, be other explanations for the post 1966 test score decline and
rebound during the 1980s. Graduation requirements and teacher expectations appear to have
followed the same cycle. While the theory explains these changes in expectations and school
policies as responses to shifts in economic payoffs, others might argue the causes lie
elsewhere. As a result, the examination of aggregate time series data for just one country can
never be completely decisive evidence for our hypothesis or indeed any hypothesis. The data
provides just too few degrees of freedom. Other types of data need to be examined. We turn
now to tests of the economic payoff hypothesis in cross section data.
2.2--Cross Section Evidence
Cross section data provide a second opportunity to examine how the college payoff
influences the behavior of high school students. There is spatial variation in the future payoffs
to college education so, if most young people intend to remain in the local labor market after
school, one would expect geographic differentials in the payoff to effect (a) the number of
college prep courses taken in high school, (b) the time spent studying and (c) the probability of
attending college. In previous work I have found that a rather crude measure of the college
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payoff—the average differential between accountant's, teacher's and engineer's wages and
operative wages—had significant positive effects on the college attendance rates of most
students in the top 75 percent of the ability distribution (Bishop 1977).
Table 1 presents linear regression estimates of the effect of college payoff, academic
orientation of courses and study time on the subsequent college attendance of 27,046 high
school juniors at Project Talent high schools in 1960. Separate models were estimated for
students categorized by family income. The control variables included in the regression are
listed at the bottom of the table. Academic orientation of courses had substantial positive
effects on college attendance and hours of study had modest positive effects.
Table 1
Determinants of College Entrance
Lower Upper
Middle Middle Middle High
Independent Var. Poverty Income Income Income Income
College Payoff .080*** .054*** .036*** -.033* -.018
(SD = $570)                        (2.86)             (3.44) (2.89) (1.83) (1.14)
Academic Orientation .163*** .201*** .256*** .227*** .227
(7.58) (16.16) (24.33) (14.54) (15.87)
Hours of Study .092*** .043*** .116*** .057*** -.022
(SD = 5.5 hrs) (4.59) (3.96) (12.64) (4.16) (.12)
R2 .224 .273 .307 .288 .272
Number Observations 2320 6538 8766 4309 5113
                                                                                                                                        
Standardized regression coefficients with t statistics in parenthesis under the coefficient. The
coefficient on the payoff variable represents the effect of a $570 increase in the difference
between professionals and operatives at a time (1959) when mean earnings of male high
school graduates 25 to 64 years old was $6132. The coefficient on the study hours per week
variable represents the effect of a 5.5 hour increase in reported study time. Mean hours of
reported study time including study halls was about 9 hours.
*** p < .01 on a two tail test.
 ** p < .05 on a two tail test.
* p < .10 on a two tail test.
Source: Weighted least squares prediction of college attendance in fall 1961 using longitudinal
data on 27,046 male high school juniors in the Project Talent data base. Students were
categorized by family income and separate models were estimated for each group. An
extensive set of controls was included in the models: socio-ec nomic status, number of
siblings, the number of changes of school, academic aptitude, the tuition at public universities
and colleges in the state, the cost (including travel costs) of attending the lowest cost 2 year
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and 4 year colleges, distance to the lowest cost college, the selectivity of local colleges, the
opportunity cost of the student's time (the operative wage rate), and a dummy for being from
an intact family and the cheapest local post-secondary institution is a 2 year vocational college.
Data was collected by phone from a five percent sample of the non-respondents to Project
Talent's mail questionnaires. Because non-respondents to the mail questionnaire were
systematically different from those who responded, the people who were part of the
non-respondent sample were assigned weights of 20 in the weighted regression.
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The payoff variable for this analysis was the earnings differential between professional workers
and operatives measured in 1959 dollars deflated for the local cost of living. The local labor
market was either the SMSA of residence or the non-SMSA portion of the state. In 1959 male
high school graduates 25 to 64 years old earned an average of $6132 and the payoff variable
had a mean of $2957 and a standard deviation of $570. The college payoff variable had
significant direct effects on college attendance rates of students from low and moderate
income families even when hours spent studying, the academic orientation of courses and
aptitude were controlled. Since students probably base judgments about the reward to college
on both local and national data, these results are probably a lower bound estimate of the
aggregate effect of a nation wide change in the payoff to college on rates of college
attendance.
Do, however, prospective payoffs to college influence behavior of students while they
are in high school? To explore this issue, the measure of the college payoff employed in the
college attendance regression was included in models predicting the number of college prep
courses taken through the junior year of high school and the weekly number of hours spent
studying including in-school study periods. The standardized regression coefficients
(representing the effect of a 20 percent change in the payoff to college) are presented in Table
2. The findings are that students living in labor markets with a large college payoff took
additional academic courses but they did not spend more time studying. The absence of the
expected positive effect of payoff on hours studying may be due to the inclusion in the study
time variable of in school study periods, for college bound students typically take heavier
course loads and consequently schedule fewer study periods.
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Table 2
The Effect of College Payoff on
The Academic Orientation of High School Courses
and Hours of Study Time
Beta Coefficient on Payoff Variable by Income Group
Lower Upper
Middle Middle Middle High
Poverty Income Income Income Income
Regression Predicting
Academic Orientation .103*** .025 * .011 .065*** .072
(4.01) (1.81) (.98) (4.26) (5.19)
                                                                                                                                               
Regression Predicting
Study Time -.060** -.002 -.057*** -.081*** .004
(2.14) (.10) (4.33) (4.54) (.25)
                                                                                                                                               
Number Observations 2320 6538 8766 4309 5113
                                                                                                                                                  
Standardized regression coefficients representing the effect of a $570 (in 1959 dollars)
increase in the earnings differential between professionals and operatives. The payoff variable
had a mean of $2957 and a standard deviation of $570. Male high school graduates 25 to 64
years old earned an average of $6132 in 1959. (T statistics are in parenthesis under the
coefficient). *** p < .01 on a two tail test.
 ** p < .05 on a two tail test.
* p < .10 on a two tail test.
Source: Weighted least squares models predicting the academic orientation of course taken
and time spent in study halls and studying at home using data on 27,046 male high school
juniors in the Project Talent data base. Students were categorized by family income and
separate models were estimated for each group. An extensive set of controls was included in
the models: socio-economic status, parents education, academic aptitude, religious activity,
the tuition at public universities and colleges in the state, the cost (including travel costs) of
attending the lowest cost 2 year and 4 year colleges, distance to the lowest cost college, the
selectivity of local colleges, the opportunity cost of the student's time (the operative wage rate
and the SMSA unemployment rate), and characteristics of the local high school—size, teacher
salary, teacher experience, homogeneous grouping, hours of homework assigned and
dummies for race, being the eldest child, being from an intact family and sports ability,. Data
was collected by phone from a five percent sample of the nonrespondents to Project Talent's
mail questionnaires. Because non-respondents to the mail questionnaire were systematically
different from those who responded, the people who were part of the non-respondent sample
were assigned weights of 20 in the weighted regression.
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Summary:  The overall results are consistent with the hypothesis that economic
returns to learning influence course taking and achievement in secondary school. The decline
in the payoff to college and to academic achievement apparently contributed to the decline in
test scores during the late 1960s and 1970s. The subsequent increase in college selectivity,
the payoff to college and to math achievement for high school graduates probably contributed
to the rise in test scores during the 1980s.
III. WHEN CURRICULUM BASED EXAMINATIONS ARE ABSENT,
WHAT HAPPENS TO
ACADEMIC STANDARDS, INCENTIVES AND ACHIEVEMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES?
3.1 Systems of Curriculum Based External Examinations—A Definition
Let us begin by defining what is meant by a system of curriculum based external
examinations (CBEE). To have the effects that the Competitiveness Policy Council and the
American Federation of Teachers have envisioned, a national or state system of examinations
must have all 9 of the following characteristics. It must:
1. Produce signals of student accomplishment that have real consequences for the
student. The nature of the rewards for achievement on these exams vary from country
to country. In many systems exam results are averaged with teacher assessments to
generate final grades for a specific course. In some cases passing the exam is
necessary for graduation from lower or upper secondary school and/or confers the right
to enroll in university. Exam results also often influence which university or academic
program secondary school graduates can be admitted to and hiring decisions of
employers.
2. Define achievement relative to an external standard, not relative to other students
in the classroom or the school. Fair comparisons of achievement across schools and
across students at different schools are now possible. This feature makes exam grades
useful for selection decisions made by universities and employers. It also makes exam
grades useful indicators of average achievement levels at a school. Parents making
choices about where to live and where to send their child to school will now have
something other than the socio-ec nomic status of the neighborhood upon which to
base that decision. Costrell's (1994a, b) formal analysis of the optimal setting of
educational standards concluded that more centralized standard setting (state or
national achievement exams) results in higher standards, higher achievement and
higher social welfare than decentralized standard setting (i.e. teacher grading or
schools graduation requirements).
3. Organized around specific disciplines. This focuses responsibility for preparing the
student for particular exams on one (or a small group of) teacher/s. When exams are
tied to particular courses with specific content, the choice of courses effectively
determines which examinations the student takes. Where students in different tracks or
specialties study a subject for varying amounts of time, separate examinations are
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often given to the students in the different tracks. Indeed, requiring everyone to take
the same exam appears to force a lowering of the passing standard.
4. Signal multiple levels of achievement in the subject. If only a pass-fail signal is
generated by an exam, the standard will have to be set low enough to allow almost
everyone to pass and this will not stimulate the great bulk of students to greater effort.
If the single standard were significantly higher, it would be too high for many to reach
and large numbers of students would become completely discouraged.
5. Assess a major portion of what students studying the subject are expected to
know and be able to do. The content domain from which the questions and assigned
tasks are sampled must represent important material that we want students to learn. It
is not, however, essential that the exam assess every dimension of achievement we
care about. Teachers can be given responsibility for evaluating the dimensions of
performance that cannot be reliably be assessed by external means.
6. Be perceived as fair. All students need to do the exam under the same conditions, be
asked the same questions (or offered the same selection of questions) and have the
same amount of time to complete the exam. The requirement of test security means
that different questions must be devised each time the exam is administered. When
good rubrics for grading the exam have been developed in advance, the student's own
teacher can be one of the graders of the paper. In some countries, papers are graded
centrally by committees of teachers who do not know the candidates. A perception of
fairness is essential because examination results are going to have important
consequences.
7. Reliably measure achievement. If an exam is an unreliable measure of achievement
in the subject, the grades received by students will have a large random component
and study effort will have limited impacts on examination grades. Students will
eventually discover this and the positive incentive effects of improved signals of
student achievement will be lost. If exam grades are unreliable, the fairness of
allocating prized places in universities on the basis of exam grades will be called into
question and political support for the high stakes exam will be undermined.
8. Evaluates mastery of a particular curriculum that is taught in schools. The
examination must be aligned with the curriculum taught. This maximizes the perception
that effort will be rewarded.
9. Cover a majority of secondary school students. Exams for only a small elite
segment of an educational system influence standards in that segment but will
probably have limited effects on the bulk of students. Since all countries allow
secondary school students to specialize, this will generally require a diverse set of
exams, not a single exam taken by all. Individual examinations may target special
groups of students (e.g. those studying Russian or auto mechanics), but the system
must cover the majority of students.
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Curriculum-based examinations are generally tied o taking a particular sequence of courses
and are therefore effectively voluntary. They cover a broad range of subjects and the
questions used are typically published after the test has been given.
The Advanced Placement (AP) examinations are the one exception to the
generalization that the U.S. lacks national curriculum-based external examinations. Students
who take these courses and pass the examinations may receive college credit for high school
work. While it is growing rapidly, AP is still a very small program. In 1991 only 9,786 of the
22,902 U.S. high schools offered any AP courses. Only 37 AP exams were taken on average
in each participating high school. Of the graduating class in 1993, only 3.2 percent had taken
an AP English exam, 4.1 percent an AP history exam, 3.8 percent an AP calculus exam, and
3.7 percent an AP science exam (NCES 1993, National Education Goals Panel 1993). Low
participation prevents the AP exams from being a CBEE system all by itself. It can, however,
serve as a component of a larger system.
Of the 50 states, only New York State has a curriculum based examination system
covering just about everyone. New York's minimum competency tests, the RCTs, set a
minimum standard that everyone must pass. AP exams now effectively set standards for the
top 5 or 10 percent of students—those seeking admission to highly selective colleges. Regents
examinations for more than 25 different high school courses set the standard for the rest of the
college going students.
Speaking of the system as it existed in 1966, Assistant Commissioner for Examinations
and Scholarships, Sherman Tinkelman, said:
The Regents examinations are closely related to the curriculum in New York State.
They are, as you can see, inseparably intertwined. One supports and reinforces the
other... These instruments presuppose and define standards... They are a strong
supervisory and instructional tool—and deliberately so. They are effective in stimulating
good teaching and good learning practices (Tinkelman, 1966 p. 12).
Sponsorship by the state Board of Regents is crucial to the role these examinations have
played in setting and maintaining high standards and promoting reform. On occasions,
examinations have been deliberately revised to induce changes in curriculum and teaching.
For years our foreign language specialists went up and down the State beating the
drums for curriculum reform in modern language teaching, for change in emphasis from
formal grammar to conversation skills and reading skills. There was not very great
impact until we introduced, after notice and with numerous sample exercises, oral
comprehension and reading comprehension into our Regents examinations. Promptly
thereafter, most schools adopted the new curricular objectives (Tinkelman, 1966 p. 12).
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Contrasts with Other Types of Examinations
Having described what a curriculum based external exam (CBEE) is, let us now review
what it is not. CBEEs may include authentic tasks and problems, but this is not essential.
Authenticity is a desirable trait of a CBEE, but it is not a defining trait.
CBEEs often use extended answer-essay formats. Students are often asked to write
essays, to show work while solving multi-step mathematics problems, conduct scientific
experiments or make something. But this too is not a defining trait. Certain skills and types of
achievement are more reliably and cost effectively measured using a multiple choice format.
Consequently, most modern CBEEs use a mix of formats.
CBEEs generally provide criterion referenced interpretations of examination results.
This is a desirable feature, but not a defining one. Norm referenced tests may be able to serve
a CBEE function if the norm is national or regional and stable over time.
Commercially prepared achievement tests such as the CAT, CTBS, ITBS, ITED that
are often mandated by state departments of education are not CBEEs because they fail test
#1. Students have no stake in doing well on the exam. Where there are stakes attached to
student performance, it is teachers and school administrators who experience the
consequences, not individual students. Another problem with these tests is the lack of security.
There are only a few forms of each test and revisions are infrequent. Different districts
administer them at different times of the year. If real stakes became attached to individual
performance on such tests, bootleg copies would become available and some students would
study by memorizing the answers for the three different forms of the test. Consequently, these
standardized achievement tests cannot be considered CBEEs because they fail requirements
#6 and #1.
The SAT-I reasoning tests are not curriculum based external exams because they do
not meet tests #3, #5 and #8. They are not organized around school subjects and fail to
assess most of the material—history, science, economics, civics, literature, foreign languages
and the ability to write an essay—that high school students are expected to learn. The SAT
was designed from the beginning to minimize backwash effects on teaching and student study
habits. Indeed, Richard Gummere, Harvard College's admissions director at the time the
machine scored multiple-choice Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) replaced the curriculum-based
essay style College Board Examinations, was very candid about why the SAT had been
adopted:
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Learning in itself has ceased to be the main factor [in college admissions].  The
aptitude of the pupil is now the leading consideration (Gummere, 1943 p. 5).
The subject specific SAT-II achievement tests sponsored by the Educational Testing
Service meet some of the requirements of a CBEE. They are external, secure, fair, reliable,
organized by subject and signal multiple levels of achievement. The stakes attached to test
results are not very high, however. Colleges admit on the basis of the SAT-I, not the SAT-II
achievement tests. The tests are limited to a multiple choice format and this calls into question
whether they meet requirement #5 and #8 that a major portion of what students are supposed
to learn in a subject is assessed. The final problem with the SAT-IIs is the relatively small
number of students taking them, requirement #9.
From its inception, the ACT test was developed as a broad spectrum achievement test,
not an aptitude test. It fulfills CBEE requirements #1, #2, #4, #6, #7 and #9. It has subtests
covering science and history so it is much broader in its curricula coverage than the SAT-I. I  is
not, however, assessing the mastery of a specific math, history or science curriculum as the
Regents exams do, so it fails requirement #8. Within the time limitation of three hours it does a
good job, but it lacks an assessment of writing, English literature and foreign languages. Since
time is so limited, the reliability and validity of the history and science subtests are probably not
high. Most educators probably feel that the ACT fails requirement #5. While it fails to meet all
nine requirements, it comes close. A plausible argument could be made that the ACT test
should have some of the same incentive effects that have been hypothesized for CBEEs,
though in a weaker form.
The minimum competency exams that many American states require students to pass
in order to graduate from secondary school are not CBEEs because they fail requirements #3
and 4. These minimum competency tests focus on basic skills that are taught in primary school
and lower secondary school. While minimum competency exams have apparently reduced the
numbers of students with very low basic skills levels (Lerner 1991), the level of competence
required to pass most of these exams is not very high. The tests are typically first taken in 9th
or 10th grade and most students pass on the first sitting. High school transcripts indicate only
whether the student eventually passes the test, not achievement levels above the minimum.
Thus, for the great majority of students who pass them on the first try, the tests no longer
stimulate study. Incentive effects are focused on the small minority who fail on the first try and
must repeat the test. Minimum competency exams can be a useful part of a CBEE system, but
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other much more demanding curriculum based exams signalling much higher levels of
performance are even more critical.
The requirement (#4) that a CBEE signal different levels of achievement (not just
whether the student has achieved a minimum) is extremely important for it has major effects
on the incentive effects of the exam. By age 13 students differ dramatically in their levels of
achievement. On the National Assessment of Educational Progress, 7-9 percent of 13 year
olds are four or more grade level equivalents behind their age mates and 15-17 percent are
four or more grade level equivalents ahead of their age mates. When achievement differentials
among students are as large as this, incentives for effort are stronger for most students if the
full range of achievement is signaled rather than just whether the individual has passed some
absolute standard. When only a pass-fail signal is generated by a test, many students pass
the standard without exertion and are, therefore, not stimulated to greater effort by the reward
given for passing. Some of the least well-prepared students will judge the effort required to
achieve the standard to be too great and the benefits too small to warrant the effort. They give
up on the idea of meeting the standard. Only a few students will find the reward for exceeding
the single absolute cutoff an incentive for greater effort (Kang 1985). Costrell agrees: "The
case for perfect information [making scores on external examinations available rather than just
whether the individual passed or failed] would appear to be strong, if not airtight: for most
plausible degrees of heterogeneity, egalitarianism, and pooling under decentralization, perfect
information not only raises GDP, but also social welfare (1994a, p. 970)."
3.2 The Effects of Curriculum-Based External Examinations
on Student and Parent Behavior
Now that we have defined what a curriculum-based external examination is and is not,
we can proceed to describe its likely impact on students, parents, teachers, and school
administrators. We begin with impacts on student and parents.
External assessments of achievement in specific secondary school subjects that have
real consequences for the student increase rewards for learning and this should induce the
student to choose more demanding courses and work harder in them.
Impacts on the Labor Market Rewards for Learning
Many American students see little connection between how much mathematics and
science they learn and their future success in the labor market. When asked whether they
agree with "It is important to know mathematics to get a good job," 32 percent of American
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10th graders either disagreed or said they were "not sure." When the same question was
asked about science, 21.5 percent disagreed and 35.4 percent were not sure (LSAY 1992, Q#
GB32K & GB33K).
The skepticism about the career utility of mathematics and science is, to some degree,
justified. While additional schooling had large effects on wages during the early 1980s, when
years of schooling is held constant, greater competence in science, reading and mathematical
reasoning was associated with lower (not higher) wages and higher unemployment for young
male high school graduates. Only technical competence and speed in doing simple arithmetic
had significant positive effects on wages and earnings of men who had recently graduated
from secondary school (Bishop 1989b, 1993). For young women, science competence had no
effect on earnings but verbal ability, mathematical reasoning and computational speed had
modest effects on wages and earnings. A one grade level increase in all three of these abilities
increased wages of young women by 1.5 percent and earnings by 3.1 percent.
Does this imply that academic achievement in secondary schools does not make
young males more productive workers? No it does not. The grades awarded by teachers in
German secondary schools are good predictors of scores three years in the future on
apprenticeship exams with a heavy practical component. Industrial psychologists have
conducted hundreds of studies, involving hundreds of thousands of workers, on the
relationship between productivity in particular jobs and various predictors of that productivity.
They have found that competence in reading, mathematics and problem solving are strongly
related to productivity in almost all of the civilian and military jobs studied (Ghiselli 1973;
Hunter, Crossen and Friedman 1985).
Additionally, American employers apparently believe that performance in school is
correlated with performance at work. When asked to rate job applicant resumes containing
information on grades in high school, they gave significantly better ratings to applicants with
high grade point averages (Hollenbeck and Smith 1984). Fifteen percent of small and medium
size employers ask job applicants to report high school grades on the job application (National
Federation of Independent Business 1987).
Why then the discrepancy between the productivity effects of academic achievement
and its wage rewards? The first problem is that getting reliable information on academic
achievement is generally difficult and costly. Self reported grades may not be a reliable
indicator of actual grades. American secondary schools are not very good at responding to
employer requests for student transcripts, even when job applicants have given written
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permission. In 1987, high school transcripts had been obtained by 14.2 percent of small and
medium size firms hiring high school graduates (NFIB 1987). Grading standards vary a great
deal across schools, however, so grades are more a signal of student achievement relative to
others at the school, than a signal of absolute achievement levels.
A system of state or national curriculum-based exams would remedy the problem of
non comparable standards and grading relative to others in the school. It would generate a set
of reliable signals of absolute levels of achievement in high school that could be cheaply
obtained by colleges and employers. If the legal environment was permissive, it would be
reasonable to expect employers to start using exam results in their hiring decisions and that
would then generate stronger and more immediate pecuniary rewards for learning in high
school.
The absence of curriculum based exams is probably not, however, the most important
reason why rewards for academic achievement in secondary school are so weak in the United
States. Employer administered employment tests are also seldom used. Such tests had been
given to only 2.9 percent of the high school graduates hired in 1987 by small and medium
sized firms (NFIB 1987). The primary barrier to giving absolute levels of academic achievement
greater weight in employer hiring decisions is the fear of legal challenges to such practices.
After the 1971 Griggs decision, almost all firms were forced to stop employment testing by
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines that made it prohibitively costly to
demonstrate test validity (Friedman and Williams 1982).
The situation is very different in Europe and Japan. In many European countries, job
applications ask students to report their final grades in examination subjects (Raffe 1984).
Exhibit 1 is an example of one such application. Note how the applicant includes information
on O and A level grades even though he has graduated from a polytechnic college. Resumes
also conventionally include this information. Rosenbaum's (1990) study of the transition from
high school to work in Japan found that good grades, no discipline problems, and participation
in extracurricular activities all had significant positive effects on obtaining jobs at large firms
and entering a white collar (rather than a blue collar) occupation. In the U.S., by contrast, the
job outcomes of males were not improved by good grades, participation in extracurricular
activities, fewer absences from school and a lack of discipline problems. For female high
school graduates, obtaining a white collar job was associated with high grades, but it was also
positively associated with being a discipline problem in school.
Two hypotheses are suggested by this discussion:
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H.1--By improving the reliability and validity of signals of achievement in high school
and making them available to employers at no cost, an examination system will
encourage employers to pay more attention to academic achievements when they
hire recent graduates of secondary school. The impact of examination systems on
rewards for learning will depend on whether employers are permitted to use
examination grades when they screen job applicants.
H.2--If the existence of an examination system increases the proportion of employers
that use grades in examinations subjects to screen job applicants, students should
be more likely to report that an examination subject is important for getting a good
job.
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Impacts on Enrollment in Demanding Courses
When curriculum based exams are absent, schools are induced to offer and many
students are induced to sign up for courses that have the reputation of being fun and not
requiring much work to get a good grade. As one student who had avoided the harder courses
even though she was sure she could do the work explained her decision: "Why should I do it,
[the extra work], if I don't have to?"  (Ward 1994). As Theodore Sizer has observed, "A lot of
the honors students aren't questers. They dodge the hard problems, the hard courses, to keep
their averages up."(1985, p. 53)
Most parents are uninformed about course options and their consequences and often
fail to influence the choices made. In the university town of Ithaca, New York, for example, less
than one-fifth of parents attend the meeting in 8th grade at which the student and guidance
counselor plan the student's 9th through 12th grade course sequence.
Guidance counselors are not encouraged to push extra students into the more
demanding classes. Parents who want their child in the more demanding course are
accommodated, but, behind their back, they are referred to as "pushy" or "elitist." For the great
majority of students with non-pushy parents, most counselors see their role as insuring that the
pupil does not get in over his head. No one should risk failure.
In many cases the parents of children assigned to less demanding courses are not
informed that their child might have taken a more demanding course. In Ithaca, for example,
6th graders learn which of four types of mathematics classes they have been assigned to on
the first day of middle school. If parents were to look at the schedule their child brings home
they might see the word "enriched" and conclude that their child is taking the most demanding
course. In fact, their child is in a class that moves at a slower pace than the "accelerated"
class. If calculus is to be taken in senior year, a switch into the accelerated stream is essential,
but it becomes increasingly difficult as time passes. Only a few parents are aware of the long
term consequences of the 6th grade math class assignment and the middle school makes no
effort to inform parents of these consequences early enough to arrange a transfer into
"accelerated" before the accelerated students have covered a good deal of ground not
covered in the "enriched" class.
Many students manipulate the information their parents receive, so as to minimize the
academic demands that are placed on them. This is illustrated by the following story:
In my case I stalled many attempts of my parents to get involved in my
education. I wanted to be left alone in high school, and the high school was more than
willing to accommodate my wish. Any parental influence could have damaged the
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treaty, and , therefore, I was cognizant that I needed to keep my parents out of my high
school relationship. My parent's lack of information about the high school was my
biggest ally in accomplishing my objective. They knew that I took math, science, and
English, but in a modern high school those titles are meaningless as you could sleep
through most classes and still receive above average grades. The other factor in my
advantage was that my parents did not know the level of my scholastic ability. It was
difficult, if not impossible for them to know if my average to above average grades were
good or bad since grades are a very relative measure of performance. For some
students an average grade is great, while for others it is poor.
My high school offered a variety of classes to deal with the diversity of its
population. If asked, its administrators and faculty would claim that it has devised the
perfect curriculum to meet the vast demands of the community. If that is true, how do
you explain my situation. At fourteen years of age my high school gave me the freedom
to choose my destiny. At that time I chose to mentally opt out of school. My decision not
only went unchallenged, it was furthered with the help of the system and teachers that
allowed free choice at the expense of my education. The system created social norms
that encouraged my apathy and under achievement. I was so entrenched in the culture
of the unspecial that I made conscious efforts to keep my parents from interfering with
my decisions. It was not hard to do as the system was set up to give the illusion that
everyone was receiving an equal and credible education (Jeff 1991, 7-8).
Subjects are taught at vastly different levels, but the rigor of these courses is not well
signaled to parents, relatives, neighbors, employers and colleges. Employers do not pay
attention to the rigor of the courses taken in high school. Admissions staff at selective colleges
learn how to read the transcripts of high schools they recruit heavily from and they evaluate
grades in that light. However, at the beginning of the 1980s, most colleges did not factor the
rigor of high school courses into their admissions decisions. Students who did not aspire to
attend a selective college, consequently, quite rationally avoided rigorous courses and
demanding teachers. Most students chose courses that had reputations of being fun and not
requiring much work to get a good grade. Teachers knew this and adjusted their style of
teaching and their homework assignments with an eye to maintaining enrollment levels:
An angry math teacher [who remembering] the elimination of a carefully planned
program in technical mathematics for vocational students simply because not enough
signed up for it,... [said] 'Its easy to see who really makes decisions about what schools
teach: the kids do.' (Powell, Farrar and Cohen 1985, p. 9)
The behavior of college admissions officers has started to change. Surveys by the
National Association of College Admission Counselors (1993) indicate that they are increasing
the weight they attach to taking rigorous courses in high school and doing well in these
courses. Grades in high school have always been the number one consideration. Standardized
test scores have now become the second most important consideration displacing class rank.
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Class rank is becoming less important because an increasing number of high schools are
refusing to calculate class rank.
Our next hypothesis, therefore, is:
H.3--Educational systems with external examination systems will have more students
pursuing rigorous courses of study.
Impacts on Peer Pressure
External assessments also have pervasive effects on the structure of st dent rewards.
In their absence, signals of achievement tend to assess performance relative to other students
in a class (e.g. grades and class rank). This gives students a personal interest in persuading
each other not to study. The studious are called nerds, in part, because they are making it
more difficult for others to get good grades or to be ranked near the top of the class. Since
devoting time to studying for an exam is costly, the welfare of the entire class is maximized if
no one studies for exams which are graded on a curve. The cooperative solution is "no one
studies more than the minimum." Participants are generally able to tell who has broken the
"minimize studying" code and reward those who conform and punish those who do not. Side
payments and punishments are made in a currency of friendship, respect and ridicule that is
not limited in supply. For most students the benefits that might result from studying for the
exam are less important than the very certain costs of being considered a "brain geek", "grade
grubber" or "acting White," so most students abide by the "minimize studying" "don't raise your
hand too much" norm. The norm that seems to prevail is: It is OK to be smart. You cannot help
that. But, it is definitely not OK to spend a lot of time studying. Instead, use your free time to
socialize, do sports or earn money. This is illustrated by the following story:
Erroneously I was lumped into the brains genus by others at [high] school just because
of the classes I was in. This really irked me; not only was I not an athlete but I was also
thought of as one of those "brain geeks. " Being a brain really did have a stigma
attached to it. Sometimes during a free period I would sit and listen to all the brains talk
about how much they hated school work and how they never studied and / had to bite
my lip to keep front laughing out loud.  / knew they were lying; and they knew they
were lying too. l think that a lot of brains hung around together only because their fear
of social isolation was greater than their petty rivalries. I think that my two friends who
were brains liked me because I was almost on their level but I was not competitive (Tim
1986).
Note how those who broke the 'minimize studying' norm tried to hide the fact from classmates.
They did not espouse an alternative "learning is fun and important" norm.
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The costs and benefits of studying vary across students because interest in the subject
varies, ability varies and parental pressure and rewards vary. This heterogeneity means that
some students break the "minimize studying" norm. When they are a small minority, they
cannot avoid feeling denigrated by classmates. In the top track and at schools where many
students aspire to attend competitive colleges, they are numerous enough to create a sub
culture of their own with norms denigrating those who do poorly on tests or who disrupt
classroom activities. This is the structural basis of the "brains" and "preppie" cliques found in
most American high schools. Most high school students, however, are in cliques that denigrate
studying. At some school awards ceremonies, "some in the crowd jeer 'Nerd!"' as students are
called to come up to receive an award (Suskind, 5/26/94, p. 1).
Peer pressure not to study does not derive from laziness. In jobs after school and at
football practice, American adolescents work very hard. In these environments they are part of
a team where individual efforts are visible and appreciated by teammates. Competition and
rivalry are not absent, but they are offset by shared goals, shared successes and external
measures of achievement (i.e., satisfied customers or winning the game). On the sports field,
there is no greater sin than giving up, even when the score is hopelessly one sided. On the
job, tasks not done by one worker will generally have to be completed by another. For too
many students in too many American high schools, when it comes to academics, there is no
greater sin than trying hard.
When learning is assessed relative to an outside standard, students no longer have a
personal interest in getting the teacher off track or persuading each other to refrain from
studying. Consequently, our theory predicts that:
H.4--Educational systems employing external assessment will have less peer pressure
against studying and fewer class disruptions intended to get the class off track.
Impacts should be greatest in the years preceding the exam.
The Case of Sweden
Sweden eliminated its high-stakes curriculum-based external examinations at the end
of secondary school during the 1970s (Eckstein and Noah 1993). Certification of achievement
was now to be based on continuous assessment by teachers. Fearing grade inflation,
however, the National Board of Education developed the multiple choice and short answer
norm reference centrala prov subject examinations "to help teachers grade students properly...
Teachers have to use them and are not allowed to deviate more than .2 grade points from the
standardized test class means in their final evaluation (Kreeft 1990 p. 15)." While the grades
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awarded by teachers were supposed to follow a normal distribution centered on the class
mean on the centrala prov, there is controversy about whether these mandates are being
followed. The Swedish students I have talked to did not perceive the centrala prov exams as
carrying high stakes for themselves.
Sweden not only ended its exit exams, it established new rules for selecting applicants
for university. Swedish upper secondary students pursue specialized lines of study beginning
in tenth grade. Universities had traditionally admitted recent graduates of academic lines of
study in upper secondary school with three year durations. Reforms introduced in the 1970s
changed the rules governing competition for university places to favor those who had worked a
few years after graduating from secondary school (Rehn 1980, p. 150). This induced many
secondary school graduates to postpone entry into higher education in order to accumulate
enough work points to gain admission to preferred educational programs. Entrants to the study
of medicine, for example, had an average age of 30 in 1977 and 1978 (Rehn 1980 p. 154).
In addition, universities were not allowed to give preference to secondary school
graduates who had pursued the more difficult longer duration academic lines of study in upper
secondary school. If one-third of all applicants to university had pursued a two year vocational
line of study, the universities and colleges were required to admit one third of their entering
class from this group. This meant that a given student's chances of being admitted to popular
majors in university were generally higher if the student pursued a less demanding shorter
duration vocational line of study. As result in fall 1978, the toughest secondary school major,
natural science, was very easy to get into. Ninety-three percent of those who selected it as a
first choice were admitted. For those who wanted to enter a two year vocational line in
secondary school, only 46 percent were admitted to their first choice program.
These changes in secondary school examinations and university admissions policies
appear to have caused a decline in the number of Swedish upper secondary students taking
rigorous courses in mathematics and science during the 1970s.
Mathematics at Graduation
Eight countries participated in both the First International Mathematics Study in 1964
and its replication in 1982 (see figure 2). The proportion of Swedish 18 year olds taking
college-prep mathematics fell from 16 percent to 12 percent. This more selected group of
students scored only slightly higher on the anchor items that appeared in both
assessments. Finns, by contrast, simultaneously increased the proportion of the age cohort
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taking college prep mathematics from 7 to 15 percent and significantly improved their mean
scores (Husen 1967; Robitaille and Garden 1989).
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Science at Graduation
A similar analysis was conducted of changes in Swedish performance on IEA science
examinations given at the end of secondary schooling. The data necessary to measure
changes in absolute levels of achievement between the First and the Second International
Science Studies are not available. Comparisons of achievement relative to that of other
countries are possible, however, and are presented in Figure 3. The zero point on the scale for
each year is the average performance for that year of the English students preparing for A
level exams. England was selected for this standardization role because there was no change
in the proportion of its 19 year old age cohort who were in the sample frame for the IEA
science study. The standard deviation used as the metric measures individual variance for
pooled data on 14 year olds from 11 (14 in 1983) industrialized countries. The vectors describe
how a nation's scores and participation rates changed relative to England. The 1983 study
reports separate means for non-specialists (e.g. majors in economics, languages) and for
students specializing in science. These two figures were averaged using the shares of the age
cohort who pursue these two courses of study as weights (Postlethwaite and Wiley 1992 p. 6,
74).
The proportion of Swedish 18 year olds in academic lines of study that were given
the IEA science exam fell from 45 to 28 percent between 1970 and 1983. This much
smaller
H.5--External examinations will result in higher achievement, even when student
characteristics, school resources, curriculum, teacher qualifications and teaching
techniques are held constant. The effects should be strongest in 11th and 12th
grade, but they should reach down to lower grades as well.
But the effects should not stop there. External exams also transform the incentives
faced by the adults in the system. I would expect parents to set stricter limits on the amount of
TV their children can watch and to be more likely to talk to their child about what they are
learning in examination subjects. Our next set of hypotheses, therefore, are that:
H.6--External exams will result in students spending less time watching TV.
H.7--External exams will induce parents to spend more time talking with their children
about school and result in student's perceiving their parents to be more interested
in their doing well in examination subjects.
When external examinations are absent, parents tend to pressure teachers for less homework
and better grades. In one school:
Students were given class time to read The Scarlet Letter, The Red Badge of
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Courage, Huckleberry Finn, and The Great Gatsby because many would not read
the books if they were assigned as homework Parents had complained that such
homework was excessive. Pressure from them might even bring the teaching of
the books to a halt ....[As one teacher put it] "If you can't get them to read at
home, you do the next best thing. It has to be done...l'm trying to be optimistic
and say we're building up their expectations in school."(Powell, Farrar and
Cohen 1985, p.81)
Therefore:
H.8--External exams will result in "parents no longer complain[ing] about too much
homework or teachers who are too strict." They will "support teachers' efforts to
elicit hard work from their children (AFT 1995 p. 1)."
Opponents of external exams argue that focusing student attention on extrinsic
rewards for learning will weaken student's intrinsic motivation to learn. Students will avoid
opportunities to learn material that is not likely to be on the exam. George Madeus's list of
negative effects includes "test scores come to be regarded by parents and students as the
main, if not the sole, objective of education" and the result is "undue attention to material that
is covered in the examinations, thereby excluding from teaching and learning many worthwhile
educational objectives and experiences (1991b p. 7)."
If they are right, students in systems with external exams should be less likely to read
for pleasure or watch science programs like NOVA and Nature. Therefore, hypothesis #9 is
that:
H.9--Students will spend
* less time watching science documentaries on TV and
* less time reading for fun.
3.3--The Effects of Curriculum-Based External Examinations
on Teacher Behavior
Impacts on Student-Teacher-Parent Team Building
External assessment of accomplishment puts students, teacher and parents on the
same team. They assist the development of mentoring relationships between teachers and
students. In the absence of external assessment, the effort to become friends with one's
students and their parents tends to deteriorate into extravagant praise for mediocre
accomplishment. In courts of law, judges must disqualify themselves when a friend comes
before the bar. Yet, American teachers are placed in this double bind every day. Often the role
conflict is resolved by lowering expectations or hiding failure with charitable phrases such as
"does good work when he chooses to participate." Other times the choice of high standards
means that close supportive relationships are sacrificed.
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This is one of the considerations that has led most European secondary school
teachers to support externally graded exams and external reviews of a student's completed
projects. When changes in this system were proposed in Ireland, the Association of Secondary
Teachers of Ireland wrote:
Major strengths of the Irish educational system have been:
(i) The pastoral contribution of teachers in relation to their pupils
(ii) the perception of the teacher by the pupil as an advocate in terms of nationally
certified examinations rather than as a judge.
The introduction of school-based assessment by the pupil's own teacher for
certification purposes would undermine those two roles, to the detriment of all
concerned ....
The role of the teacher as judge rather than advocate may lead to legal accountability
in terms of marks awarded for certification purposes. This would automatically result in
a distancing between the teacher, the pupil and the parent. It also opens the door to
possible distortion of the results in response to either parental pressure or to pressure
emanating from competition among local schools for pupils (ASTI 1990 p. 1).
Therefore:
H.10--External Exams improve relationships between teachers and students. Teachers
will shed the role of judge and take on the role of coach. Students will now see
their teachers as allies in a common endeavor.
Impacts on Expectations and Grading Standards
Teachers are inevitably held somewhat accountable for how many of their students
pass their courses. In systems without external exams, a teacher can lower class failure rates
by lowering the passing standard. Thirty percent of teachers say they "feel pressure to give
higher grades than students' work deserves" and "feel pressure to reduce the difficulty and
amount of work you assign" (Peter D. Hart Research Associates, 1994).Most commonly the
pressure to lower standards comes from school administrators.
Students also pressure teachers to set low standards. Theodore Sizer's description of
Ms. Shiffe's biology class, illustrates the difficulties that some teachers get into:
She wanted the students to know these names. They did not want to know them and
were not going to learn them. Apparently no outside threat-flunking, for example--
affected the students. Shiffe did her thing, the students chattered on, even in the
presence of a visitor ...Their common front of uninterest probably made examinations
moot. Shiffe could not flunk them all, and, if their performance was uniformly shoddy,
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she would have to pass them all. Her desperation was as obvious as the students'
cruelty toward her. (1984 p. 157- 8)
Theodore Sizer's (1984) description of Mr. Brody's class provides an example of how
teachers benefit from setting modest goals.
He signaled to the students what the minima, the few questions for a test, were; all
tenth and eleventh-graders could master these with absurdly little difficulty. The
youngsters picked up the signal and kept their part of the bargain by being friendly and
orderly. They did not push Brody, and he did not push them ....Brody's room was quiet,
and his students liked him. No wonder he had the esteem of the principal who valued
orderliness and good rapport between students and staff. Brody and his class had
agreement, all right, agreement that reduced the efforts of both students and teacher to
an irreducible and pathetic minimum. (p. 156)
Some exceptional teachers are able to induce students outside the honors track to undertake
tough learning tasks. But too often academic demands are compromised because the bulk of
the class sees no need to accept them as reasonable and legitimate.
Under a system of external exams, teachers and local school administrators lose this
option. Their response will be to strive to prepare their students for the external exam. And
because of the exam, they will find they have more cooperative students. Therefore,
hypothesis #11 is that:
H.11--External exams will induce teachers
(a) to set higher standards,
(b) to assign more homework,
(c) to increase the number of experiments that students do in science class,
(d) to have students solve mathematics problems alone rather than in groups,
(e) to give more quizzes and tests,
(f) to increase their use of other teaching strategies which they believe improve
exam performance.
H.12--Impacts on how teachers teach will grow as the year of the exam approaches.
Some educators argue that external exams can have negative effects on teaching. It is
argued, for example, that "preparation for high stakes tests often emphasizes rote
memorization and cramming of students and drill and practice teaching methods" and that
"some kinds of teaching to the test permits students to do well in examinations without
recourse to higher levels of cognitive activity (Madeus 1991 p. 7-8)."
The assumption of opponents appears to be that the tests developed by individual
teachers for use in their class are better than examinations developed by the committees of
teachers that would have responsibility for developing state or national examinations. To the
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contrary, the tests that teachers presently develop for themselves are generally of very low
quality. Fleming and Chambers (1983) study of tests developed by high school teachers using
Bloom's taxonomy of instructional objectives found that "over all grades, 80% of the items on
teachers' tests were constructed to tap the lowest of the taxonomic categories, knowledge (of
terms, facts or principles) "(Thomas 1991, p. 14). Rowher and Thomas (1987) found that in
colleges fully 99 percent of items on instructor developed tests in American history required the
integration of ideas, while only 18 percent of junior high school and 14 percent of senior high
school test items required such integration. Teachers test low level competencies because that
is what they teach. Students do not take state mandated tests in history, so poor history
teaching cannot be blamed on standardized tests. More evidence is needed on this issue, so
tests will be conducted of the following hypotheses:
H.13--External exams provide fewer opportunities for exhibiting higher order thinking
skills than conventional teacher made tests.
H.14--External exams will cause teachers to focus on teaching facts and definitions; not
the scientific process. Students will conduct fewer experiments in science class and
computation will be stressed in mathematics.
3.4--The Effects of Curriculum-Based External Examinations
on the Behavior of School Administrators and School Boards
The behavior of school administrators and local school boards is also influenced by
how student achievement is signaled to others.
Impacts on a School's Academic Standards
In the absence of valid measures of their students achievement relative to an external
standard, some American school administrators focus on lowering the failure rate rather than
raising achievement. Teachers who set expectations too high get in trouble. For example,
Adele Jones was fired because too many students (42 percent one year and 27 percent the
next) failed her Algebra II course. The principal of the school justified his decision with the
following:
"I have made it very clear that one of my goals is to decrease the failure rate, to
make sure the kids feel good about learning, stay in class, stay in school and do
well .... Math is just a big body of knowledge; what is Algebra II across the nation
anyway?" he asks. When he taught band, he adds, he certainly didn't expect
kids to finish the year as musicians—but he did want them to know more
about music than they did before ....All the talk about preparing students for
college struck him as "ludicrous." Instead the goal should be to keep students
studying math (Bradley, Sept 19, 1993 p. 19, 20).
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Senior Norman Kennedy said, however, the students who flunked Ms Jones class, "were
sleeping. They don't want to learn. They goof off, and they talk. " At the hearing Walter Hall Jr.,
a student who had flunked the course, testified:
"I guess some of it could be attributed to a lack of study, because I wasn't really like
into the books hour after hour, But in the rest of my classes, I was doing fairly well, and
it was only testing that gave me a problem. " He added that his parents had wondered
how he could be getting such good grades in most classes without studying (p. 20).
Impacts on Hiring Standards and Resources Devoted to Academics
In the U.S. locally elected school boards and the administrators they hire make the
thousands of decisions that determine academic expectations and program quality (e.g.
homework guidelines, whether to retain a popular but not very effective teacher, whether to
raise wages to attract better teachers, etc.). Academic achievement is not the only goal of
American schools. They are also expected to foster self-est em, to provide counseling,
supervised extra-curricular activities, musical training, health services, community
entertainment (e.g. interscholastic sports), drivers education and to do all this in a racially
integrated setting. These other goals require additional staff and different kinds of staff. They
may not be served by hiring teachers with a strong background in calculus or chemistry.
When there is no external assessment of academic achievement, students and their
parents benefit little from administrative decisions that opt for higher standards, more qualified
teachers or a heavier student work load. The immediate consequences of such decisions—
higher taxes, more homework, having to repeat courses, lower GPA's, complaining parents, a
greater risk of being denied a diploma—are all negative.
When student learning is not assessed externally, the positive effects of choosing
academic rigor are negligible and postponed. If college admission decisions are based on rank
in class, GPA and aptitude tests, not externally assessed achievement in secondary school
courses, upgraded standards will not improve the college admission prospects of next year's
graduates. Graduates will probably do better in difficult college courses and will be more likely
to get a degree, but that benefit is uncertain and far in the future. Maybe over time the school's
reputation and, with it, the admission prospects of graduates will improve because the current
graduates are more successful in local colleges. That, however, is even more uncertain and
postponed. Publishing data on proportions of students meeting state targets on standardized
tests probably speeds the process by which real improvements in a school's performance
influence it's local reputation. However, other indicators such as SAT test scores, proportions
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going to various types of colleges and the socioeconomic background of the students tend to
be more prominent. As a result, school reputations are determined largely by things that
teachers and administrators have little control over: the socio-economic status of the student
body and the proportion of graduates going to college.
Few American employers pay attention to a student's achievement in high school or the
school's reputation when they make hiring selections (Bishop 1989, 1993, Hollenbeck and
Smith 1984). Those that do pay attention to achievement use indicators of relative
performance such as GPA and rank in class rather than results on an external exam as a
hiring criterion. Consequently, higher standards do not benefit students as a group, so parents
as a group have little incentive to lobby strongly for higher teacher salaries, higher standards
and higher school taxes.
The Scholastic Aptitude Test is no substitute for curriculum based exams because it
does not assess knowledge and understanding of science, history, social science, statistics
and calculus or the ability to write (Jencks and Crouse 1982). Consequently, parents can see
that improving the teaching of these subjects will have only minor effects on how their children
do on the SAT, so why worry about standards?
External exams in secondary school subjects can be expected to transform the
signalling environment. There is now a visible payoff to hiring better teachers and improving
the school's science laboratories. Larger numbers of students pass the external exams and
this in turn influences college admissions decisions. School reputations will now tend to reflect
student academic performance rather than the family background of the community or the
success of football and basketball teams. Hypothesis #16, therefore, is that:
H.15--External exams will cause priorities to shift in favor of achievement in
examination subjects. Administrators and school boards will be induced:
(a) to improve the school's science laboratories (if science is an examination
subject).
(b) to offer additional courses in examination subjects and scale back offerings
outside the core academic program.
(c) to increase the share of the school week devoted to examination subjects,
(d) to lengthen the school day and school year,
(e) to use specialist teachers to teach examination subjects.
(f) to hire teachers with a thorough background in the field
(g) to reduce class size in examination subjects.
(h) to give teachers additional preparation time.
(i) to pay higher salaries.
(j) to spend more per pupil.
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While senior secondary schools should be most affected, middle schools will also be
influenced. If parents are able to choose which secondary school their child will attend and
school funding is based on enrollment, the pressure on school administrators to provide a high
quality academic program will be particularly intense.
Assuming that administrators know how to allocate school resources to improve
achievement, our seventeenth hypothesis is that:
H.16--School resources and policies that regression analysis finds are effective should
be more common in educational systems with external exams.
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IV. TESTING FOR BACKWASH EFFECTS OF EXAMINATION SYSTEMS:
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
4.1 Do Examination Systems Effect
Teacher Salaries, Qualifications and Spending per Pupil
Only a few industrialized countries (the U.S., Sweden, Spain, Portugal, and Belgium
are the major examples) lack curriculum-based external exams at the end of secondary school
(Kreeft 1990, Madeus and Kellaghan 1991, Eckstein and Noah 1993, OECD 1991). The theory
presented in Chapters 1 and 3 predicts that these nations will
-- set lower minimum qualifications for becoming a secondary school teacher,
-- pay their secondary school teachers less (relative to other workers),
-- allocate a smaller share of the education budget to teaching,
-- have fewer teachers per pupil and
-- spend less overall on secondary education.
Table 3 presents data on salaries, qualifications and spending in 17 OECD countries
that allows us to test these hypotheses. Since many countries fund pensions and medical
insurance through mandated social security taxes, it is essential to include both voluntary and
compulsory contributions for these purposes in the measurement of teacher compensation.
Compensation of secondary teachers was calculated by multiplying their salary by the ratio of
compensation to wages for manufacturing workers. This estimate of teacher compensation
was then divided by average compensation of all workers. (Nelson and O'Brien, 1993, pp. 37,
74 & 93).
Data on the relative wage of experienced lower and upper secondary teachers with 15
years of teaching experience is presented in the first two columns of Table 3. The countries
with curriculum based external exams (CBEEs) pay experienced lower secondary teachers 58
percent more on average than the average worker. Experienced upper secondary teachers are
paid 81 percent more. The four countries without a CBEE pay their experienced lower
secondary teachers only 28 percent more and their upper secondary teachers only 50 percent
more than average worker. Thus, relative to others in their society, secondary school teachers
in the CBEE nations are paid a statistically significant 21 percent more than teachers in the
nations which lack curriculum based external exams.
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Table 3
Spending per Pupil and Teacher Pay and Qualifications
             Teacher Wage(15 yr Exp)         Yrs of Educ             Yrly Hrs        Secondary          Spending Per Pupil/          Share
     /Earnings All Wkrs1              Reg to Teach2        Instruction3        Pupils/            Compen/          GDP/          of Non
No Ext. Exam   Lower         Upper             Lower      Upper        Upper S.S.     Teachers4            Wrkr5             Pop5          Teachers6
Belgium 1.25 1.61 15 16 637 7.8 .191 .285 20%
Spain 1.40 1.72 15 17 536 16.6 .107 .218 ---
Sweden 1.14 1.32 16 16 593 13.0 .243 .364 ---
United States 1.33 1.33 16 16 825 15.9 .201 .283 56%
Mean-No Exam 1.28*** 1.495** 15.5** 16.3* 648 13.3 .1855 .2875 38%
External Exam
Austria 2.01 2.48 15 16 819 9.4 .270 .356    ---
Australia 1.60 1.60 --- --- --- 12.9    ---   --- 31%
Denmark 1.16 1.83 --- --- 615 9.7 .226 .280  42%
Finland 1.61 1.67 18 18 556      ---- .195 .333  46%
France 1.44 1.66 16 16 532 14.3 .203 .293  40%
Germany 1.82 1.98 19 20 810 16.2 .243 .305  18%
Ireland 1.49 1.49 17 17 801 17.1 .123 .217   ---
Italy 1.31 1.35 17 17 745 8.9 .204 .271  24%
Japan 1.71 1.73 --- --- 696 16.6 .182 .202  23%
Netherlands 1.58 2.32 17 17 943 18.8 .149 .195  20%
Not-ray 1.33 1.65 15 16 586 8.3 .311 .351 ---
Switzerland 1.85 2.13 --- --- 716 --- --- --- ---
United Kingdom 1.63 1.63 17 17 776 15.2 .187 .278 ---
Mean—Exam 1.58 1.808 16.8 17.1 716 13.4 .2084 .280        30.7%
1 Compensation of secondary teachers was calculated by multiplying their salary by the ratio of compensation to wages for
manufacturing workers. This estimate of teacher compensation was then divided by average compensation of all workers.
The figure for French upper secondary teachers is a weighted average of salaries for Agrege (20%) and others (80%).
(Nelson and O'Brien, 1993, pp. 73, 74, 90 & 91).
2 Minimum number of years of education required to be a lower or upper secondary teacher (OECD, 1995, p. 185).
3 Mean number hours teaching a class per day times the mean number of workdays for teachers. (Nelson and O'Brien,
1993, table 11.3. & 11.4.)
4 The ratio of the number of full-time-equivalent pupils enrolled in public and private secondary schools to the number of
full-time-equivalent secondary school teachers (OECD 1995, p. 179).
5 1992 Spending per secondary student divided by compensation per employee or per capita GDP (OECD 1995, p. 90;
Nelson and O'Brien, 1993, p. 91).
6 Share of all staff employed in public or private primary, secondary and tertiary education that are not classroom
teachers. The non-teaching staff includes administrators at all leve s, teachers aides, guidance counselors, librarians,
nurses, custodial staff, food service workers, bus drivers, and clerical workers. Figures for most nations are for all three
levels of schooling (OECD 1995 p. 176).
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To some degree the salary advantage is compensation for longer teaching hours (see
column 4). The teachers in the CBEE nations spend on average about 10 percent more time
providing instruction than teachers in no CBEE nations (Nelson and O'Brien 1992).
As hypothesized, nations with curriculum based external exams tend to set higher
minimum standards for becoming a secondary school teacher. The schooling required to teach
in a lower secondary school averaged 16.8 years in CBEE nations, significantly more than the
15.5 years in no CBEE nations. The more stringent entry qualifications are probably an
important reason why teachers in CBEE nations are paid more.
Contrary to our hypothesis, the ratios of secondary school students to full time
equivalent secondary school teachers are not lower in nations with a CBEE system (see
column 6). Relative to per capita GDP, spending per secondary school student is also not
higher in CBEE nations (see column 8). Per capita GDP may not be the best deflator for
education costs, however. Since labor compensation accounts for the bulk of education costs,
the proper deflator for schooling expenditure is a wage index that reflects the cost of recruiting
competent teachers. When spending per secondary school student is deflated by average
compensation of all workers (see column 7), the CBEE nations are estimated to spend about
12 percent more on their secondary schools than the no CBEE nations.
Our hypothesis that CBEE nations tend to focus school spending on teaching is also
supported. Column 9 of table 3 presents estimates based on population census data of the
share of people working in all levels of education that are not teachers. Non-t achers account
for 56 percent of the employees of primary, secondary and tertiary education in the U.S. By
contrast, in Germany, Italy, Japan and Netherlands, non-teachers account for less than a
quarter of education employees (see column 5 of Table 3). The average for the eight CBEE
countries for which data are available was 30.7 percent; substantially lower than the 38
percent average for Belgium and the U.S., the two no CBEE countries for which data were
available.
Howard Nelson's (1990) examination of this issue also concludes that teacher compensation is
a smaller share (between 45.5 and 53.5 percent) of current expenditures in the U.S. than in
most other OECD countries. The mean for OECD countries reporting this statistic was 68
percent (OECD 1993 p. 88).
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4.2--Impacts on Student Achievement in Math, Science and Geography:
An Analysis of Data from the
International Assessment of Educational Progress
Three of the countries that lack curriculum-based external examinations—Spain,
Portugal and the United States—participated in the 1991 International Assessment of
Educational Progress (IAEP). Consequently, a comparison of student achievement in these
three countries to that in the rest of the IAEP sample provides an initial test of the hypothesis
that CBEEs raise student achievement. The power of this test, however, is very low. Only 20
nations participated in the IAEP science and mathematics study. Low levels of industrialization
necessitate the exclusion of four nations—Brazil, China, Jordan and Mozambique. Canada
participated as 9 different provinces five of which were stratified into separate English
speaking and French speaking school systems. The Canadian data on mathematics and
science achievement was set aside for separate analysis in Chapter VI. The fifteen countries
included in the analysis are: England, France, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Emilia
Romagna/Northern Italy, Korea, Portugal, Scotland, Slovenia, Soviet Union, Spain,
Switzerland, Taiwan and the United States.
In the IAEP, schools were first sampled, then students within schools. Sampling frames
generally excluded separate schools for special education students and often very small
schools as well. Israel assessed only its Hebrew speaking schools, The Soviet Union assessed
Russian language schools in 14 of the nation's 15 republics. Switzerland's assessed 15 of 26
cantons. A school's likelihood of selection was roughly in proportion to its estimated number of
13 year-olds. In most countries school non-response rates were extremely low. They were zero
in Hungary, Slovenia, Korea and Taiwan and 3 percent in Israel and the Soviet Union. The
countries with high non-response rates were Switzerland (17%), Emilia Romagna (18%),
Scotland (19%), USA (21%) and England (48%). When sampled schools declined to
participate an alternate was selected from the same stratum (IAEP 1992c).
Random samples of 30 to 34 thirteen year-olds were selected from each school. Half
were assigned to the mathematics assessment and half assigned to the science assessment.
Students also completed a brief questionnaire that asked about books in the home, number of
siblings, language usually spoken at home and home availability of calculators and computers.
The following procedure was implemented to standardize for differences in socio-
economic background across countries. Cross section regressions were run within each nation
predicting mathematics and science test scores adjusted for guessing as a function of gender,
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number of siblings-2, age -13.5, and dummies for language of instruction different from
language used at home, 10 or fewer books at home, 11 to 25 books at home, and more than
100 books at home. The mathematics achievement regression also had dummy variables for
'have a calculator,' and 'ever use a computer for school work or homework.' The resulting
regressions were then used to predict adjusted percent correct for three groups of male and
female students: those from families with 10 or fewer books, those with 25 to 100 books and
those with more than 100 books. The predictions were made for students who were 13.5 years
old, had 2 siblings and spoke the national language at home. The mathematics predictions
assumed that the student had a calculator but not a computer. A weighted average of
predicted percent corrects was then calculated with male and female students with 10 or fewer
books each given a weight of .1 and the 25-100 books and over 100 books predictions for
each gender each getting a weight of .2.
This average adjusted percent correct was then regressed on per capita gross
domestic product (GDP deflated by a purchasing power parity price index), a dummy for Asian
nation (Korea or Taiwan) and a dummy for curriculum based external examinations. The
results are presented in Table 4.
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Table 4
Impact of Curriculum Based Examinations
at the End of Secondary School on
Mathematics, Science and Geography Achievement
Age 13-IAEP
Curric              1990GDP
Based    Asian       /Pop                     Portugal       Canada       R2
Num
Exam Nation (PPP) USA Spain No Exam Exam Rmse Obs
Mathematics
Adj Avg 13.9*** 15.7*** .668 15
(3.5) (3.4)  6.0
Adj Avg 14.3*** 17.1*** .42 .669 15
(3.6) (3.6)        (1.0)                                                                   5.9
Adj. Avg. -- 17.4*** .48     -16.2* -11.7 -15.3* -- -- .606 15
(3.2) (.89)     (2.1) (1.7) (2.2)   6.5
Raw Avg. 15.6*** 14.1*** .46 .649 15
(4.0) (2.9)        (1.1)   5.9
Science
Adj Avg 2.0 11.8*** .619 15
(.9) (4.6)   3.3
Adj Avg 2.3 13.0*** .35 .663 15
(1.1) (5.2)        (1.6)   3.1
Adj. Avg. -- 12.7*** .27 - 1.1 - .3 - 5.3 -- -- .640 15
(4.8)       (1.01)   ( .3) ( .1) (1.5)   3.2
Raw Avg. 4.7 9.4** .13 .439 15
(1.8) (2.9)         (.4)   4.0
Geography
Adj. Avg 3.5** -2.4 .146 21
(2.3) (.7)   3.3
Adj. Avg. 2.9 -3.3 -.15 .127 21
(1.7) (.9)         (.8)   3.4
Adj Avg. -2.3 - .8 -2.3 -3.8* .2 .023 21
(.6) (.2) (.6) (1.9) (.1)   3.6
F = 3.9
*** p < .01 on a two tail test.
** p < .05 on a two tail test.
* p < .10 on a two tail test.
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prob=.068
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Mathematics
Students in Korea and Taiwan score significantly higher than students in Europe and
North America: 17 points higher in mathematics and 12-13 point higher in science. The US
standard deviation was 26.8 percentage points in mathematics and 19.9 in science, the
Korea/Taiwan effect is more than one half a U.S. standard deviation. Coefficients on per capita
GDP are positive but not statistically significant. The low income countries in this sample are
Hungary and the Soviet Union and their students do remarkably well on the IAEP tests.
Of primary interest are the estimated impacts of curriculum based external examination
systems. For mathematics the effect is highly significant and quite large (about one-half of a
U.S. standard deviation or nearly 2 U.S. grade level equivalents). The third row in the table
presents estimates of how each no CBEE country deviates from the prediction of the model.
Portugal, Spain and the U.S. under perform by similar amounts.
Science
For science the impact of curriculum based external examinations is positive (about 12
percent of a U.S. standard deviation) but not statistically significant. When each no CBEE
country is allowed to have its own separate effect, Portugal is about 25 percent of a U.S.
standard deviation below the level predicted by the regression. The coefficients on the Spanish
and U.S. dummies are negative but tiny.
Table 4 also presents regressions predicting mean achievement levels unadjusted for
demographic differences between countries. Surprisingly, this does not increase the estimated
effect of per capita GDP on achievement. Curriculum-based external exams have slightly
larger effects on achievement in these models. Impacts on science achievement just miss
significance at the 5 percent level on a one tail test.
Geography
Nine of the countries in the IAEP study assessed geography as well as mathematics
and science. The countries participating in the geography assessment were Canada, Hungary,
Ireland, Korea, Scotland, Slovenia, Soviet Union, Spain and the United States. Canada
collected sufficient data to allow valid comparisons between provinces and between the
Anglophone and Francophone school systems of the five provinces with dual education
systems. Some of these provinces have CBEEs and others do not so including the Canadian
provincial data in the study substantially increases the power of our tests for the effects of
exams (IAEP 1992d).
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Regressions were estimated predicting country means using the same specifications
as above. Per capita GDP had the wrong (a negative) sign, so preferred specifications are
those which do not include this variable. In the preferred model (row 9 of table 4), curriculum
based exams have a significant effect on geography achievement. The effect appears to be
roughly 20 percent of a U.S. standard deviation. Row 11 presents a regression where each of
the no CBEE countries has its own coefficient. The U.S. does not lie below the regression line.
The Canadian provinces without examination systems do significantly worse than the
provinces that have examinations systems (F for Hyp = 3.9).
These results are consistent with the causal hypotheses presented above. Causation is
not proved, however, because other explanations for the U.S., Spanish and Portuguese lag
can no doubt be proposed. Other sources of variation in curriculum based exams need to be
analyzed. Best of all would be studies which hold national culture constant.
4.3--Effects of Sweden's Elimination of Exit Examination
Another approach is to study the effects of changes in examination systems. There
are, however, three problems with this approach. The first problem is that changes in
examination systems will influence student achievement outcomes only with a long lag. An 18
year-olds skills in mathematics are the product of 12 years of education, not just what
happened during the previous year. But even more important is the conservative nature of
schools as institutions. School cultures are very slow to change. Teachers who have adapted
to a system of external exams by setting high standards for their students will not quickly lower
their standards when they are given more authority over final senior year grades. Parental and
public attitudes about learning and the proper goals and priorities for schools also shift at a
glacial pace. Consequently it will probably take more than a decade for most of the effects of
changes in examination regime to be felt. Over that time frame schools and societies change
in so many other ways, it will be hard to distinguish the effects of changes in examination
regime from the effects of other phenomena.
The second problem is the marginal character of most of the changes that have been
made. Many countries have tinkered with the mechanism for deciding who is admitted to
different kinds of post-secondary education or have lowered the weight of t e external exam
when assigning course grades. As long as the external exams count in the final grades and
college admissions decisions, the weight attached to them may not be all that critical. The
passing standard of the exams effects their incentive impacts, but the passing standard is
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determined endogenously with average performance levels, so one cannot treat the passing
standard as an exogenous determinant of performance.
The third problem is the limited number of countries for which it is possible to track
performance levels over time. Sweden appears to be the only country for which such data is
available which has made a non-marginal change in its examination system.
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And surely more able group of Swedish students only slightly improved their position relative to
England (see Figure 3). Finland, by contrast, increased the proportion of the age cohort
Curriculum-Based External Examinations WP 95-30
Page 66
assessed in science from 21 to 41 percent and simultaneously improved its score relative to
England. Other countries—Australia, Italy—had declines in relative test scores, but they were
associated with large increases in the proportion of 18 year-olds in the academic lines of study
that were tested. Hungary was the only other country to reduce the share of 18 year-olds that
participated in the IEA science exam and it experienced a substantial increase in relative test
scores (Comber and Keeves 1973 p. 168; Postlethwaite and Wiley 1994 p. 74).
Science at age 14
The decline in Sweden's relative performance appears to be an upper secondary
school phenomenon. The relative performance of Swedish 14 year olds did not decline
between 1970 and 1983/84. Of the eight countries that participated in both the First and
Second International Studies of Science achievement of 14 year olds, four lost ground on
Sweden and three gained ground. Japan and Hungary originally way ahead remained ahead,
but their lead diminished. England and the United States were roughly equal to Sweden in
1971, but fell back in the succeeding decade. Finland and Italy were behind in 1971 but had
essentially caught up by 1982. Dutch 14 year olds were way behind in 1971, but had
surpassed Sweden by 1982.
Mathematics at age 14
Mathematics achievement of Swedish 14 year olds was low in 1964 and remained low
in 1982. Changes in mathematics achievement can calculated for 9 other countries. Three
improved mathematics achievement levels: Finland, France and the Netherlands. In Belgium
and Israel large declines in test scores were associated with a significant increase in the
proportion of 14 year olds in school between 1964 and 1982. The other four countries with
declining test scores had close to 100 percent of 14 year olds in school in 1964. The test score
declines were modest for Japan and the U.S. but substantial for England and Scotland.
Mathematics achievement declined 8.4 points for England and 4.4 points for Scotland even
though enrollment rates were stable at high levels.
The lack of backwash effects on Swedish 14 year olds is probably due to the fact
selection for preferred specializations in upper secondary school is only a year or so away.
Which specialization is preferred has changed over time, but the fact of competition has not.
Certain lines of study are strictly rationed. For example, in 1978 only 22 percent of those giving
nursing as their first choice specialization were admitted to the line. Admission to rationed lines
is based on grades in lower secondary school (Rehn 1980) so external incentives to study in
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lower secondary school were maintained even while they were being weakened in upper
secondary school.
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V. NEW YORK STATE versus THE REST OF THE UNITED STATES
Probably the best way to test these hypotheses is to limit the study to just one country
and compare jurisdictions with different kinds of examination systems. The jurisdictions must
be large, however, for otherwise colleges and employers are not likely to use grades on the
curriculum-based exams in their selection decisions, so the rewards for doing well may be
quite limited.
New York State is reasonably large and has a curriculum based Regents Examination
system. It began in 1865 as a system of high school entrance examinations. "The plan of
uniform and impartial entrance examinations was immediately successful, and there soon
arose a strong demand for similar safeguards and standards for high school graduation and
college admission (The University of the State of New York 1965 p. 1)." The first high school
achievement exams were administered in June 1878. They have been in continuous evolution
ever since.
The examinations are taken throughout one's high school career. A student taking a full
schedule of college preparatory Regents courses would typically take Regents exams in
mathematics and earth science at the end of 9th grade; mathematics, biology and global
studies exams at the end of 10th grade; mathematics, chemistry, English and foreign language
exams at the end of 11th grade and mathematics and physics exams at the end of 12th grade.
The system now reaches over half of the state's high school students. In 1993, about
56 percent of 9th graders took the Mathematics Course 1 exam and, of these, 24 percent fail.
Similar proportions of 10th and 11th graders took the global studies, biology and English
exams. Failure rates were 20 percent in global studies, 18 percent in biology and 13 percent in
English. The great bulk of those not taking Regents exams are in courses that are
considerably less challenging than Regents level courses. The fact that nearly half of New
York students are avoiding Regents courses because they perceive them to be too much work
or too difficult suggests that the standard of the exam is about as high as is feasible
considering current average achievement levels in the state. A system of minimum
competency tests in specific subjects sets a minimum standard for those not taking Regents
courses. Of the 50 states, New York is the only one with such a system.
5.1 Does New York State Invest More in K-12 Education?
The theory predicts that New York State will pay its teachers more, employ more
qualified teachers, spend more per student, have smaller classes and focus that spending on
instruction. Table 5 presents data on education spending patterns from New York and 10 other
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large and nearby states. Stars indicate whether New York is significantly higher than the other
49 states. Indeed, New York pays significantly higher salaries than other states. It pays better
than wealthier states such as Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Hampshire and Maryland (see
row 1). Only Alaska and Connecticut pay more. Its not just a high cost of living that produces
this effect. New York's ratio of K-12 teacher salaries to college faculty salaries is also
significantly (at the 10 percent level) above the national average (see row 2). New York
teachers are also more likely to have masters degrees than the teachers of any state except
Connecticut and Indiana. New York ranks number 7 in teacher-pupil atios (row 4) and number
7 in the ratio of spending per pupil to gross state product per capita (row 6).
New York is also significantly above average in the share of K-12 spending that it
allocates to instruction (row 5). Only Delaware exceeds the New York level. Much of the extra
spending is on teachers aides and other specialized instructional staff. In New York, teachers
accounted for 51 percent of school staff in 1990. The national average was 53.3 percent
(NCES 1992 Table 79).
Clearly, New York invests a great deal in its K-12 education system. If the cause of the
high spending were a strong general commitment to education or legislative profligacy, we
would expect spending to be high on both K-12 and higher education. This is not the case.
New York is number 1 in the ratio of K-12 spending per pupil to higher education spending per
college student (row 7). Compared to other states, New York gives K-12 ducation greater
priority than higher education.
New York's heavy investment in K-12 education is not a result of a strong tax base. In
1989 New York's median family income was only 10 percent above the national average (row
8). Its poverty rate was equal to the national average (row 9). The neighboring states that also
have high teacher salaries and high spending per pupil, such as Connecticut, New Jersey and
Massachusetts, are much wealthier. Connecticut and New Jersey's median family income was
24-26 percent above New York's median in 1989.
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Table 5
Spending and Academic Outcomes
New York vs. Other States
New U.S.     New Mary
Effort-Public York Avg.          Calif          Illinois     Ohio    Michigan   Wisc.    Penn.     Jersey     Conn.    Mass.    -land
K-12 Teacher
Salary-92' 45,400** 35,900 43,300 37,800 35,400 39,900 34,900 39,400 43,600 48,900 44,500 40,400
%Teacher Sal/
Faculty Sal2 91.3* 81.6 79.7 84.4 80.2 94.9 82. 85.2 84.8 92.0 86.9 90.2
% Masters Deg3 67.5** 47.2 44.5 47.7 40.1 59.6 36.6 50.4 40.5 75.0 51.3 50.8
90 Pupil/teacher3 14.7 17.2 22.8 16.7 17.2 19.8 16.5 16.6 13.6 13.6 15.4 16.8
% $ Instruction4 66.0** 60.4 57.8 59.1 56.6 56.7 62.4 61.4 59.1 63.5 58.9 59.4
% K-12 Spending
/percap GSP5 22.1 19.6 16.2 16.3 18.7 21.4 20.7 22.1 21.1 20.0 18.8 20.6
% K-12 Spending
/Higher Ed6 82.7*** 52.0 46.4 64.3 53.7 56.3 54.2 54.0 76.1 78.2 75.5 65.7
Context
89 Med Fam Inc7 33,000 30,100 36,800 32,300 28,700 31,000 29,400 29,100 40,900 41,700 37,000 39,400
% Poverty Fam-7 10.0 10.0 9.3 9.0 9.7 10.2 7.6 8.2 5.6 5.0 6.7 6.0
% Black7 15.9 12.1 7.4 14.8 10.6 13.9 5.0 9.2 13.4 8.3 5.0 24.9
% Hispanic7 12.3 9.0 25.8 7.9 1.3 2.2 1.9 2.0 9.6 6.5 4.8 2.6
% Foreign Born7 9 7.9 21.7 8.3 2.4 3.8 2.5 3.1 12.5 8.5 9.5 6.6
Pop 25+ Literacy8
Prose Level 3 + 46 52 --- 52 55 --- --- 54 53 --- --- ---
% Doc Level 3+ 43 49 --- 49 51 --- --- 49 49 --- --- ---
% Ouan Level 3+ 46 52 --- 54 56 --- --- 54 54 --- --- ---
Student Outcomes
90-91 Students Taking8
% Algebra I 83 77 89 77 86 --- 95 + 88 --- 81 --- 94
% Algebra II 45 49 42 39 50 --- 58 60 --- 59 --- 51
% Calculus 13 6.6 9 9 10 --- 21 19 --- 14 --- 13
% Biology 95 + 92 89 78 93 --- 95 + 92 --- 95 + --- 95 +
% Chemistry 58 50 33 40 53 --- 59 59 --- 63 --- 61
% Physics 28 22 15 20 22 --- 27 31 --- 37 --- 27
% Take AP Eng,Sci
Math & Hist8 14.5** 8.5 11.1 8.6 5.6 6.9 5.2 7.2 11.9 10.9 11.6 12.7
% Pass AP Eng,Sci
Math & Hist8 9.4** 5.4 7.1 6.1 3.7 4.5 3.3 4.7 8.2 8.0 8.2 88
% Pass AP F.Lng8 1.0** .6 1.7 .5 .2 .3 .2 .3 .8 1.1 1.0 8
                                                                                                                                                                                             
1  Average annual salary of instructional staff 1991-92, (includes school administrators), NCES, Digest, 1993, table 76.
2 Ratio of 1990-91 salary of K-12 instructional staff to salary of full-time instructional faculty on 9 month contracts in all higher
education. NCES, Digest, 1993 Table 76, 220.
3 NCES, 1992, Table 62 & 64.
4 Instruction expenditures divided by sum of Instruction, support and non-instruction. NCES. Digest, 1993 Table 154.
5 Ratio of public K-12 spending per pupil to gross state product per capita. NCES, States and Nations, 1993, Table 15b.
6 Ratio of public K-12 spending per pupil in average daily attendance to education and general expenditures at public institutions of
higher education per FTE student. NCES, Digest, 1993 Table 157, 189, 333.
7 Data is from the 1990 census. Slater and Hall, 1995, p. 3, 6.
8 National Education Goals Panel, 1993, Volume 2. AP data is the ratio (in % metric) of the number of AP exams
taken/passed to the number of 11th and 12th graders in state.
*** p < .01 on a one tail test
 ** p < .05 on a one tail test
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  * p < .10 on a one tail test
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5.2-Do New York Schools Add More Value than the Schools of Other States?
New York's student population is more disadvantaged, more heavily minority and more
likely to be recent immigrants than the students of most other northern states. Among northern
states, only Maryland and Delaware have a larger share of African- merican citizens (row 10).
Nationwide, only California has a higher share of its population foreign born and only
California, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico and Colorado have larger Hispanic population shares
(rows 11 & 12). Literacy levels among adults are substantially below the national average (row
13-15).
Consequently, when one compares student achievement levels, family background
must be taken into account. Considering the disadvantaged character of its students, New
York students do remarkably well. The proportion of students taking algebra, calculus,
chemistry and physics is generally above national averages but below Pennsylvania,
Connecticut, Maryland and Wisconsin and a number of other states (rows 16-21). With respect
to participation in Advanced Placement classes, New York is significantly higher than the rest
of the nation. A larger proportion of its 11th and 12th graders are taking and passing (9.4
percent) AP exams in English, science, math or history than any other state except Utah (row
22-24).
5.3-The Impact of Curriculum-Based Exams on SAT Scores
Our theory predicts that, when demographic characteristics are held constant, New
York students should do better on secondary school exit exams than students from other
states. As predicted, New York students do out perform students in other states. Graham and
Husted (1993) discovered this fact when they examined the determinants of mean SAT test
scores in the 37 states with reasonably large test taking populations. Controlling for the
proportion of high school seniors taking the SAT test and the race, gender, parental income
and parental education of test takers, they found that New York State had the highest adjusted
mean Scholastic Aptitude Test score. They did not, however, test the statistical significance of
the New York State effect and used an unusual log-log specification.
Are their findings robust to changes in specification? How large is New York's
advantage? Is the differential statistically significant? Table 6 presents the results of a
regression predicting 1991 mean Math SAT-I, Verbal SAT-1 and Total SAT-I test scores for the
37 states for which data is available. With the exception of the dummy variable for New York
State, all right hand side variables are proportions—generally the share of the test taking
population with the characteristic described. Clearly, New Yorkers do significantly better on
Curriculum Based External Examinations                                                                                                                      WP
95-30
Page 73
both the math and verbal sections of the SAT-I than students of the same race and social
background living in other states. When this model is estimated without the NYS dummy
variable, New York has the largest positive residual in the sample. The next largest
(Wisconsin's) positive residual is 87 percent of New York's residual. Illinois and Nevada have
positive residuals that are about 58 percent of New York's value. Arizona, California, Colorado,
Florida, New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas and Washington have negative residuals
greater than 10 points. Many of these states have large populations of Hispanics and recent
immigrants, a trait which was not controlled for in the analysis. This makes New York's
achievement all the more remarkable when one considers that Hispanics are 12.3 percent of
the state's population and that only California has a higher share of its population foreign born.
Table 6
Determinants of Mean SAT Scores for States
  NYS   Partic Parents  Priv    Prop. Large 3+Math 3+Eng. InTeach InExp R2
  Rate AA-BA+  School Black School Courses Courses   /stud /stud RMSE
Math   25** -45*** 173***   46**  -83***   -8   42 -61 .916
SAT-1 (2.7) (3.1) (5.3) (2.2) (3.5) ( .6) (1.1) (.9) 8.3
Verbal   21**  -23  197***  14  -52** -36**   43  26 .897
SAT-1 (2.1) (1.5) (5.9)  (.6) (2.1) (2.5) (1.1) ( .4) 8.6
Total   46**  -68**  370***  60 -135*** -44*   85 -36 .926
SAT-1 (2.7) (2.6) (6.4) (1.6) (3.2) (1.8) (1.3) (.3) 14.8
Total   35*  -88***  367***  69* -113*** -36   45 -45   48*  13 .933
SAT-1 (2.0) (3.3) (6.6) (1.9) (2.6) (1.5) ( .7) ( .4) (1.7) (.8) 14.2
TotSAT
Mean .027 .414 .581 .207 .078 .129 .617 .797   -2.822 1.648 925
SD .164 .240 .097 .082 .064 .113 .067 .038 .113 .215 55
                                                                                                                                                
*** p < .01 on a two tail test.
 ** p < .05 on a two tail test.
  * p < .10 on a two tail test.
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Adding the logarithm of the teacher-pupil ratio and spending per pupil to the model, reduces
the NYS coefficient by 25 percent (from 46 in row 3 to 35 in row 4). It remains significantly
greater than zero, however. This suggests that one of the reasons why New York students do
better on the SAT than students in other states is the heavy investments in K-12 education
made by the taxpayers of the state. Most of the effects of the Regents exams, however,
operate through other mechanisms such as higher standards, studying harder, etc.
For individuals the summed SAT-V + SAT-M has a standard deviation of approximately
200 points. Consequently, the differential between New York State's SAT mean and the
prediction for New York based on outcomes in the other 36 states is about 23 percent of a
standard deviation or about three-quarters of a grade level equivalent.
This occurred despite that fact that Regents exam grades generally account for less
than half of final grade in the course and influence only the type of diploma received.
Employers ignore exams results when they make hiring decisions. During the 1980s,
scholarships sponsored by the Regents were based on aptitude test scores, not Regents exam
results. A passing score on Regents exams is not necessary for admission to community
colleges or out of state colleges. Students are aware that they can avoid Regents courses and
still go to college. Indeed some perceive an advantage to avoiding them:
My counselor wanted me to take Regents history and I did for a while. But it was
pretty hard and the teacher moved fast. I switched to the other history and I'm
getting better grades. So my average will be better for college. Unless you are
going to a college in the state, it doesn't really matter whether you get a
Regent's diploma. (Ward, 1994)
Indeed, the small payoff to taking Regents exams may be one of the reason why nearly
half of students take local rather than Regents courses or take the Regents course but skip the
exam.
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VI. MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE ACHIEVEMENT IN CANADA:
COMPARING PROVINCES
Probably the best place to test hypotheses about the impact of curriculum-based
external examinations is Canada. Some Canadian provinces have curriculum-based exams;
others do not. At the time the data used in this study was collected, 1990-91 Alberta, British
Columbia, Newfoundland and Quebec had curriculum-based criterion-referenced examinations
in English, French, mathematics, biology, chemistry, physics and many other subjects. These
exams accounted for 50 percent of the final grade in Alberta, Newfoundland and Quebec and
40 percent in British Columbia. New Brunswick had such exams in language arts and
mathematics but not in science or other subjects. Local school districts decided how much
weight the New Brunswick Provincial Achievement Exam was to be given in assigning final
grades.
The other provinces had no curriculum-based provincial examinations in 1990- 1.
Ontario eliminated them in 1967, Manitoba in 1970 and Nova Scotia in 1972. Nova Scotia
substituted multiple-choice norm-referenced achievement tests in reading, language usage,
proofreading, mathematics, science and social studies which do not influence student grades.
In Ontario, some local school districts have district level exams for core subjects, but most
have not. In any case, one would not expect local district subject exams to have as powerful
incentive effects as provincial or national exams.
Figure 4 plots provincial mean mathematics achievement of 16 year olds from the 1993
School Achievement Indicators Program (SAIP) against the mean literacy level of the parents
of each province. The provinces with CBEEs--Quebec, Alberta, British Columbia, New
Brunswick and New Foundland--are in italics. Diamonds and triangles indicate the provinces
without a CBEE—Ontario, Nova Scotia and Manitoba. Most of CBEE provinces had higher
scores on the SAIP assessments than the provinces without CBEEs with the same level of
parental literacy—(Council of Ministers of Education, Canada 1993; Jones, 1993).
Two of the provinces that lacked CBEEs in 1991 have now reintroduced them (GAO
1993). Manitoba introduced its 12th grade examination in the winter of 1991 about the time the
IAEP exam was being administered to 8th graders in the province. The new examination
system was announced in June 1990 only 7 months earlier. The teaching of 12th graders was
probably affected during the 1990/91 school year, but its unlikely that any incentive effects had
percolated back to the 8th grade in so short a time. The system introduced in Manitoba in 1991
rotated the subject assessed on a five or six year cycle. Starting in 1996, Manitoba will assess
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math and language arts every year and require the exams to count for 30 percent of the
student's final grade. Saskatchewan has also recently reintroduced a provincial examination
system. New Brunswick plans to expand their system to include other subjects. Alberta's
examination system was instituted in 1984, so it was 7 years old when the IAEP data was
collected.
In terms of governance and finance, the Canadian system of elementary and
secondary education is more similar to America's system than almost any other nation.
Comprehensive schools predominate. As in the U.S., education is a provincial/ state
responsibility. Localities administer schools and use the property tax to raise their share of the
funding. In 1980 localities accounted for 43 percent of the funding in the United States and
28.5 percent in Canada. Funding levels vary less within Canadian provinces than within
American states. The average within province coefficient of variation is .09 for Canada and .17
for the United States (McDonald 1993; National Center for Education Statistics 1992)). In some
provinces negotiations over teacher salaries occur at the provincial level.
The analysis proceeds as follows. The data is described in section 6.1, and an analysis
of the determinants of math and science test scores is presented in section 6.2.
The impact of provincial exam systems on the behavior of parents, students, teachers and
school administrators is presented in section 6.3.
6.1 The IAEP Data
The hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3 will be tested in data on the mathematics and
science competence of 42,241 Canadian and American 13 year olds from the International
Assessment of Educational Progress (IAEP). When the Educational Testing Service
canvassed countries about participating in the 1991 International Assessment of Educational
Progress, Canada decided to collect sufficient data to allow valid comparisons between
provinces and between the Anglophone and Francophone school systems of the five
provinces with dual systems. The Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Prince Edward Island
did not to participate in the study. Stratified random samples of 105 to 128 secondary schools
were selected from the French speaking school systems of Ontario and Quebec and from the
English speaking school systems of Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan,
Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. The United States sample
contained 106 schools. A school's likelihood of selection was roughly in proportion to its
estimated number of 13 year-olds. All French speaking schools in New Brunswick,
Saskatchewan and Manitoba were invited to participate.
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In the United States 21 percent of the schools invited to participate declined. In Canada
the highest school refusal rates were for the English speaking schools in Quebec (15%), the
English speaking schools in Saskatchewan (12%) and the French speaking schools in New
Brunswick (12%). In the rest of the provinces refusal rates were below 7 percent and in many
provinces all invited schools participated. When sampled schools declined to participate an
alternate was selected from the same stratum (IAEP 1992c).
Random samples of 30 to 34 thirteen year-olds were selected from each school. Half
were assigned to the mathematics assessment and half assigned to the science assessment.
Students also completed a brief questionnaire that asked about books in the home, number of
siblings, language usually spoken at home, hours watching TV, hours doing homework,
pleasure reading, watching science programs on TV, home availability of mathematics and
science resources, and attitudes towards math and science. The principals of participating
schools also completed questionnaires describing school policies, school resources and the
qualifications of 8th grade mathematics and science teachers.
6.2 Impacts of Curriculum Based Examinations on Math and Science Achievement
In this first stage of the analysis the dependent variable is the percent correct with
adjustments for guessing. It is defined as the (number of correct answers minus .25 times the
number of answered questions) all divided by (.75 times the number of items on the test).
Adjusted for guessing, the students examined here got an average of 47.2 percent in math
(SD= 24 points) and 57.3 percent in science (SD=20.2 points). The independent variable of
greatest interest is EXAM, a dummy variable that equals 1 if one's province has a
curriculum-based provincial exam in the subject at the end of secondary school and zero
otherwise. In the model predicting math score, students in Alberta, British Columbia, New
Brunswick, Newfoundland and Quebec are assigned a 1 on EXAM. Students in Ontario,
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Nova Scotia and the United States have a 0 on EXAM. When the
science score is predicted, New Brunswick students get switched to 0 on EXAM.
Table 7 presents our estimates of the impact of curriculum-based exams taken in 12th
grade on test scores in 8th grade. Odd numbered columns present results for math. Even
numbered columns present results for science. The first three rows present the results of
simple regressions containing no controls for personal or school characteristics. American
students score 8.6 percentage point below the Canadian sample in mathematics and 1.9
points below them in science. Row 2 tells us that students in provinces with exam systems
score 6.3 points higher in math and 5.6 points higher in science. Adding controls for USA and
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for Francophone school (see row 3) slightly reduces the estimated impact of the exam to 5.5
points for math and 5.2 points for science. The coefficient on the USA dummy falls by about
35-40 percent, suggesting that exam systems are one of the reasons why Canadian students
outperform American students. But the significant negative coefficients on the USA dummy in
the mathematics equation suggest that there are also other reasons for the American lag in
mathematics.
Now let us examine what happens in row 5 when controls are added for the
demographic background of the student and the school's student body—books in the home,
number of siblings, gender, languages usually spoken at home and school means for books at
home and proportion of students whose home language is different from the language of
instruction. The estimated effects of exam systems on test scores remain strong: 5.6
percentage points for math and 3.7 points for science. The variables to be added to the
regressions in models 6 through 9—TV watching, home math-science resources and activities,
attitudes, school resources and policies and teaching strategies—are hypothesized to be
influenced by the existence of external exams. Consequently, row 5 presents our best
estimate of the total impact (including indirect effects) of having a provincial exam in the
subject at the end of secondary school on IAEP test scores at age 13. Provincial exams have
very large effects: 23.3 percent of a standard deviation (about four-fifths of a grade level
equivalent) in mathematics and 18.3 percent of a standard deviation (about two-thirds of a
grade level equivalent) in science. In a standard deviation metric, the impact of provincial
exams on math scores is larger than the 22.6 percent of a standard deviation decline in
Math SAT test scores between 1969 and 1980 and 2.8 times the magnitude of the
increase in Math SAT scores since 1980.
Adding the demographic variables also causes the USA dummy to fall to zero. This
implies that the 8.6 point gap between the math scores of Americans and English speaking
Canadians can be fully explained by a combination of demographics and exam system effects.
On the other hand, the mathematics achievement of Americans and Canadians attending
English speaking schools is way behind students from the same social class at French
speaking schools in Canada. When one controls for the number of books in the home, the
number of siblings, whether the language usually spoken at home is same as the school's
language of instruction, and school means for books and language, students at Francophone
schools score 10 points higher in math and 2.5 points higher in science.
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Row 6 of Table 7 presents the results of adding 5 to 6 measures of family behavior and
math-science resources to the regression. Four of the additional variables—time spent
watching TV, school mean on TV watching, a reading for fun index and school mean on a
home resources for math and sciences index—appear in both the math and the science
regressions. The additional variable in the science regression is a watching science programs
on TV index. The mathematics regression has two additional variables: a dummy for owning a
calculator and a dummy that equals one if the student says yes to: "Do you ever use a
computer for school work or homework?" Adding these variables substantially increases R
squares. The coefficients on EXAM fall by 9 percent in the mathematics regression and by 19
percent in the science regression. It would appear that induced changes in home behavior
(particularly TV watching) account for an important part of the impact of provincial exams on
test scores at age 13.
Adding student and parental attitudes to the model has no effect on the coefficient on
EXAM, suggesting that the three attitude questions available in this data set do not mediate
the effects of provincial exams (contrast rows 6 and 7). Similarly adding teaching strategies to
the model (contrast rows 8 and 9) fails to reduce the estimated effect of EXAM suggesting that
teaching strategies also do not mediate the effects of provincial exams. However, adding
school resources and policies to the model (contrast row 7 and 8) reduces the EXAM
coefficient in the mathematics regression by 29 percent of its original (.056) level suggesting
that school resources and policies do mediate some of the effects of provincial exams.
When a full set of controls for teacher, administrator and parent behavior are included
in the model, EXAM continues to have major effects. The provincial exams appear to raise
percent correct in both subjects by 3.5 to 3.6 points or 15 to 17 percent of a standard
deviation. When we control for home characteristics, school resources and policies and
teaching strategies, American 13 year olds are equal in math to Canadians at English
speaking schools but 4 points below Canadians at French speaking schools. In science
Americans are equivalent to Canadians at French speaking schools and 3 points ahead of
Canadians at English speaking schools. The same sequence of models was estimated without
the dummy variable for Francophone school. In addition, similar models were estimated using
schools rather than students as observations. Neither of change in specification appreciably
changed findings regarding the impact of EXAM systems.
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Table 7
Impact of Curriculum-Based Exams on Math and Science Achievement
  SUBJECT EXAM  UNITED STATES FRENCH SPK SCL Adj R2
Controls in Model Math Science Math Science Math Science Math Science
1. None -.086 -.019 .0076 .0005
       (12.5)(3.3)
2. None .063 .056 .0160 .0180
(18.6) (19.0)
3. None .055 .052 -.056 -.012 .007 -.049 .0192 .0284
(15.6) (17.1) (7.8) (1.9) ( 1.9) (14.6)
4. Family Demog-Bks in home, .054 .044 -.035 .002 .036 -.019 .1052 1307
      sibs, gender, lang (15.4) (15.4) ( 5.1) ( .4) ( 8.5) (5.7)
5. Add Mean School Demog. .056 .037 -.004 .015 .100 .025 .1292 .1431
      Books, Languages (15.6) (12.8) (.5) (2.6) (19.4) (6.2)
6. Add TV & Sch mean TV .051 .030 -.003 .018 .073 -.002 .1672 .1887
      Reading, MathSci Resources(14.3) (10.5) (.4) (3.2) (13.7) (.5)
7. Add Student Attitudes .051 .032 -.002 .019 .068 .005 .1869 .1968
(14.5) (11.1) (.2) (3.6) (12.9) (1.1)
8. Add School Resources & .035 .031 -.025 .012 .066 .008 .1959 .2015
     Policies (8.8) (9.4) (3.2) (2.0) (12.2) (1.7)
8. Add Teaching Strategies .036 .035 -.004 .030 .040 .017 .2202 .2105
( 9.3) (10.4) ( .5) (4.9) ( 6.3) ( 3.7)
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6.3 Other Determinants of Mathematics and Science Achievement
Impacts of School Demography
Table 8 presents the full set of results when all school characteristics and teaching
strategy variables are included in the regression. The average number of books in the homes
of the students of the school has large effects. Controlling on the actual number of books in
the student's own home, doubling the school mean number of books at home increases math
scores by 5.6 points and science scores by 3.5 points. Coming from a home where a different
language is spoken than the language of instruction substantially lowers science scores but
has little effect on math scores.
Students in the IAEP survey reported watching 14.7 hours of television a week. Heavy
TV watching by the students at a school is apparently a sign of a school culture that does not
encourage and support learning. If you attend a school where students average 20 rather than
15 hours of TV a week, your test scores are predicted to be 4.25 points lower and your science
test scores are predicted to be 3.1 points lower. If you copy your friends and spend an extra 5
hours watching TV, your math score is predicted to go down a further 1.2 points and your
science score is predicted to decline by 0.9 points.
Curriculum Based External Examinations                                                                                                                      WP
95-30
Page 83
TABLE 8
The Determinants of Math and Science Achievement at Age 13
                                                               Standard       Math Percent   Correct Science Percent Correct
School Demography                     Deviation              Coef         T Statistic       Coef       T Statistic
Log Avg Books in Home .44 .080 (14.00) .050 (10.33)
Speak Different Lang in Home .21 .016 (1.45) -.045 (4.97)
Sci-Math Materials in Home .65 -.0078 (3.03) -.0042 (1.91)
TV Hrs/Wk Avg in School 2.85 -.0085 (12.20) -.0062 (10.85)
TV Hrs/wk of Student 8.65 -.0024 (12.52) -.0017 (10.56)
Francophone School .44 .040 (6.29) .018 (3.73)
Has Curriculum-Based Exam .50/.48 .036 (9.27) .035 (10.40)
United States .25 -.004 (.47) .032 (4.95)
Non-Public School .40 -.022 (5.16) -.031 (8.03)
School Administrator Behavior
Specialist Teachers in Subject .50/.50 .020 (5.41) .006 (1.93)
Teachers Studied Subj in Univ .36/.36 .007 (1.46) .003 (.83)
Specialized Science Laboratory .92 .013 (6.92) .005 (3.54)
Tracking in 8th Gr in Subject .38/.27 .015 (3.31) .009 (1.79)
w/Class Abil Group in Subj. .41/.30 -.018 (4.76) .001 (.34)
Log Size of 8th Grade .93 -.0037 (1.81) -.0052 (3.11)
Propor. Exper. Teachers .22 .018 (1.82) .008 (1.03)
Propor. New Teachers .14 -.002 (.12) .012 (.84)
Class Hours in Subject .86/.79 .0002 (.13) .0092 (5.10)
Teacher Behavior
Avg. Homework Hrs/wk in Subject .62/.44 .0074 (2.86) .0044 (1.43)
Math Difficulty Index .41 .000 (.06) -.0024 (.75)
Quiz Index for Subject .65/.56 -.0281 (10.33) -.0280 (10.94)
Listen to Teacher Index .77/.70 -.0365 (14.49) -.0030 (1.40)
Math Group Problem Solving .96 -.0228 (13.58)
Math Work Alone on Problems .70 .0239 (10.50)
Science Do Experiments Ind. .86 .0000 (.05)
Science Watch Experiments .71 -.0116 (5.77)
Science Watch Films Index .66 -.0111 (5.46)
Student Behavior and Attitudes
Read for Pleasure Index 1.09 .019 (12.63) .024 (19.25)
Have used Computer for Sch Wrk .49 .027 (8.16)
Have a Calculator .31 .018 (3.59)
Watch Science Programs on TV .98 .0156 (10.98)
Subject Important to get Job .63/.86 .0232 (8.60) .0181 (10.98)
Parent want me to do well in Subj .61/.95 .0110 (4.06) .0106 (7.17)
Subj. Useful in Everyday Life .87/.95 .0314 (16.39) -.0103 (6.78)
Family Demographics
Female .50 -.026 (8.11) -.058 (21.82)
Age .28 .053 (9.77) .034 (7.45)
Number of Siblings 1.36 -.0105 (9.14) -.0110 (11.26)
Lang of Instruct & Home Diff--1 .28 -.015 (1.94) -.016 (2.49)
Lang of Instruct & Home Diff--2 .22 .005 (.67) -.031 (5.21)
Less than 10 books at Home .19 -.100 (11.86) -.107 (15.10)
Betw. 11 & 25 Books at Home .32 -.063 (11.89) -.060 (13.89)
Over 100 Books at Home .50 .045 (12.93) .037 (12.75)
Adjusted R Square                                                 .2202                                        .2105
Mean Square Error                                                                                      .2179                                      .1780
Number of Observations                                                                           20,232                                       19,841
Mean Value of Dependent Variable                   .474            .576
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Effectiveness of Non-Public Schools
In their influential 1990 book, John Chubb and Terry Moe argued that the constraints
placed on public schools by bureaucracy and democratic government make them inherently
less effective than non-public schools that must compete for students and that are, thus,
required to survive a market test. Clearly, however, their theory does not apply to Canada.
When background characteristics of the students are controlled, students at non-public
schools know considerably less math and science at age 13 than public school students.
Canadian nonpublic schools lag behind their public counterparts even though they receive
considerable funding from provincial governments and local school districts.
As in the U.S., most nonpublic schools in Canada were started by religious
denominations. Models were estimated which distinguished different types of nonpublic
schools. When social class is controlled, public school students have significantly higher
achievement in both math and science than students at religiously controlled schools. Students
at secular nonpublic schools are slightly ahead in mathematics but significantly behind in
science.
One is forced to conclude, therefore, that nonpublic schools are not inherently more
effective at teaching math and science than public schools. My interpretation of these results is
that religious schools probably place math and science education lower in their list of priorities
than public schools. Their finances may also be more constrained. The religious
denominations which control these schools and the parents who send their children to them
are primarily seeking better discipline and ethical and moral climates that are consistent with
their beliefs, not better math and science teaching. Fewer resources are devoted to math and
science teaching and lower achievement results.
Effects of School Resources and Policies
The regressions yield some important insights into the school policies that are
associated with high achievement in mathematics and science. The school resource and
school policy variables are based on a questionnaire filled out by the principal. A number of the
variables constructed from this questionnaire appear to contain considerable measurement
error. For example, student-teacher ratios calculated by dividing total enrollment by the size of
the teaching staff range from 1.7 to 520 and have a standard deviation of 23. Estimates of the
time during the school day that teachers have for preparing their lessons derived from class
size and student-teacher ratios range from -15.8 to .93. Reported classroom hours of
instruction in math and science also appear to contain measurement error. For the United
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States alone, the range is from 2.08 to 6.67 hrs/wk in mathematics and from 1.83 to 8.75
hrs/wk in science. One of the Canadian schools in the IAEP reportedly allocated only one hour
a week to teaching science. The measurement error problems mean that coefficients on these
variables are probably biased toward zero. It is also quite possible that school policies are in
some cases jointly determined with average performance levels. Consequently one should
view these coefficients as only suggestive of causal relationships, not structural estimates of a
well specified causal model.
Schools that have invested in specialized science laboratories, that use specialist
teachers to teach the subject and that have smaller numbers of students in each grade are
more effective at teaching science and mathematics. Tracking also appears to help, though in
science the effect is not large and only marginally significant. Within-class ability grouping of
mathematics classes is associated with significantly lower math scores. Having more
experienced teachers is associated with significantly higher scores in mathematics but not in
science. When teaching strategies are included in the model, the share of math and science
teachers who had studied the subject at university has no significant effect on test scores.
Such teachers appear to use more effective teaching strategies, however, because, when
teaching strategies are not controlled, the proportion of math teachers who studied the subject
at university has a statistically significant positive effect on math scores (not shown). The
proportion of teachers with fewer than 3 years of experience has no significant effects on
scores.
It is difficult to estimate the effect of time spent doing homework on learning in data
sets where homework is not manipulated experimentally. Spending a lot of time doing
homework might be due to a strong work ethic, strict parental supervision or a particularly
demanding teacher. But it also might result from having difficulty doing the problems.
Consequently, at the individual level, homework time will tend to be negatively correlated with
unobservable ability, so coefficients will be biased. To minimize this problem, the specification
uses school mean hours of homework rather than the time individuals spend on their
homework to capture the effect of homework. Variations across schools in amount of time that
is spent doing homework in particular subjects probably depends primarily on how demanding
teachers choose to be and school policies regarding homework not unobservable student
ability.
The average number of classroom hours devoted to mathematics has no effect on
math competence but assigning lots of homework does. For science, by contrast, devoting
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additional classroom hours to the subject has a big effect, while the effect of homework time is
smaller and statistically insignificant. This pattern of results suggests that doing problems at
home is an effective strategy for learning mathematics, but less effective for science. For
science, an hour in the classroom has twice the effect on learning that an hour of homework
has.
Teaching Strategies—Associations with Achievement
The conventional wisdom is that students spend too much time listening to teachers
giving chalk and talk lessons or working alone at their desks. According to effective schools
research, students do better on standardized tests when they attend schools that frequently
test their own students. Science teachers are urged to use the discovery method—lots of
experiments particularly experiments done by the student. Math teachers are urged to have
their students solve mathematics problems in groups.
The IAEP students were asked how frequently—“every day”, "several times a week",
"once a week", "less than once a week" or "never"—they experienced different types of
teaching. Both math and science students were asked about tests and quizzes and about
listening to the teacher give lessons. The math students were also asked "How often do you
solve problems in small groups during mathematics class?" and "How often do you do
mathematics exercises by yourself during mathematics classes?" Students who took the
science test were asked how often they watched science films, how often they watched the
teacher do experiments and how often they did experiments themselves. The variables
employed in the analysis were an average of the school mean response (with one-th rd weight)
and the student's own response (with two-thirds weight). Other weighting schemes were tried
including using the school means for these variables. This did not change the pattern of results
discussed below.
These indicators of teaching strategy have strong relationships with test scores.
Contrary to the effective school research, students in classes where quizzes were common
score below students in classes that tested less frequently. Students in classes where the
teacher spent a lot of time giving lessons do more poorly in mathematics but not in science.
Students who report doing lots of experiments do not perform better than students reporting
few such opportunities. At least, however, they are probably not watching science films or
watching the teacher perform experiments which is associated with students knowing less
science. Spending a good deal of class time in group problem solving activities seems to lower
the student's ability to solve problems on their own in a testing situation. Doing exercises
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alone, on the other hand, is associated with significantly higher performance on the IAEP test.
This last finding is consistent with the earlier finding that math homework has a significant
effect on IAEP test scores.
Interesting as these relationships may be, one must be cautious about interpreting
them as reflecting causality. Longitudinal data on changes in test scores as students progress
through school were not generated by the IAEP. The proxy for teaching strategy describes
only the methods employed in 8th grade, not earlier grades. Consequently, these results do
not tell us much about the effectiveness of different modes of teaching. Teachers may have
been varying their strategies based on the background and ability of their students. The
findings of effective schools research have received a lot of publicity. Many troubled schools
may have adopted the frequent quizzes strategy and this may be the reason why quizzes have
a negative relation with test scores. Similar arguments can probably be made about some of
the other indicators of teaching strategy.
Effects of Student and Parental Behavior and Attitudes
All of the indicators of voluntary participation in school like activities—reading for
pleasure, watching science programs on TV, having a calculator and using a computer for
school work or homework—have the expected positive effect on mathematics and science test
scores. Positive attitudes also had the anticipated effects. Students who report that their
parents want them to do well in math or science do indeed do better. Students who believe
that math and science are important for getting a good job also do better on the IAEP tests.
Students who strongly agree that "mathematics is useful for solving everyday problems" also
do better. Surprisingly, those who make the same claim about science do not do better on the
IAEP science test.
6.4--The Impact of Exam Systems on
Parent, Student, Teacher and Administrator Behavior
The backwash effects of curriculum-based provincial exams on the behavior of 13 year
olds, their parents, teachers and school administrators were examined by estimating models
predicting these behaviors using schools as observations. The questionnaire completed by the
principal provided the measures of school resources and policies. The student questionnaires
provide our data on student, parent and teacher behavior. School means on each variable
were calculated for the schools with at least 9 students in the school sample and these were
the dependent variables analyzed. Some of the schools selected to participate in the IAEP had
considerably fewer than 30 age eligible students. In developing the IAEP sampling frame,
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schools predicted to have only a few age eligible students were combined into larger super
schools for purposes of drawing the sample. When one of these schools was selected, the
target sample of 30-34 students was distributed among the schools forming the super school
(IAEP 1992c). Principal questionnaires were completed in each school, but sometimes the
number of student interviews was too small to provide reliable estimates of school means. If
the very small schools had been included, the estimated impacts of EXAM would have been
slightly larger than the results shown in Table 9.
The specification was the same for all dependent variables. Nine variables were used:
logarithm of the mean number of books in the home, the mean number of siblings, the
proportion of the school's students whose home language was different from the language of
instruction, a dummy for religiously controlled school, a dummy for secular nonpublic school, a
dummy for French speaking school, a dummy for USA and EXAM. For outcome variables
specifically associated with either math or science, EXAM's definition was the same as the one
used in the Table 8 regressions predicting test scores. When general school characteristics
such as TV watching, total homework and class size were predicted, an average of the math
and science EXAM variables was used.
The results are presented in Table 9. Each row represents a separate regression on
data from 1366 to 1460 schools. The means and standard deviations across schools of each
dependent variable are presented in columns 2 and 3. Coefficients on four of the variables--
EXAM, USA, French Speaking school and log books in home—appear in columns 4 through 8.
Adjusted R squares appear in column 9.
Column 1 summarizes the hypotheses that were presented in the first section of the
paper. To the left of the slash, /, is the expected sign (based on a priori reasoning and the
literature) of the impact of EXAM on this measure of home or school behavior. A question mark
appears here if no hypothesis was generated for this variable. The +, - and 0's appearing to
the right of the slash mark summarize the analysis of IAEP data presented in Table 8. A +
indicates that the variable had a significant positive effect on test scores at age 13. A -implies
a significant negative effect. A zero, 0, indicates no significant relationship.
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TABLE 9
Effect of Curriculum-Based Exams on
Parent, Teacher and School Administrator Behavior
StdDev Curric  Exam U.S. French LnBookHm Adj.
Hyp. Mean Schl Coef Tstat Coef. Coef     Coef   R2
Home Behavior
TV-Sch. Avg.-Hrs/wk -/- 14.7 2.85 -.64 (4.2) .32         -2.1***       -3.5*** .272
Read for Fun Index -/+ 1.85 .28 .05 (2.8) -.09** .10*** .26*** .143
Use Computer for Sch Work ?/+ .40 .24 -.08 (6.3) -.09*** -.11*** .150*** .180
Have Calculator ?/+ .88 .13 .05 (6.2) .04*** .04*** .075*** .084
Watch Science programs on TV-/+ .97 .38 .03 (1.5) .04 .25*** .099*** .110
P. want me to do well-- Math +/+ 2.53 .22 .04 (3.4) .05** .02 .038** .076
P. want me to do well-Science +/+ 1.67 .34 .06 (3.0) .01 .10*** .172*** .063
Parent Talk about Math Class +/? .62 .17 .04 (3.8) .08*** .03** .030** .034
P. Talk about Science Class +/? .47 .17  .06 (6.1) .O6*** .00 .047*** .048
Teacher Behavior
Total Homebork—Hrs/wk +/? 4.41 1.62 .76 (8.2) 1.52*** -.21 .02 .165
Math Homework—Hrs/wk +/+ 1.66 .64 .14 (3.6) .16** .008 .124** .042
Science Homework—Hrs/wk +/+ 1.04 .47 .20 (7.0) .19*** -.07* .072* .054
Emphasize Whole Number Oper-/- 1.68 .49 -.13 (4.4) -.12** .09** -.044 .029
Math Quiz Index +/- 1.62 .52 .19  ( 7.6) .53*** .70*** -.010 .368
Science Quiz Index +/- .89 .38 .12 (6.2) .68*** .34*** -.056** .331
Math Group Problem Solving -/- 1.48 .62 -.09 (2.6) .07 -.59*** -.124** .131
Math Work Alone on Problems+/+ 3.22 .37  .03 (1.6) -.05 -.13*** .052* .060
Science Do Experiments Ind. +/0 1.52 .63  .33 (9.6) -.11* .41*** -.050 .169
Science Watch Experiments +/- 2.42 .47  .16 (6.0) -.08 .24*** -.121*** .106
Science Watch Films Index ?/- .94 .48  .02 (.8) .40*** -.06 .006 .059
Math Listen to Teacher ?/- 3.28 .55  .00 (.1) .18*** -.97*** -.110*** .587
Science Listen to Teacher ?/0 2.30 .48+ .04 ( 1.8) .38*** -.60*** -.057* .398
School Administrator Behavior
Math Specialist Teachers +/+ .48 .50 .27 (10.5) .64*** .10** .124*** .209
Science Specialist Teachers +/+ .49 .50 .35  (13.7) .57*** .00 .122*** .225
Took Math Courses in Univ +/+ .66 .39  .15 (6.8) .22*** -.05 .080*** .103
Took Science Courses in Univ +/0 .69 .38  .20 (9.8) .15*** -.17*** .046* .173
Math Class Hours +/0 3.97 .89  .42 (8.3) .17* .30*** -.253*** .114
Science Class Hours +/+ 3.00 .82  .24 (5.4) .99*** -.O6 -.017 .174
Specialized Science Labs +/+ 1.95 .95 .63  (12.3) .33*** .12 .065 .135
Tracking in 8th Gr. Math +/+ .16 .37 .09 (4.7) .63*** .07** .042* .174
Tracking in 8th Gr. Science +/+ .08 .27  .03 (2.2) .28*** .11*** .014 .077
w/Class Abil Group in Math ?/- .23 .42 -.16 (6.7) -.01 -.08** -.007 .039
w/Class Abil Grp in Science ?/0 .10 .30  -.05 (2.9) .03 .00 .003 .008
Propor. Exper. Teachers +/+ .59 .24  -.03 (1.8) -.00 .03 -.033* .072
Propor. New Teachers -/0 .16 .15 -.02 (1.6) -.03* .00 -.003 .049
Hours in School Year +/0 949        89            13.2 (2.5)          34.0*** -10.6 4.90 .032
Class Size -/+         24.8       6.1             1.9 (5.2)           2.1***.1 .73 .073
Teacher Preparation Time +/+ .31 .27 .06 (6.0) .07*** -.02* -.006 .083
Student Attitudes
Math Important to get Job +/+ 2.56 .21 -.02 (1.4) -.03 -.05** .017 .055
Science Important to get Job +/+ 1.93 .33 -.07 (3.8) -.13*** -.21*** .046* .131
Source: Regressions predicting the characteristics of 1366 to 1460 Canadian and American secondary schools.
Control  variables included but not shown were religious school, independent school, share of students whose home
language was different from the language of instruction and mean number of siblings. Mean school char. based on
n gt 8.
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Effects on Home Behavior
The hypotheses about the behavior of parents are strongly supported. As predicted in
H-6 and H-7, students in provinces with exams watch 40 minutes less television a week, and
are 4 to 6 percentage points more likely to report that their parents want them to do well in the
examination subject and are also more likely to report that their parents have talked to them
about what they are learning in school.
Opponents of externally set curriculum-based examinations predict that they will cause
students to cut back on learning activities that do not have a direct relationship to the exams.
This hypothesis, H-9, was operationalized by testing whether exam systems are associated
with less reading for pleasure and less watching of science programs like NOVA and Nature.
Neither of these hypotheses is supported. Indeed point estimates of the effect of EXAM are
positive (rather than the hypothesized negative) and the positive effect is statistically significant
for reading for pleasure.
Effects on Teacher Behavior
It was hypothesized in H-11 that provincial exams would cause teachers to give more
homework, to cover more cognitively difficult material, to schedule more quizzes and tests, to
reduce the time that students spend doing group problem solving, increase the time that
students work alone doing math problems and schedule more experiments in science class.
Hyp #14, which was derived from the writings of opponents of external examinations, makes
opposite predictions: exams will induce teachers to focus on lower cognitive processes like
computation in mathematics and facts and definitions in science. Students would have fewer
opportunities to do experiments in science class.
All of the Hyp-11 hypotheses tested in this data receive strong support. Provincial
exams are associated with students doing 45 additional minutes of homework per week and 10
to 12 additional minutes per week of homework in mathematics and in science. Students report
taking more in class quizzes and tests. Contrary to Hyp-14 but consistent with Hyp-11,
emphasis on computation using whole numbers—a skill that should be learned by the end of
5th grade—declined significantly. In addition, students did more (not fewer) experiments in
science class. Apparently, teachers subject to the pressure of a provincial exam 4 years in the
future adopt strategies that are conventionally viewed as "best practice," not strategies
designed to maximize scores on multiple choice tests.
But they also apparently see through the conventional wisdom and allocate less time to
group problem solving activities. Also against conventional wisdom they may have also given
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students more in-class time to do problems on their own. This effect, however, is small and not
significant.
Effects on School Resources and Policies
Most of the hypotheses, Hyp. 15 (a) through (k), about how administrator behavior
would be affected by provincial exams are supported. The most striking effect is the big
increase in the use of specialist teachers and teachers with university courses in the subject.
The percentage of specialist teachers is 27 points higher in mathematics and 35 points higher
in science. In provinces with exam systems, the proportion of teachers who took courses in
their subject at university is 15 percentage points higher for math teachers and 20 percentage
points higher for science teachers. The specialized science labs index is also two-thirds of a
standard deviation higher. Classroom instruction hours are 11 percent higher in mathematics,
8 percent higher in science and 1.4 percent higher overall. This suggests that the increase in
class time devoted to math and science comes at the expense of something else. In addition,
tracking appears to be more common particularly in mathematics and teachers get extra time
to prepare their lessons.
The hypothesis that schools in exam provinces would try to hire more experienced
teachers (in all subjects not just math and science) receives little support. They are slightly less
likely to employ teachers with fewer than three years of tenure but they were also less likely to
employ teachers with over 10 years of experience.
The other rejected hypothesis is the prediction that exam systems would stimulate
reductions in class size. In fact, classrooms in provinces with exams have on average two
additional pupils. Preliminary analyses of the determinants of test scores found a negative
relationship between mean class size for the eighth grade and IAEP test scores. Could it be
that principals "know" that large classes do not hurt student achievement on tests and that they
obtain the resources necessary to hire more qualified teachers by increasing class size?
Hypothesis #16 that schools in exam system provinces would allocate resources in
ways that our regression analysis suggests maximize IAEP test scores also receives strong
support. Of the ten administrator behavior variables that had significant positive effects on
IAEP test scores, nine have significant positive relationships with EXAM.
I have specified no hypothesis for how within class ability grouping would be affected
by external exams or how it would affect test scores. The cross section regressions uncovered
a negative relationship with IAEP test scores and with EXAM systems. Here again the signs of
these relationships are, as predicted by Hypothesis #16, the same.
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Effects on Student Attitudes
Examination systems were not associated with a higher proportion of Canadian
students thinking that mathematics or science were important for getting a job. These student
attitudes apparently reflect the Canadian reality. Canadian employers apparently seldom use
exam grades in hiring. Job applications were obtained from seven large companies located in
Quebec, a province with a long tradition of exit exams. All of them requested information about
degrees and certificates of skills but none requested information on grades in secondary
school. School transcripts were asked for in a few cases, but interviewers reported that this
was to confirm graduation not to screen on grades in school. These practices are not a
consequence of legal prohibitions on requesting and using such information. A government
approved official Canadian Manpower form obtained from the University of Montreal's College
Placement office requests such information. Apparently, the availability of more reliable
information on student performance in secondary school has not caused Canadian employers
in Quebec (and presumably other provinces with examination systems) to ask applicants to
provide information on secondary school grades.
Canadian provincial exams increase rewards for studying by signalling performance to
students, parents, colleges and universities and making graduation dependent in part on
externally assessed achievement; not by directly signalling achievement to employers.
6.5--How Does the USA Differ from Canada?
Column 6 of Table 9 presents estimates of the differences in student, teacher and
administrator behavior between the USA and English speaking Canadian schools holding
EXAM, school control and social class constant. American 13 year olds do less reading for fun,
are more likely to have a calculator, but less likely to use a computer for school work. American
parents are more likely to talk with their children about what they are learning in math and
science classes. American 13 year olds do 1.5 hours per week more homework than Canadian
students. They take more quizzes, watch science films more and spend more time listening to
teachers give lessons. Drill on simple arithmetic is less common.
American middle schools are much more likely to employ specialist mathematics and
science teachers who have studied the subject in college. Science labs are better and an extra
hour per week is typically devoted to teaching science. Tracking is much more common and
the school year is nearly 3.6 percent longer. Class sizes are larger and teacher preparation
time is greater as well. Relative to Canada, anyway, the adults in the system appear to be
Curriculum Based External Examinations                                                                                                                      WP
95-30
Page 93
trying hard to do the things that both conventional wisdom and Table 8 regressions tell us raise
test scores. Why then do American students score significantly below Canadian students on
the IAEP? The answer is demography (fewer book in the home and extra siblings) and the
absence of curriculum-based external exams at the end of secondary school (see table 7).
VII. CASE STUDY OF ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, FRANCE, THE NETHERLANDS
AND THE UNITED STATES
Despite similar standards of living, the secondary education systems of France, the
Netherlands, Britain and the United States produce very different levels and patterns of
achievement. In primary school, Americans do not lag behind their European counterparts.
Reading ability varies little across these four countries. However, when 14year olds were
compared at the beginning of the 1980s, the French and Dutch were about 1.3 to 1.5 grade
level equivalents ahead of the Americans in math and science. At the end of secondary
school, performance differentials appear to be even larger.
What causes differences in secondary school achievement across these four nations?
Section 7.1 describes these achievement differences. Seven hypothesized proximate causes
of these differentials are evaluated in section 7.2. Four hypotheses can be rejected. The rest
cannot: teacher quality, priority given to academics and student engagement and time on task.
Section 7.3 then tackles the more fundamental question: "Why do American students,
teachers, parents and school administrators place a lower priority on academic achievement
than their counterparts abroad?" Why, for example, is student engagement in learning higher
in France and the Netherlands? Some place the blame on culture, American anti-
intellectualism, or historical tradition. Such ad hoc explanations cannot be ruled out (or in) by
the analysis to follow. Our purpose is, instead, to propose an alternative explanation derived
from the economic theory presented in Chapters 1 and 3.
7.1. Differentials in Academic Achievement
The differences in achievement levels at age 13, 14 and 15 during lower (first cycle)
secondary school are summarized in Table 10. The table presents data from studies
conducted in the 1980s and 1990s comparing France, the Netherlands, England, Scotland and
the United States. The IEA studies sampled students at particular grade levels, not at
particular ages. Consequently, age adjusted scores on the IEA tests are reported where
possible and information on the age of the sample is provided in the footnotes of the table.
If mean differences in achievement are to be given a grade level equivalent (GLE)
interpretation, an assumption must be made about the relationship between grade level
equivalents and the sample standard deviation for the test. This relationship varies across
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tests and across societies depending on the age of the students tested, the character of the
test and the pace of instruction. The approximate number of GLEs per SD for 13 year olds is
about 4 for NAEP assessments, 3 for the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (8th graders) and 2.85 for
the IEA science test. Where an estimate for the specific test is not available, I assume an SD
on a test taken by 14 year olds equals 3 U.S. GLEs.
Reading
In the 1990/91 IEA study of reading, age adjusted scores indicate that American 9 year
olds (see column 1 of Table 10) were reading about 58 percent of a U.S standard deviation
better than Dutch 9 year olds and about .20 SDs better than French 9 year olds. However, by
age 14 differences between the countries (column 2) were tiny.
Mathematics
In the 1981/82 study of mathematics achievement of 13-14 year olds conducted by the
International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), Dutch and
French 13-14 year olds ranked number 2 and 3 (behind only Japan). Of the 17 industrialized
nations participating in the study of 13-14 year olds, Americans were ranked 12th, English 11th
and Scots 10th (McKnight et al.1987). After adjustment for small differences in mean age,
American 14 year olds scored 10.7 (7.5) points below Dutch (French) students of comparable
age (see column 4). The 1991 International Assessment of Educational Progress (IAEP)
mathematics study obtained similar results (columns 8-10). The gap between French and
American 13 year olds was 42.6 percent of a U.S. standard deviation (about 1.3 U.S. grade
level equivalents). British students were about half way between the French and the
Americans (IAEP 1992a). The gap remained roughly constant even though math achievement
of 13 year old Americans improved by .20 SDs between 1982 and 1992 (NCES 1994, p. 54).
The performance gap between the American and European students grows even
larger during upper (2nd cycle) secondary school. Evidence of this can be found in Table 11.
The Americans who participated in the Second International Math Study were high school
seniors in college preparatory math courses like trigonometry, pre-calculus and calculus. This
very select group, representing 13 percent of American 17-18 year olds, got 39.8 percent of
the questions correct. The 6 percent of English students studying mathematics at A level got
59.8 percent correct McKnight et al 1987).  Substantial proportions of French and Dutch
secondary students specialize in mathematics and science (20 percent of French youth are in
the mathematics and science lines known as C, D or E of the lycee general) and the questions
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they are asked on their final examinations suggest that these students achieve at a very high
level.
In 1964, performance gaps were also large, but at that time they were probably due
almost entirely to the larger share of the age cohort tested in the United States.
Science
In the 1983 IEA study of science achievement of 14-15 year olds, the Netherlands
ranked 3rd and the U.S. ranked last among 17 industrialized countries. After a rough
adjustment for age differences, American students lagged slightly more than half a standard
deviation (about 1.4 U.S. grade level equivalents) behind English and Dutch students (see
column 5 of Table 10).
The 1991 IAEP science study found that at age 9 American students were ahead of
students in Scotland, England and most other European countries (data for France and
Netherlands are not available for this age). By age 13, English, Scottish and French students
were ahead, though the differences were small and not statistically significant (IAEP 1992b).
The gap is smaller in the more recent study in part because overall science achievement of 13
year old Americans rose by .21 SDs between 1982 and 1992 (NCES 1994, p. 56).
Few American upper secondary students study science in depth (see Table 11). Only 1
or 2 percent of the age cohort take two years of physics or two years of chemistry. Despite the
highly selected nature of this group (many of whom were taking the subject for Advanced
Placement college credit), only 47.5 percent of the questions were answered correctly on the
IEA physics exam and only 37.7 percent were correct on the IEA chemistry exam. The 4 or 5
percent of the age cohort of English youth who in their 13th year of schooling were studying
these subjects for their A levels got 62.4 percent and 69.3 percent correct respectively
(Postlethwaite and Wiley, 1992).
In the 1971 IEA science study, 75 percent of the age cohort was assessed in the
United States; only 13 to 29 percent of the age cohort was assessed in Britain, France and the
Netherlands. This explains the performance gap between the U.S. and Europe at that time.
While one cannot really be sure, the data suggests that the U.S. lag in mathematics and
science at the end of secondary school developed during the 1970s. While standards were
falling in the U.S., enrollment in rigorous academic programs was rising in Europe.
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Table 10
Achievement in Lower Secondary School
1991 IEA 1982 IEA 1983 IEA Science 1991 IAEP Mathematics 1991 IAEP Science
Reading Math Age 14-15 Adj. Level Gain Level Gain
Age Adjusted Age 13-14 (not adj for Age 13 Age 9 Age 13 Age 9
Age Age 14 % Correct for age) Age % Correct to % Correct to
                                  9  Mean (SD)        Mean (SD)  Diff Mean (SD)     Age13      Mean (SD) Age 13
France 526 533 (68) 53.9 --- --- --- 64.2 (20.3) --- 68.6 (17.1) --
Netherlands 494 523 (76) 57.1 63.7 (16.1) 62.2 --- --- --- --- --- --
England --- --- -- 47.1 55.9 (15.7) 62.2 60.6 (21.4) 29.8 68.7 (17.5) 18_7
Scotland --- --- -- 48.4 --- --- --- 60.6 (20.3) 26.5 67.9 (16.5) 20.8
United States 543 528 (85) 46.4 53.7 (16.7) 53.7 55.3 (20.9) 25.4 67.0 (16.4) 17.2
                                                                                                                                                              
Columns 1, 2 & 3 are the age adjusted means and standard deviations of the overall reading score in the IEA
reading study (Elley 1992, pp. 108-9).
Column 4 is a weighted mean percent correct for students in the grade where the majority have attained 13:00 to
13:11 years by the middle of the school year from the Second International Mathematics Study (McKnight et al
1987, p. 124). The French, English, and American students all had the same mean age, 14.1. Mean age was 14.0
for Scotland and 14.4 for Netherlands. Adjusting for the greater age of the Dutch students would have lowered their
percent correct by about 2 points.
Columns 5 & 6 are the percent correct and standard deviation for 9th graders on the full 50 item IEA science test
(Postlethwaite and Wiley, 1992, p. 60 & 74). An estimate of how U.S. students would have performed on the full
test was made by subtracting 1.1 percentage points (the average difference between core and full test scores for
England, the Netherlands) from the U.S. 's core test score. The mean age of students differed a great deal. Mean
age was 14:2 for England, 15.3 for the United States and 15:6 for the Netherlands.
Column 7 is an estimate of scores for the full 50 item IEA science test for students who are 15.3 years old, the
mean age of U.S. students. The age gradient used was the average for Sweden (4.3) and Italy (7.4), the two
countries for which it was available.
Columns 8, 9, 11 and 12 are the mean percent correct and standard deviation from the 1991 IAEP study of
mathematics and science achievement of 13 year olds (IAEP, 1992a 1992b).
Columns 10 & 13 are the increase in the percent correct on items common to the tests given to 9 and 13 year olds.
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Table 11
Achievement at the End of Upper Secondary School
1982 IEA Mathematics 1983 IEA Science—Final Year of Upper Secondary School         1964 IEA Math  1971 IEA
Science
Final Yr. of Sec. Sch. Physics Chemistry                     Biology                Total      College Math All Students
                        Percent %Age %TimePercent %Age Hrs/Percent %Age Hrs/    Percent %Age  Hrs/     Science   Percent %Age    Percent %Age
                      Correct  Group  Math    Correct Group Week Correct Group Week  Correct Group Week             Hmwk    Correct  Group    Correct
Group
France --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 37.4 5 28.8 29
Netherlands --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 45.6 5 40.3 13
England 59.8 6 21 62.4 6 5.1 69.3 5 5.2 62.4 4 5.2 7.2 50.3 5 36.8 20
Scotland 42.8 18 17 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- --- --- 36.4 5.4 36.8 17
United States39.8 12 14 45.3 1 5.0 37.7 2 5.0 38.1 12 5.0 2.8 19.7 18 21.4 75
(18.0) (15.1)
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Column 1 is a weighted mean percent correct for students in the final year of secondary school from the Second International
Mathematics Study (McKnight et al 1987, p. 124). The mean age was 17:8 for the US, 18:1 for England, 16:9 for Scotland. Column
2 is the share of the age cohort in advanced mathematics courses included in the study. Column 3 is the share of school time spent
in mathematics classes.
Columns 4, 7 & 10 give the percent correct for students studying each science subject in the final year of secondary school.
Column 5, 8 and 11 are the proportions of the age cohort taking each science subject in the final year of secondary school [for the
U.S. it is the share of students taking their second year of the subject).
Columns 6, 9 and 12 are the number of hours per week spent in classes in each science subject. (Postlethwaite and Wiley, 1992,
p. 6, 36, 37 & 69). The mean age was 17:5- :10 for the U.S. and 18:0 for England.
Column 13 and 14 are for the students specializing in mathematics in the final year of an academic secondary school. The British
students are in their 13th year of schooling. (Husen 1967, vol 2, p. 24, 118)
Column 15 and 16 are for all academic (or comprehensive) secondary school seniors regardless of specialization. (Comber and
Keeves, 1973 p. 159)
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7.2--The Proximate Causes of Achievement Differentials
American elementary school students do not lag behind their counterparts in Europe.
Indeed in reading they are substantially ahead and in science slightly ahead (see row 1 & 13 of
table 10). What then caused the large deficits in achievement in mathematics and science at
the end of secondary school? Why does achievement lag in math and science and not in
reading? Let us start by looking at seven proposed proximate causes of achievement
differentials across countries.
1)  Diversity
2) Restricted access to secondary education
3) Teacher quality and salaries
4) Overall Spending per pupil
5) Priority given to academic achievement
6) Time devoted to instruction and study
7)  Engagement—Effort per unit of scheduled time
Our purpose is not to select a single most important explanation for the U.S. lag behind France
and the Netherlands. Rather our objective is the more modest one of narrowing down the list
of possible causes.
Diversity
Non-Hispanic whites score .45 grade level equivalents (GLE) higher than the overall
U.S. average on NAEP reading tests, .56 GLE higher on NAEP mathematics tests and .98
GLE higher on NAEP science tests. If all French and Dutch students are compared to the 77
percent of American students who are neither black nor Hispanic, the European advantage is
smaller. For mathematics at age 13, the gap would be about 0.9 grade level equivalents in
both 1982 and 1991. In science, U.S. white 13 year olds were about one-half GLE behind the
Dutch in 1983 and about .6 GLE ahead of French 13 year olds in 1991.
But, is it really fair to compare the non-Hispanic white population of the US to the total
population of France and the Netherlands? The U.S. is not the only country challenged by
diversity. The Netherlands accepted 120,000 immigrants in 1990, twice the rate of immigration
into the United States. The share of the students who are taught in a language different from
their mother tongue is 6 percent in both France and the United States, 5 percent in Scotland,
12 percent in Canada, 15 percent in Northern Italy and 20 percent in Switzerland (IAEP
1991a). If one is to adjust scores for the demographic and socio-economic background of
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students, why not hold parent's education constant as well. If this were done, the French/Dutch
lead over the U.S. would increase.
Access—Numbers of Students and Graduates
It is sometimes said that low achievement is the price one must pay for greater access.
During the 1960s restricted access to academic upper secondary schools did appear to
explain the lead of European upper secondary school students over their U.S. counterparts. By
1982, however, the situation had changed. Enrollment in rigorous academic programs had
fallen in the U.S., while it was rising in France, Britain and the Netherlands. At present, only the
United Kingdom exhibits the expected tradeoff between achievement levels and enrollment
ratios (see Table 12). Only 43 percent of British 17 year olds and 12 percent of 18 year olds
were attending secondary school full-time in 1991. Students preparing for A level exams
achieve at high levels, but they represent a decided minority of the age cohort.
French and Dutch youth, by contrast, now have higher enrollment rates than American
youth. For example, 86.4 percent of French and 90 percent of Dutch 17 year olds were in
secondary school in 1991; only 74.7 percent of American 17 year olds. At age 18 enrollment in
either secondary or tertiary education was 76 percent in France, 80 percent in the Netherlands
and 54 percent in the United States. Despite lower college attendance rates in France and the
Netherlands, larger shares of 18-21 year olds in France (52.2 percent on a FIE basis) and the
Netherlands (56.4 percent) are enrolled in school (either secondary or tertiary) than in the
United States (40.4 percent). Between age 16 and 29, the average American spends 4.1
FTE years in school, British youth spend 2.3 years, French youth spend 4.6 years and
Dutch youth spend 4.9 years (OECD 1993, pp. 117, 129 & 131). These statistics contradict
the widely held belief that the American education system, despite all its faults, at least
achieves higher levels of participation than continental systems.
Not only are secondary school graduation standards higher, graduation rates are
higher as well. In 1991 graduation rates were 82.2 percent in the Netherlands, 75.8 percent in
France and 73.9 percent in the United States (OECD 1993 p. 176). The large proportions of 18
and 19 year olds attending secondary school in France and the Netherlands indicate how high
graduation standards are made compatible with high graduation rates. Students having
difficulty with the fast paced curriculum do not drop out; rather, they repeat grades and thus
gain extra time to prepare for the demanding external exams. Many participate in vocational
programs and apprenticeships that currently account for 54 percent of French and 70 percent
of Dutch upper secondary students (OECD 1993, p. 119).
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The benefit of the early completion of secondary school in the U.S. is that large
numbers of students enter tertiary education at a young age. However, some of the material
covered during the first two years of college in the United States is covered in upper secondary
school in France and the Netherlands. More bachelors degrees are awarded in the U.S., but
there is doubt that the BAs awarded by America's second rank universities represent the same
standard of achievement as comparable European degrees? Hard evidence on this issue is
not available.
Table 12
1991 ENROLLMENT AND COMPLETION RATES
Nether United United
France -lands Kingdom States
Percent Enrolled FT in Secondary School1
At age 16 92.0% 91.2% 62.4% 90.2%
At age 17 86.4% 90.0% 43.1% 74.7%
At age 18 57.2% 67.4% 12.3% 21.1%
At age 19 31.6% 41.5% 3.4% 5.0%
FT Equiv. Enrollment in Tertiary Education 2
Age 18 19.1% 12.7% 24.4% 33.1%
Age 18-21 26.6% 19.5% 16.0% 33.4%
Age 22-25 12.7% 14.0% 4.8% 13.5%
Age 26-29 4.0% 4.0% 2.2% 6.2%
FTE Years in School betw Age 16-293 4.6 yrs 4.9 yrs 2.3 yrs 4.1 yrs
School Enrollment Rate Age 5-294 57.7% 55.2% 52.7% 55.2%
Secondary Diplomas Awarded/Population
of Theoretical Completion Age6 75.8% 82.2% 74.4% 73.9%
First-degree Graduates from Universities/
Pop. of Theoretical Completion Age 16.3%8.3% 18.4% 29.6%
                                                                                                                                                              
1 OECD, Education at a Glance, 1993, p. 117.
2 OECD 1993, pp. 129 & 131.
3 Calculated by summing the ratios of FTE enrollment to population for one year age groups from age 16 to 29.
(OECD, 1993, pp. 117, 129 & 131).
4 OECD 1993, p. 108.
5 OECD, 1993, p. 176. The US data does not include GED certificates. The labor market does not view the GED as
equivalent to a high school diploma. GED certified high school equivalents are paid 6 percent more than high
school dropouts but 8 to 11 percent less than high school graduates. The graduation rate for the UK is spuriously
high because it counts regular GCSE exams taken at the end of 11th year of schooling as graduation. If one or
more A level exams had been the definition of secondary school graduation, the graduation rate would have been
28 percent (Government Statistical Office 1992, p. 8).
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6 OECD 1993, p. 179.
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Teacher Quality and Compensation
The quality of the people recruited into teaching is very important. The teacher's
general academic ability and subject knowledge are the characteristics that most consistently
predicts student learning (Hanushek 1971, Strauss and Sawyer 1986, Ferguson 1990,
Ehrenberg and Brewer 1993, Monk 1992).
Secondary school teaching does not pay well in the United States and it does not
attract the kind of talent that is attracted into the profession in France and the Netherlands.
Since university admission standards are higher in Europe, the university graduate pool from
which European secondary school teachers are recruited is better educated on average than
the college graduate pool out of which American teachers are recruited. Furthermore,
American teachers are generally not the most talented members of the pool of college
graduates. In 1977- 8 the Math Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) score of intended education
majors was .38 standard deviations (SDs) below the overall average, one SD below
engineering majors and 1.2 SDs below majors in the physical sciences. The Verbal SAT of
intended education majors was .30 SDs below the overall average (NCES 1992, Table 124). In
this respect, Britain is similar; entrants into programs preparing primary school teachers have
significantly lower A level grades than average for university entrants (O'Leary 1993).
In France, by contrast, secondary school teachers must do a double major in the two
subjects for which they seek certification and then pass rigorous subject matter examinations.
In 1991 only 31.3 percent of those who took the written exam for the Certificat d'Aptitude au
Professorat de l'Enseignement du Secondaire (th  most common of these examinations)
passed it. The best teaching jobs go to those who pass an even more rigorous examination,
the Agregation Exteme, which had a pass rate of 17.7 percent in 1991 (Ministere de
1'Education Nationale et de la Culture, 1992 p. 205 & 206). French and Dutch secondary
school teachers tend to be recruited from the middle (not the bottom half) of a pool of
graduates of tertiary education which is in turn a selected sample of the nation's population.
Furthermore, American teachers are often not very expert in the fields they teach.
Recent college graduates recruited into math or science teaching jobs spent only 30 percent of
their college career taking science and mathematics courses. Since 46 percent had not taken
a single calculus course, the prerequisite for most advanced mathematics courses, it appears
that most of the math taken in college was reviewing high school mathematics (NCES 1993b,
p. 428-429). The graduates of the best American universities typically do not enter secondary
school teaching because the pay and conditions of work are relatively poor.
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Teacher Compensation
The high academic standards for entry into upper secondary teaching in France and
the Netherlands are sustainable only if wages and conditions of work are attractive. Data on
the relative compensation of secondary school teachers is presented in rows 1 and 2 of Table
13.
American upper secondary teachers start at a wage that is 14 percent below that of the
average worker and after 15 years of experience they earn only 33 percent more. Starting
salaries are equally low in England. However, in France starting salaries are 6 percent above
the all worker average and in the Netherlands they are 39 percent higher. In France, England
and Scotland upper secondary school teachers with 15 years of experience are paid 61 to 63
percent more than the average worker and in the Netherlands they are paid 132 percent more
than the average worker. For primary school teachers, by contrast, American pay levels are
comparable to their Dutch and French counterparts (see row 6).
The lower pay in the United States is not compensation for more attractive conditions
of work (see rows 7-13 of Table 13). French upper secondary school teachers are in front of a
classroom only 532 hours per year. Their American counterparts teach 825 hours per year.
Teaching hours are similar to U.S. levels in England and Scotland (776 and 886 respectively),
but class sizes are substantially smaller. Dutch upper secondary teachers are the only group
that clearly have heavier teaching loads than American teachers (Nelson and O'Brien 1993).
When the salaries of college graduates are compared, those who enter teaching come
out at the very bottom. Starting salaries of U.S. mathematics and physical science majors who
entered teaching were 42 percent below the salaries of those who obtained computer
programming and system analyst jobs and 35 percent below the starting salaries of those
obtaining jobs in mathematics or physical science (NCES 1993b, p. 26). University graduates
who majored in physical science earned 78 percent more and economics majors earned 92
percent more than education majors over the course of their working lifetime (Kominski and
Sutterlin 1992). Since Americans with university training in mathematics and science can earn
much more outside of teaching, those with talent in these areas are difficult to recruit into high
school teaching. This results in most American teachers of mathematics and science being
less well prepared than their counterparts in Northern Europe. This may help explain why
American students lag behind French and Dutch students in mathematics and science, but not
in reading. The fact that American primary school teachers are almost paid as much as French
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and Dutch teachers may also help explain why American 9-10 year olds compare favorably to
their counterparts abroad.
Table 13
TEACHER COMPENSATION AND CONDITIONS OF WORK
Nether- Eng- Scot- United
France lands land land States
Compensation—Teacher/All Employees1
     Upper Sec. Teacher--Start. 1.06 1.39 .87 .91 .86
Mid Career (15 yrs) 1.61 2.32 1.63 1.61 1.33
     Lower Sec. Teacher--Start. .95 1.12 .87 .91 .86
Mid Career (15 yrs) 1.44 1.58 1.63 1.61 1.33
     Primary Sch. Teacher-Start. .93 .97 .87 .91 .84
Mid Career (15 yrs) 1.34 1.39 1.57 1.61 1.30
Teacher Class Contact Hrs/Yr2
     Upper Secondary School 532 943 776 887 825
     Lower Secondary School 706 943 776 887 748
     Primary School 875 1014 1013 950 1098
Class Size3
     Upper Secondary 29 24 16 15 25.6
Lower Secondary 24 28 16 20 26.8
Primary 23 25 25 20 24.0
Sec. School Students/Teachers4 14.0 15.9 14.7 14.7 15.5
Sec. School Expenditure/student 28.1% 24.7% 28.05 28.0% 29.4%
     Relative to GDP per capita5
Share of Staff not Classroom 36 % 20 % --- --- 47%
     Teachers6
                                                                                                                                    
1 Compensation of secondary teachers was calculated by multiplying their salary by the ratio of compensation to
wages for manufacturing workers. This estimate of teacher compensation was then divided by average
compensation of all workers. The figure for French upper secondary teachers is a weighted average of salaries for
Agrege (20%) and others (80%). (Nelson and O'Brien, 1993, pp. 73, 74, 90 & 91).
2 Mean number of students in each class. (Nelson and O'Brien, 1993, Table II.2.)
3 Mean number hours teaching a class per week times the mean number of weeks in the school year. (Nelson and
O'Brien, 1993, Table 11.3. & II.4.) Time devoted to preparation, in service training and to non teaching activities are
not included in this total.
4 The ratio of the number of full-time-equivalent pupils enrolled in public and private secondary schools to the
number of full-time-equivalent secondary school teachers (OECD 1993, p. 104).
5 Data on expenditure relative to GDP per capita is from OECD, Education at a Glance, 1993, p. 95.
6Share of all staff employed in publicly funded elementary and secondary schools and ministries of education that
are not classroom teachers. The non-teaching staff includes administrators at all leve s, teachers aides, guidance
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counselors, librarians, nurses, custodial staff, food service workers, bus drivers, and clerical workers. The Dutch
figure is for all three levels of schooling (OECD 1993 p. 100). The French figure is for secondary education only
(Ministere de (Education Nationale et de la Culture 1992, p. 184). The U.S. figure is for public elementary and
secondary schools and does not include people working for State Departments of Education (NCES 1992, p. 88). In
the U.S. teachers aides account for 8.8 percent of school staff.
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Overall Spending per Pupil
Data on pupil teacher ratios and spending per pupil are presented in row 13 and 14 of
Table 13. Pupil teacher ratios are quite similar in the five countries, as is the ratio of spending
per pupil to per capita GDP. Consequently, "low" overall levels of spending on K-12 education
are not the cause of the lag in U.S. achievement.
Priority Given to Academics
If American spending per pupil is comparable to that in our four comparison countries,
how come salaries are lower. What happens to the money saved by paying lower teacher
salaries? It is used to hire additional non-teaching staff. Non-teachers account for nearly
one-half of the employees in K-12 education in the U.S, but only one-fifth of employees in the
Netherlands and only 36 percent of secondary education employees in France (see the bottom
row of Table 13). These staff perform services (such as bus transportation, sports activities,
before and after school day care, counseling and occupational training) which are provided by
other governmental organizations or the private sector in some other nations. The money also
pays for the more attractive buildings, sports facilities, large school libraries, the numerous
computers and colorful texts that are typical of American secondary schools. In part, this
reflects the fact that books, computers and buildings are cheaper (relative to teachers of
constant quality) in the United States. American spending patterns also reflect different goals.
Academic achievement is the over arching goal (some would say the only goal) of French and
Dutch secondary schools. In the U.S., academic achievement must compete with other goals.
American schools are also expected to foster self-e teem, to provide counseling, supervised
extra-curricular activities, musical training, health services, community entertainment (e.g.
interscholastic sports), drivers education and to do all this in a racially integrated setting. These
other goals require additional staff and different kinds of staff. They may not be served by
hiring teachers with a strong background in calculus or chemistry, so resources get diverted
from paying the high salaries necessary to recruit teachers thoroughly educated in chemistry.
Unlike France, selection into teaching is not based almost solely on competence in the subject
matter.
Time Devoted to Instruction
Many studies have found learning to be strongly related to time on task (Wiley 1986).
How do the five countries differ in the time that students spend in classrooms and doing
homework? Table 14 reports the results of a variety of studies that compare time devoted to
instruction. Estimates of total amount of time students in a country spend in school seems to
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depend on whom you ask and how the question is worded. The data quality problem was dealt
with by averaging across studies. The total hours of instruction per year for each country was
first expressed as a ratio to the U.S. level. Then a mean ratio was calculated by averaging the
ratios from the studies that provided a comparison with the U.S. Sources are given in Table
14's footnotes.
While estimates vary across studies, the pattern for secondary school students in the
1980s and 90s is that French, Dutch and Scottish students spent 5 to 15 percent more time in
school than U.S. students. English students, by contrast, spent 6 to 9 percent less time in
school than U.S. secondary school students.
Differences in instruction time may explain some achievement differentials between
countries. But they do not explain the generally poor showing of U.S. secondary school
students in mathematics and science. While American students spend less total time in school,
they get more mathematics and science instruction time than French, Dutch and Scottish
students. Heavy European time commitments to foreign language study tend to crowd out
mathematics and science instruction. In lower secondary school, all British students study one
foreign language and French and Dutch students often study two. In America, by contrast, few
lower secondary school students study a foreign language and, by the end of high school,
graduates have taken an average of only 1.46 years of foreign language (NCES 1992, p. 131).
European students learn mathematics and science more thoroughly than American
students even when they spend less time on it. For example, in the IAEP study, mathematics
instruction time was the same in France and the U.S., yet French students knew about 1.47
U.S. grade level equivalents more mathematics than American students. In science, by
contrast, instruction time was one hour per week less in France, yet Americans still lagged
about one-third of a U.S. grade level equivalent behind French students. Why does an hour of
instruction in French and Dutch classrooms produce more learning than in American
classrooms? Could heavier homework assignments be the explanation?
Homework
Harris Cooper's (1989) meta-analysis of randomized experimental studies found that
students assigned homework scored about one-half of a standard deviation higher on post
tests than students not receiving homework assignments. The impact of homework on the rate
at which middle school students learn was also significant, though somewhat smaller.
French lower secondary school students spent more time doing mathematics
homework and homework of all types (see Table 14). In 1991, French 13 year olds averaged
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2.03 hours of math homework a week compared to 1.65 hours in the United States, 1.33 hours
in England and 1.07 hours in Scotland. This is consistent with their lead in mathematics
achievement. In science, however, there is no evidence that Dutch and French students got
more homework than American students. Furthermore, English and Scottish lower secondary
school students do less homework (and have less instruction time) in mathematics and science
than American students and yet outperform them.
Table 14
STUDENT TIME--INSTRUCTION AND HOMEWORK
                                                                                    Nether-     Eng-      Scot- United
                                                                                 France    lands        land       land States
Total Hours of Instruction/Year
Primary Sch.-19711 918 1040 900 1040 900
5th Grade in 19822 --- --- 984 --- 1070
4th Grade in 19915 840 975 --- --- 954
Secondary Sch-19711 775 1120 900 1080 900
9th Grade in 19822 --- 1007 1025 --- 1141
8th Grade in 19823 1187 1000 896 1067 1008
9th Grade in 19915 1030 1092 --- --- 792
Age 13 in 19914 1073 --- 960 1031 1003
Hours of Homework in All Subjects
Hrs/wk—9th Grade in 19822 -- 8.4 6.0 -- 9.6
Hrs/wk—8th Grade in 19823 8 5 5 3 5
Hrs/wk—12thGrd Math Stud (1982)3 -- -- -- -- 9
Hrs/wk—12th Grd Sci Stud (1982)2 -- -- 11.5 -- 9.8
Hrs/wk in 4th Grade (1991)5 . 53 hrs .13 hrs -- -- 1.89 hrs
Hmwk GT 2 hrs/day-Age 13 (1991)4 55% -- 30% 15% 30%
Hrs/Wk on Language Arts-4th Grade5 9 hrs 7 hrs -- -- 11 hrs
# LangA Hmwk Assign/wk Grd 9-19915 1.6 .4 --- --- 2.3
Time Devoted to Mathematics
Math Share--8th Grade (1982)3 12% 10% 13% 14% 14%
Hrs/wk Math Instr-Age 13 (1991)4 3.85 -- 3.04 3.52 3.90
Hrs/wk Math Hmwk--Age 13 (1991)4 2.03 -- 1.33 1.07 1.65
Hrs/wk Math Hmwk--8th Gr (1982)3 4.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Time Devoted to Science
Science Share--5th Grade (1971)1 8% 2% 3% 3% 7%
Science Share--5th Grade (1982)2 -- -- 4% -- 10%
Science Share--9th Grade (1971)1 8% 7% 8% 5% 10%
Science Share--9th Grade (1982)2 -- 25% 10% -- 20%
Hrs/wk Science Instr-Age 13-19914 2.86 -- 3.34 2.91 3.90
Hrs/wk Science Hmwk-Age 13-19914 .80 -- 1.03 .62 1.13
                                                                                                                                      
1 First International Science Study, Passow, Noah, Eckstein and Mallea, 1976, 262,268.
2 Second International Science Study, Postlethwaite and Wiley, 1992, 14-33.
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3 Second International Mathematics Study, Robitaille and Garden, 1989, pp. 36 & 79.
4 International Assessment of Educational Progress, 1992a & 1992b.
5 Lundberg and Linnakyla (1992, pp. 20- 5, 57-59) analysis of the 1991 International
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement study of Reading.
Engagement—Effort per Unit of Scheduled Time
Classroom observation studies reveal that American students actively engage in
learning activities for only about half the time they are scheduled to be in a classroom. A study
of schools in Chicago found that public schools with high-achieving students averaged about
75 percent of class time for actual instruction; for schools with low achieving students, the
average was 51 percent of class time (Frederick, 1977). Overall, Frederick, Walberg and
Rasher (1979) estimated 46.5 percent of the potential learning time is lost due to absence,
lateness, and inattention.
Even more important is the intensity of the student's involvement in the process. The
American high school teachers surveyed by Goodlad ranked "lack of student interest" as the
most important problem in education. Sixty-two percent of 10th graders agree with the
statement, " I don't like to do any more school work than I have to" (Longitudinal Survey of
American Youth or LSAY, Q. AA37N).
Formal studies comparing ratios of on-task time to scheduled time are not available.
Nevertheless, people who have visited classrooms in France or the Netherlands and the U.S.
report that European teachers are less likely to be talking about extraneous matters and
European students are more likely to be paying attention and doing what they have been
assigned. My school visits in France and the Netherlands generated similar impressions.
Summary
Four of the seven proposed explanations for the US lag in mathematics and science
behind France, Britain and the Netherlands can be ruled out: diversity, restricted access,
spending per pupil and time for instruction. The hypotheses that survive the first round of tests
are: lower quality teachers, lower priority attached to academic goals and lower levels of
student engagement. With only 5 data points, no further narrowing of the list of hypothesized
proximate causes is possible. Now let us look behind these proximate causes for ultimate
causes. WHY does an hour of instruction and homework time apparently have larger
learning effects in England, France and the Netherlands than in America? WHY do
French and Dutch secondary school mathematics and science teachers apparently
expect more of their students than American teachers? The next section of the paper
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proposes some tentative system level answers to our WHY questions. Our purpose is to show
that a very simple application of the economic theory developed in Chapters 1 and 3 can
provide a plausible explanation for the large system level differences in goals and learning
efficiency demonstrated above.
7.3 Signalling As Ultimate Cause:
External Examinations as Standard Setters
Examination Systems
When questions such as those placed in bold type above are put to French citizens
and educators, they point to the high standards and pervasive influence of the Baccalaureate?
In 1992, 71 percent of the age group took a Baccalaureate (Bac) exam. Fifty-one percent of
the age group passed. Thirty-eight percent of the Baccalaureats awarded were Bac
Technologique or Bac Professionel (i.e. in vocational lines) (Ministere de I’Education Nationale
1993). This was a major accomplishment, for Bac exams set a very high standard. The
three-year lycee programs that prepare 43 percent of the age cohort for the Bac G neral are
quite rigorous. Bac Exams in mathematics, history/geography and French are set and marked
by 23 regional academies. School based assessments are used for other subjects (Madeus
and Kellaghan 1991, p. 17). The Bac exams taken in one's area of concentration are roughly
comparable to the AP exams taken by American students seeking college credit for high
school work. Cornell University, for example, generally awards advanced placement credit to
recipients of the Baccalaureate General.
The payoff to higher education is high, so access to university is highly prized. A Bac is
necessary for university admission and the line pursued and the mentions obtained on the
exam influence which university program one can enter. About 10 percent of those obtaining a
Bac General enter special programs which prepare them for the exam that regulates admission
to the elite Grandes Ecoles. The job market also rewards young people who have passed the
Bac. There are alternative lower level examined qualifications for employment such as the
Brevet d'Enseignment Professionnel (BEP) and the Certificat d Aptitude Professionelle (CAP),
but the Baccalaureate confers greater access to preferred jobs. In 1987, unemployment rates
for 15 to 24 year olds were 37 percent for those without a diploma, 22 percent for those with
CAPS or BEPs, 18 percent for those with a Bac and 10 percent for university graduates
(Ministere de l’Education 1992b, p. 25).
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Dutch university graduates earn 65 percent more than secondary school graduates at
age 45 to 64 (OECD 1992, 1993), so access to higher education is highly prized in the
Netherlands as well. Examinations set by the Ministry of Education influence access to
postsecondary education, so the high achievement of Dutch students in mathematics and
science can be explained in the same way. The Ministry of Education sets an exam which has
both essay and multiple choice components. The multiple choice component which represents
half the written paper is graded centrally. The essay component is marked by the student's
own teacher and by a teacher from another school with the aid of a marking scheme supplied
by the Ministry. Oral components are administered by the student's teacher. In both France
and the Netherlands questions and answers are published in newspapers and available on
video text. The published exams signal the standards that students and teachers must aim for.
Nine-tenths of English youth now take the General Certificate of Secondary Education
(GCSE) exam at the end of 11th grade and an increasing number take A levels two years later.
Scotland also has a system of external examinations. For the United Kingdom as a whole, the
ratio of the number of school leavers passing at least one A level (or the Scottish equivalent) to
the number of 19 year-olds was 23 percent in 1991 (Government Statistical Service 1993, p.
8). Completing an A level qualification lowers unemployment rates for 25-34 year olds from
16.9 to 6.9 percent and graduating from university lowers it further to 4.3 percent. Grades on
the GCSE and A level exams are included on resumes and requested on job applications, so
employment opportunities depend on school results as well (Raffe 1984). University graduates
earn 66 percent more than secondary school graduates at age 45 to 64 (OECD 1992, p. 111).
Performance on GCSE and A level examinations and the equivalent Scottish exams determine
whether one can continue one's schooling and which university and program one can enter.
There is a timing problem, however, because A exams grades become available months after
most students have applied to university. The solution that has been developed is quite
ingenious. Universities base admissions offers on GCSE results and eacher predictions of
how the student will do on her A levels. If the student does not achieve the A level grades that
are predicted, the student may find that their admission to the specific university program is
canceled. Even though teacher predictions of A level grades are decidedly optimistic, few
school leavers suffer this fate. Nevertheless, the possibility is enough to keep British students
studying hard up through the A exam.
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In the United States, by contrast, admission to the best colleges depends on teacher
assessments of relative performance—rank in class and grades—and aptitude tests that are
not keyed to the courses taken in secondary school.
External assessments of achievement that directly affect access to preferred
educational and job outcomes have clearly increased rewards for studying in these four
European countries. They also change the s ructure of rewards for learning and, therefore, the
incentive environment of students, teachers and administrators. These issues will be discussed
under seven headings:
1.  Peer group norms
2.  Teacher incentives
3.  Administrator incentives
4.  Competition among upper secondary schools
5.  High standards in the external exams
6.  Redoublement, grade repeating, as Mastery Learning and an Incentive to Study
7.  Choice of Specialization as Goal Setting
Peer Group Norms
Peer pressure was discussed in my interviews of school staff and students in England,
the Netherlands and France. The French educators I interviewed reported that peer pressure
not to study occurred sometimes, but only in some lower secondary school classes, not at the
lycee serving upper-middle class students that I visited. In lower secondary schools the
pressure appeared mild by American standards. In upper secondary schools particularly in the
math-science line, the peer pressure was to excel. Discussions with Dutch and English
students and educators produced similar observations.
Teacher Incentives
Most American secondary school teachers do not feel individually accountable for the
learning of their students. The lack of accountability for learning stems from: (1) the rarity of
examinations assessing student achievement in particular subjects relative to an external
standard, and (2) the fact that most secondary school students receive instruction in a given
subject from many teachers. Only coaches, band conductors and teachers of advanced
placement classes are exceptions to this norm. They teach in environments where student
achievement is visible to parents and colleagues and as a result feel accountable for
outcomes.
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In France and the Netherlands, by contrast, upper secondary students are in small
classes that take most subjects together and generally remain intact for two or more years.
Fewer than three teachers share responsibility for preparing each class for the external exams
in the subject. In the Netherlands where schools are small, many subjects are taught by only
one teacher. Since important rewards accrue to those who pass or do well on these exams,
everyone takes them very seriously. The number of students taking and passing each exam is
public knowledge within the school and among parents. Exam results influence teachers'
reputations. Responding to such informal pressures, upper secondary school teachers strive to
prepare their students for the external exam.
Administrator Incentives
In many European countries the record of each school in the external examinations
(the numbers passing or getting high grades) is published in local and national newspapers.
Recent reforms in England and Scotland, for example, have resulted in schools publishing
annual reports that contain the grades received by last year's students in each examined
subject. These reports are now sent to parents of current and prospective students. The
school league tables have important effects on school reputations. Administrators seeking to
strengthen their school's reputation are thus induced to give teaching effectiveness (as
assessed by the external exam) first priority.
Competition among Upper Secondary Schools
For generations French and Dutch upper secondary schools have faced a competitive
environment that is similar in many ways to the one faced by American colleges and
universities. Funding has been on a per student basis, so schools experiencing an increase in
applications have had an incentive to expand up to the capacity of their physical plant. Schools
with strong reputations get more applications than they can accept and are, in effect, rewarded
by being allowed to admit the "best" from their pool of applicants.
In the U.S. access to quality teaching and supportive peers depends on the parent's
ability to buy or rent a home in a suburb with excellent schools. In France and the Netherlands
access to the top upper secondary schools depends primarily on achievement in lower
secondary school. This means that parents who want their child to attend the best upper
secondary schools must make sure their child studies hard in lower secondary school.
The Netherlands has three types of general secondary school—the VWO, the HAVO
and the MAVO—and a system of lower vocational schools, LBO/LEAOs and KVBOs, which
prepare students for both occupation specific and general education exams. The first year
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curriculum is supposed to be the same in all schools so that students can transfer between
schools at its conclusion. In succeeding years, however, curricula and rigor diverge. Rigor and
work loads are greatest at the six year VWOs, somewhat less demanding at the five year
HAVOs and still less demanding in the four year MAVOs. These schools also differ in the
foreigit languages offered and the standard to which they are taught. The LBOs devote
considerable time to occupationally specific curricula, so less time is available for general
studies. Advise to parents about which type of school is appropriate for their child is based on
the pupil's record in primary school and in some cases standardized tests as well (Nijhof &
Streumer 1988). Parents have the right, however, to select the type of school and which
school of that type their child will enter. There are three parallel systems of education—a
locally administered public system, a Catholic system and a Protestant system—so parents
have a great deal of choice.
About a decade ago English and Scottish parents were given the right to send their
children to schools outside the normal attendance area. Two years after choice became
operational in Scotland, 9 percent of pupils entering secondary school nationally (11 to 14
percent in urban areas) attended a school outside their cachement area (Adler and Raab
1988). Scottish parents who made this choice appeared to be behaving rationally for they
tended to choose schools that had higher SES student bodies and were more effective than
the school in their own cachement area. An analysis of school choice in the Fife Education
Authority found that the schools chosen by those leaving their cachement area had better
examination results than would have been predicted given the pupil's primary school test
scores and family background and the average SES of pupils at the school (Willms and Echols
1993 Table 3). Consequently, the free choice of schools that prevails in our four European
nations generates a competitive pressure on schools to excel that doesn't have any
counterpart in the U.S. outside of cities with magnet schools.
Standards of the External Exam
External examinations at the end of secondary school are probably necessary if high
achievement levels are to he attained, but they are not sufficient. Effects will be small if the
exams are easy, are taken by only a small minority of students, or do not generate substantial
rewards for successful students. British youth have lower achievement levels than French and
Dutch youth. One possible explanation for this is that the passing standard of the GCSE is
lower than for the Bac and the Dutch exams, and the more difficult A levels are taken by only a
small minority.
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High passing standards on external exams are clearly associated with high
achievement levels. Does this reflect a cause and effect relationship? Yes, but causation runs
both ways. High passing standards on medium and high stakes exams are politically
sustainable only when most students taking the exam are able to meet or surpass the
standard. At present, the median pupil in Britain is not expected to learn the entire
multiplication table up to 10 X 10 until age 11. If the GCSE mathematics exams were made
more demanding without strengthening mathematics teaching, failure rates might rise to
politically unacceptable levels.
Does the passing standard also influence student effort? Yes it does. In High School
and Beyond data, those taking more rigorous courses learned a good deal more between
sophomore and senior year, even though their grade point average suffered as a result
(Gamoran and Barends 1987). Kulik and Kulik's meta analysis (1984) of the educational
literature found that students chosen to skip a grade or to a compressed and accelerated
curriculum score 75 percent of a standard deviation higher on tests (a few years later) than the
matched non-accelerated students. Repeating a grade effectively lowers learning goals and
reduces the retained child's achievement a few years later by about 30 percent of a standard
deviation (Holmes 1989).
Over a hundred experimental studies have been conducted of the effect of goal
difficulty on various kinds of achievement. The effects are quite large: on highly complex tasks
like school and college course work, specific hard goals raised achievement by 47 percent of a
standard deviation (Wood, Mento and Locke 1987). In the laboratory and field settings used by
psychologists conducting this research, the subjects have generally accepted the goal set for
them by the researcher. Achievement goes up, but the probability of failing to reach the goal
rises as well. In most studies more than two-thirds of those in the "hard goal" condition failed to
achieve their goal (Locke 1968 p. 163- 5). Most of the studies examine behavior over
relatively short periods of time. One would imagine, however, that if such experiments lasted a
couple of years, those who consistently failed to achieve their goal might lower their goals or
give up altogether.
Stedry (1960) found that when subjects who had already set their own goals were
assigned even higher goals by the study director, they rejected the assigned goal and
achievement did not rise. This appears to be what happens in American secondary schools.
Most students reject the goals teachers set because the rewards for success are small. Others
reject them because they appear unattainable.
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How do European education systems induce students in upper secondary
schools to set difficult learning goals and work toward them? They do not, as some have
proposed for the U.S., set a single high yea-nay standard that everyone is expected to meet.
Young people are too different from each other for such a policy to work. External exams need
to signal the level of a student's achievement, not just whether the exam was passed. Dutch
external exams are graded on a 1 to 10 scale. Excellence on the Baccalaureate xams results
in the award of a Mention Tres Bien, a Mention Bien or an Mention Assez Bien. Once
information on performance levels becomes available, employers and institutions of higher
education will tend to base their selection decisions on it. Graduates with the strongest exam
results have options not available to those with weak results, and the outcome is a system of
graduated rewards. When the variance of achievement is high, incentives for effort are
stronger on average under a graduated rewards system than under a single large reward
attached to achieving a fixed standard (Kang 1985).
The English GCSE and Scottish "Lowers" Examinations are taken by 90 percent of 16
year olds. They generate substantial and graduated rewards for learning what appears on the
exams. Indeed the rewards for doing particularly well on these external exams appear larger
than those in the Netherlands.
In the U.K., access to 6th form programs preparing for university, vocational technical
programs of various kinds and employment depend on the student's performance on the
GCSE and Scottish lowers. Since A level results are not available at the time initial university
admission decisions are made, GCSE results influence which university and which field of
study a student is admitted to. In the Netherlands the passing standard is high, but exceeding
it by a large margin generates few rewards because the external exam results are only part of
the student's overall grade and access to the most popular university fields of study is largely
on a first-come first-serve basis. In addition, there is much less variation in the quality and
reputation of Dutch universities than of British universities.
Why then are English and Scottish 13 year olds assigned less homework than
their American and Dutch counterparts? Why is their achievement in mathematics and
science at age 13 significantly lower than in the Netherlands? As the time for the exam
approaches in Britain, teacher demands and student effort increase substantially. At age 13,
however, standards are low. Why do the backwash effects of the secondary school
graduation exams extend further back in the pupil's schooling in the Netherlands and
France than in Britain?
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Redoublement as Mastery Learning and an Incentive to Study
One explanation for low British standards for 10-13 year olds is the lack of immediate
rewards for doing well in classes. The external exams are three to six years away. Students
are promoted to the next grade no matter how well they do in the previous grade. Those who
fall behind inevitably slow the pace of the class in succeeding years. Primary school teachers
do not feel accountable for how well students do on exams taken after four years of
attendance at a secondary school. Secondary schools tend to be large and the teachers who
handle the first year students also lack a sense of accountability for performance on exams
that are more than three years in the future.
Social promotion of students is also the rule in the United States. A survey of teachers
by Peter Hart Research Associates (1994) found that 46 percent reported pressure to "pass
students on to the next grade who are not ready."
The situation is very different in France and the Netherlands. Pupils who fail more than
one of their courses are generally required to redoubler or "to repeat the grade." In 1990 Dutch
redoublement rates were 7.5 percent per year in academic lower secondary schools, 5.1
percent per year in LBOs, the vocational lower secondary schools, and 13.3 percent per year
in academic upper secondary schools (Central Bureau Voor De Statistiek, 1993 pp. 19, 20 &
29). French rates of redoublement ranged from 6.8 and 11.0 percent per year during the four
years of general lower secondary education, ranged from 12.1 to 18.4 percent per year in the
three year academic upper secondary schools and averaged 8.4 percent per year in the first
two years of vocational upper secondary schools (Ministere de l'Education Nationale et de la
Culture 1992, p. 77, 93 & 99. According to H. D. Lewis, the "basic motivation is to help the
child himself, to ensure that the pupil is sufficiently well prepared so that he may fully benefit
from work at a more demanding level (1985 p. 5)" For French teachers, redoublement is a form
of Mastery Learning, a way of allowing some students extra time to achieve very demanding
learning goals. Consequently, at age 19, 31.6 percent of French and 41.5 percent of Dutch
youth are still in secondary school compared to 3.4 percent in Britain and 5 percent in the
United States.
Redoublement is not inflicted only on children from lower class backgrounds. Often
high aspirations can be achieved only by redoublement. In France selective upper secondary
schools serving upper middle class communities have grade repeating rates that are nearly as
high as schools serving lower income communities. For example, Lycee Charlemagne, an
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upper secondary school serving one of the richest neighborhoods in Paris, asked 14 percent of
its entering class to repeat the year in 1992.
For French and Dutch teenagers, the threat of having to redoubler is a strong incentive
to study. When I asked how the students who must redouble feel about it, I was told that they
feel "dishonored." Since redoublement is a public event, parents also feel stigmatized, so
they have an incentive to see that their child studies hard. In the Netherlands, students
struggling with the fast paced VWO or HAVO curricula are often given a choice: either repeat
the year or transfer to a less demanding school. At the VWO I visited in the Netherlands, one
third of the entering class transfers to a HAVO or a less demanding VWO before the beginning
of the third year. VWOs offer a fast paced six year university preparation program. Parents
who want their child to enter a VWO are generally accommodated even when primary school
teachers advise against it. The child's performance in school determines whether the parents'
aspirations are realized or whether a transfer to a less demanding type of school is necessary.
Being forced to transfer to a HAVO or a MAVO does not foreclose university attendance. With
good grades at the end of the five year HAVO program the student can transfer to a VWO,
complete the final two years and then enter a university. In addition, numerous vocationally
oriented higher education options are open to HAVO and MAVO graduates and transfers to
university are feasible with good grades.
While other routes to university are possible, pupils who choose the fast track in 7th
grade, a VWO, do not want to be forced "to get off the train." Students in the Netherlands and
France are formed into classes which take most subjects together and which remain intact for
two years and sometimes longer. Friendships tend to develop within this class. When I asked a
Dutch student who, despite long hours of study, had been required to repeat a grade, why she
had studied so hard, she responded "I wanted to stay with my class!" Students do not want
to have to repeat the grade because it threatens to sever the friendships they have made in
the class. Apparently, trying to keep up academically (i.e. accepting the academic goals of the
school) is viewed positively by peers because it is an expression of commitment to the group.
Those who refuse to study are apparently seen as rejecting the group. In these two countries
peer pressure seems to encourage lagging students to study, not discourage them as in the
U.S.
One would not expect the study effort of primary school pupils to be influenced by the
prospect of being retained. The hypothesis of significant threat induced incentive effects
applies to students in small secondary schools or large schools organized into small classes
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which take most subjects together and remain intact from year to year. Since most American
students are in large high schools where peer relationships are not tied to taking particular
courses, failing two courses does not sever peer relationships the way it does in Europe.
Consequently, the threat of failing a course is not the powerful motivator that it appears to be
in France and the Netherlands.
This would change only if something that really matters to youth—such as staying with
age mates when they transfer to upper secondary school—were tied to passing a series of
relatively rigorous courses or exams. This would produce a modified version of the "study hard
or else you will be separated from your classmates" incentive that prevails in France and the
Netherlands. The argument against retention is that it effectively lowers the learning goals
being set for the student in subsequent years. Cross-section studies of primary school children
indicate that retention reduces subsequent learning (Holmes 1989). It also, apparently,
increases future dropout risks (Grissom and Shepard 1989).
Choice of Specialization as Goal Setting
All education systems give upper secondary students (and their parents) the right to
select a specialty and the right to choose the rigor and difficulty level of either the school, the
academic program or specific courses.
In France four academic lines—literature and languages (A), economics and social
science (B), mathematics and physical sciences (C), and biology (D)—have roughly equal
numbers of students and together account for most of the Baccalaureate Generales awarded
the Mathematics-Physics-Chemistry line (C) is the most difficult, carries the greatest prestige
and gives one the best chance of being admitted to a preparatory school for one of the elite
Grandes Ecoles. Admission to the C line within a lycee is generally highly competitive. The
Netherlands has a similar though less elaborated system of specialization within general upper
secondary education. As in France the math-science line has the reputation of being the most
difficult.
In France and the Netherlands, picking one's school and specialization effectively sets
a specific learning goal. The prevalence of grade repeating and transfers to easier schools
suggests that most students and parents initially set very difficult goals. The goal setting
literature tells us that working toward a specific and difficultgoal leads to greater effort and
performance than being told to "do your best" or setting easy goals. Thus the French and
Dutch pattern of setting highly ambitious goals, maximizes average achievement levels even
while it increases the number of students who fail to achieve the goal they initially set. Why do
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French and Dutch parents select secondary schools and programs that are so
challenging that many must repeat grades to keep up or transfer into easier programs
and schools? There are three reasons. First, the goal selected is visible to parents, relatives
and neighbors and going for difficult goals confers prestige. Second, achieving difficult
learning goals is rewarded by admission to preferred universities and fields of study and
access to better jobs. Finally, the choice is generally made by the parent, not the child. Parents
are better informed about the long term benefits of achieving difficult goals and their own
prestige rises when their child attends a selective school or pursues a difficult line of study.
Parents may view the extra studying necessary in a rigorous specialty as a plus not a minus.
In America, by contrast, selecting difficult goals generates much weaker rewards.
Everyone in the neighborhood attends the same school. Students select individual courses,
not programs or schools. Subjects are taught at vastly different levels, but the rigor of these
courses is not well signaled to parents, relatives, neighbors, employers and colleges. In the
past most colleges failed to factor the rigor of the courses taken into their admissions
decisions. This is changing, however, and selective colleges now give preference to students
who take Advanced Placement courses. Seniors applying to selective colleges are aware of
this and often sign up for AP classes. However, grades on AP courses taken senior year
become available long after admissions decisions are announced, so many seniors do not put
the required energy into the course and skip the AP exam.
VIII. SUMMARY AND LESSONS
This monograph develops and tests a theory of student effort and school priority
setting. The key assumptions of the theory are that:
* Learning requires the time and active engagement of the learner.
* Students have many other uses for their time, so learning is costly for them.
* The intensity of their investment in learning depends on a comparison of benefits—
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards for learning—to costs. When the benefits of learning
increase, student effort increases and learning increases.
* Parents, school administrators and teachers are also influenced by comparisons of
the benefits of learning to the costs of focusing school resources and policies on
academic achievement. When rewards for academic achievement grow for students
and parents, pressures are generated that induce teachers, administrators and
school boards to refocus their energies on raising academic achievement.
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The first major prediction of the theory is that an increase in the extrinsic rewards for
learning will cause student effort and achievement to increase. The primary extrinsic reward for
achievement in high school is a higher probability of completing college. Thus the extrinsic
rewards for learning in high school depend on the size of the payoff to college and on how
contingent college admissions decisions are on achievement in high school. Time series data
suggests that changes in college selectivity and payoff may have contributed to the ups and
downs of student achievement during the postwar period. The college payoff and test scores
rose during the 1950s and peaked during the 1960s. Both series then declined during the
1970s, bottomed out around 1980, and then rose during the 1980s. The doubling of the payoff
to college during the 1980s appears to have contributed to more homework being assigned
and done and a big increase in the proportion of students taking rigorous mathematics and
science courses. Analysis of cross section data also supports a causal link. High school
students living in communities where the payoff to college is large tend to take a heavier
academic course load and are more likely to go to college.
The theory's second major prediction is that systems of regional or national
curriculum-based external examinations that signal levels of achievement in specific subjects
to colleges and employers will increase extrinsic rewards for learning and this, in turn,
stimulates changes in priorities and behavior that result in higher achievement. The rest of the
monograph is devoted to testing this prediction.
The analysis indicates that externally set curriculum-based examinations at the end of
secondary school have pervasive backwash effects on students, parents, teachers and school
administrators. Nations with curriculum-based external examinations set higher minimum
standards for entry into secondary teaching, pay their secondary school teachers more and
focus school resources primarily on teaching. Mathematics and geography achievement is also
higher in these nations. After Sweden eliminated upper secondary school exit exams during
the 1970s, the proportion of students taking rigorous college prep mathematics and science
courses declined substantially.
New York, the only the state in the U.S. with a system of curriculum based external
exams, ranks number 3 in teacher pay and the proportion of teachers with at least a masters
degree and ranks number 2 in the share of the education dollar that is spent on instruction.
The ratio of K-12 spending per pupil to public higher education spending per student is higher
than in any other state. When adjustments are made for the ethnicity and parent's education of
SAT test takers, New York State ranks higher on the SAT than any of the other 37 states
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where the SAT is taken by large numbers of students. New York State students scored 23
percent of a standard deviation higher than students of the same race and social background
in other states.
Holding the social class background of students constant, students from Canadian
provinces with examination systems were substantially (23 percent of a standard deviation)
better prepared in mathematics and 18 percent of a standard deviation better prepared in
science than students from provinces lacking such exams. The effect of an exam system on
mathematics achievement of 13 year olds is larger in a standard deviation metric than the
decline in math SAT scores between 1969 and 1980 that has been such a focus of public
concern.
The analysis also found that examination systems had pervasive effects on school
administrators, teachers and parents. In the provinces with external exams, schools were more
likely to:
-- employ specialist teachers of mathematics and science
-- employ teachers who had studied the subject in college,
-- have high quality science laboratories
-- schedule extra hours of math and science instruction
-- assign more homework in math, in science and in other subjects
-- have students do or watch experiments in science class and
-- schedule frequent tests in math and science class.
At home students watched less TV and were more likely to report their parents wanted them to
do well in math and science. In addition, parents were more likely to talk to their child about
what they were learning at school.
There is no evidence that external exams caused any of the undesirable effects that
opponents of external exams have predicted. Canadian students in provinces with exit exams
did not watch fewer science programs on TV and reading for fun went up, not down as
predicted. Contrary to the predictions of exit exam opponents, mathematics teachers
decreased their emphasis on low level skills like computation and science teachers arranged
for students to do more, not fewer, experiments.
Only two of the testable hypotheses set forth in chapter 3 were rejected. Jurisdictions
with exit exams did not have smaller class sizes. Secondly, Canadian employers in Quebec
were not using grades on high school exit exams in their hiring process.
The final chapter of the monograph applies the theory to the task of interpreting
differences between systems of secondary education in Britain, France, the Netherlands and
the United States. In the Netherlands and France, learning in secondary school is assessed by
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difficult subject-specific external examinations and doing well on these exams generates very
large rewards for the student. The reputations of teachers and schools are also affected by
student achievement on these exams. Parents base their selection of the upper secondary
school their child will attend and which academic or vocational program he/she will pursue, in
part, on these reputations. Parents tend to set difficult goals for their children, so most
students are placed in programs of study that for them are very demanding. Students are
formed into classes which take all their subjects together, remain intact for two years or more
and become the student's circle of friends. Students who are not progressing at the rate
necessary to succeed on the external exam are asked either to switch to an easier curriculum
or to repeat the year. Students do not want to be forced to sever the friendships they have
developed in the class, so they are strongly motivated to keep up with their studies.
In the United States, students are ranked relative to their classmates, not assessed
against an external criterion, so they pressure each other not to study. Teachers are expected
to pass almost all students, and if the class fails to study hard, the teacher is forced to lower
the passing standard of the course. Subjects are taught at vastly different levels, but the rigor
of the courses and the learning achievements that result are not well signaled to parents,
neighbors, colleges and employers, so rewards for setting difficult goals are small.
The French and Dutch models of secondary education combine in one system
many of the most drastic reforms that have been proposed for the United States:
1. Externally set subject-specific achievement exams taken by almost all secondary
school graduates which supplement not displace teacher assessment of
students.
2. Parental/student choice of upper secondary school with money following
     students.
3. Mastery learning with teeth (those who fail two subjects in secondary school are
required to either repeat the grade or transfer to a less demanding school or
program).
4. Secondary teaching is available only to those who demonstrate very high levels of
competence in their subject. High entry standards are sustained by offering high
wages and good working conditions.
5. High standards for admission to the next stage of education.
This system of incentives and school organization appears to work for France and the
Netherlands. A similar system, lacking only the externally set exit exams, also works well in
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undergraduate education in the United States. At the secondary level, however, such reforms
are controversial. Successful implementation of any one of these reforms would be a major
political undertaking? Implementation of the whole package of reforms is politically infeasible at
present. Yet the analysis suggested that when, in Britain, just two elements of the package—
mastery learning with teeth and attractive teacher salaries—are missing and a third element,
school choice, is only recently introduced, achievement levels were substantially lower than in
the Netherlands and France. Consequently, from a practical policy point of view the message
is not very positive: School climates and educational standards do not change rapidly and
easily. France and the Netherlands have not discovered a cheap and painless route to high
achievement.
The important lesson is that incentives—both their strength and structure—matter.
There are less controversial ways of increasing the rewards for academic achievement.
Reforms tailored to the American context have a greater chance of success than an effort to
replicate the French or Dutch systems of secondary education.
Suggestions for Research
The effects of external examination systems must be assessed by comparing
education systems, not by comparing individuals, classrooms or schools. Changes in
examination systems take decades to have their full effect. This limits the number of
independent observations and reduces the power of formal statistical tests. The low power of
individual tests can be overcome by developing multiple tests of hypotheses.
This monograph presented numerous tests of its central hypothesis, but it has not
exhausted the possibilities. Other international data sets such as the IEA examinations need to
be analyzed. When the Third International Mathematics Study is completed the number of
countries for which changes in achievement over time can be analyzed will substantially
increase. The theory predicts that countries which have experienced large increases in the
payoff to college or the selectivity of college admissions such as the United States and Britain
will improve their position relative to other countries. It also predicts that countries that ended
or weakened their curriculum based external examinations about two decades ago—Sweden,
Spain and Portugal, etc.—will find themselves falling behind. Comparative data on time on
task, homework, student engagement and peer pressure against learning need to be collected
and analyzed.
New York State should be compared to the other 49 states in additional data sets such
as the NAEP state assessment, NLS-88 and High School and Beyond. Possible positive
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impacts of the ACT test and minimum competency tests on achievement also needs
evaluation. The School Achievement Indicators Program in Canada is generating data on
student achievement in Canada that will allow researchers to track over time the effects of
reestablishing provincial examinations in Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan.
The impacts of variations in the structure of external examination systems should be
examined. The theory predicts that centrally administered Abitur examinations such as those
given in Bavaria should create stronger incentives for study and lead to higher achievement
than examinations where the student's teacher suggests the essay questions to be asked and
grades the exam. Examination practices vary a great deal across Swiss cantons and this
creates further opportunities for studying their impact. Exceptional nations such as Belgium
that have high achievement levels despite an absence of curriculum based external
examinations need to be studied intensively.
More complex and sophisticated theoretical modelling will also be useful. The economic
theories of greatest relevance to this complex system are agency theory, game theory,
signalling theory and consumer demand theory, not production theory. This paper only
scratches the surface. Deeper plowing of these furrows will, I predict, yield a large crop of new
insights.
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